760f.62/1780: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:55 a.m.]
374. The general tenor of Soviet opinion on foreign affairs since the Munich Agreement98 as revealed in recent published expressions may be summarized as openly condemnatory of that agreement on the basis that it represents a betrayal of Czechoslovakia by Great Britain and France; that it constitutes a blow to the policy of collective security and the safety of the smaller countries; that it has encouraged further aggression on the part of the Fascist countries; and that it has created a situation which threatens world peace in general. The Governments of England and France have been the object of special denunciation and their policies have been adversely contrasted in the Soviet press with the fidelity of the Soviet Government to its international obligations in the interest of peace.
Although speculation from the Soviet standpoint as to events and tendencies in foreign countries has been indulged in, there have been no clear indications as yet of any change in Soviet policy in regard to those countries or of any positive orientation of that policy as a consequence of the recent events in Central Europe. The chief preoccupation of Soviet foreign policy continues to be its relations with Nazi Germany and Japan and events abroad are envisaged primarily from the standpoint of their possible effect on those relations. Furthermore, the recent developments in connection with the Czechoslovak crisis have confronted the Soviet Union with the threat of isolation and, although a favored theme of published utterances here is the ability of the country to stand alone on the strength of its own resources and the adequacy of its own defenses, the weight of evidence at present points to a disinclination on the part of the Soviet Government to maintain a position of isolation as regards other countries [Page 592] and to a readiness to join in any moment [movement?] of international concern which would enhance the prestige of the Soviet Government without incurring too great a risk. The impression prevails however that for the moment at least the Kremlin is inclined to await the course of further developments abroad to assist it in determining: its policy in relation to other countries, either singly or collectively, and to refrain from any definite commitment in policy until those developments are more clearly defined. In the meantime it is believed the Soviet Government is continuing its program of armaments especially as regards the air force and the navy even in spite of the danger to the internal structure inherent in an increased burden and sacrifice which the concentration on heavy industries imposes upon the population. It is also believed that an added impetus may be given to the activities abroad of the Comintern and certain indications; have become apparent of an attempt in this way to accentuate the class struggle and the differences between Government factions in certain countries.
Closely allied with any consideration of Soviet foreign policy at present is the personal position of Litvinov. With the weakening of League influence and the blow dealt by the Munich Agreement to the policy of collective security and to the system of mutual assistance pacts to which the Soviet Union was party, his well grounded position as a sponsor of those policies has been regarded in certain circles as definitely compromised and rumors circulate to the effect that he will follow the fate of many others who have been made to serve as scapegoats for a failure in Soviet policy. It is true that the continuation in office of high Soviet officials is a permissible subject for speculation but in this instance it should be pointed out that even if Litvinov’s prestige has suffered, his resignation now need not necessarily follow. In the first place there appears to be no other person available who combines the qualities required to replace him and furthermore his usefulness as Commissar for Foreign Affairs may well continue in view of the fact that in any event he can do no more than devote his efforts to carrying out whatever policies may be dictated to him from time to time by the Kremlin.
- For text of the agreement signed at Munich on September 29, 1938, see Documents on British Foreign Policy, 3rd Series, vol. ii, document No. 1224, p. 627, and Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, vol. ii, document No. 675, p. 1014.↩