Foreign Relations of the United States, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939

861.00/11778

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 1104

Moscow, April 1, 1938.
[Received April 20.]

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a brief résumé of the situation here.

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Japan

In the Far East, from what Commissar Litvinov tells me, this Government believes that Japan is having a hard time of it in China and that the Chinese are now putting up substantial resistance. This Government does not conceal its deep sympathy for China, but it is meticulously careful to maintain peace with Japan, at least for the present.

China

The Chinese Chargé d’Affaires,⁴¹ a new man recently from the Chinese Foreign Office and a Cornell graduate, tells me that the policy of his Government very definitely is not to give up everything and place its future in Soviet control in consideration of help from the Soviet Union. He states their position and attitude to be that China is essentially individualistic and non-communistic in character; that China has received aid and support from other nations as well as the Soviet Union; that after all it has maintained the burden of the war for almost a year now; that it recognizes that it must pay for Soviet help but that it is not proposed by them to pay at the expense of their independence or their form of government. Sun Fo, the Chinese Special Envoy, has left, leaving this Chargé here in charge. I gathered that conditions had not been too agreeable as between the Soviet officials and this Chinese Mission, but that conditions are improving.

Border—Near Eastern and Asiatic Countries

There are serious border and other disputes as between Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey, respectively, with the Soviet Union. Relations are not good. There are indications of asperities.

Border—European and Baltic States

Since the Soviet diplomat in Rumania escaped to Rome and the fascist regime, Rumanian relations here have been somewhat difficult. Relations with Poland are definitely worse than at any time since I have been here, but both Governments seem intent upon maintaining relations in spite of these conditions. Finland, Estonia, and Latvia have given some indications of being impressed by the success of German aggression. Up to the Lithuanian incident⁴² they were sympathetically definitely falling away still further from this regime. I state this only, however, from impressions obtained from discussions with the diplomatic representatives of these countries here. Since the Lithuanian incident there seems to be a change of attitude and a recognition of the desirability of the friendship of Russia as a bulwark and support to their independence as against possible German or Polish aggression.

European and World Conditions Generally

As I have cabled you, Litvinov’s position and the attitude of this country definitely is that a fascist peace is being imposed on Europe; that ultimately Europe will be completely fascist with the exception of England and the Soviet Union; that finally Italy will desert Germany, as she did during the Great War; that Soviet Russia must count on no outside aid and in fact must be and is completely self-contained and independent; that France cannot be depended upon; that there is no hope for the maintenance of law and order based on public morality between nations until the “reactionary elements” in England in power are overthrown; that they see no immediate prospect of this; that your great pronouncement before the National Press Club⁴³ was a great help, but that without practical implementation it would, unfortunately, not be effective against the “ruthless forces of fascism”.

Internal Conditions—Political

Security.

Internally, practically the consensus of the best judgment here in the Diplomatic Corps is that the Stalin regime, politically, is firmly entrenched in power; that the Army is within control of the Kremlin; that the agencies of the Secret Police, press, and all propaganda forces are vigilantly and aggressively building up and supporting the Stalin regime. It is also generally recognized here now that these alleged trials, which are not trials at all, established fairly conclusively that there had existed widespread and serious opposition among the leaders of the Party which was treasonable in character; that this opposition was not closely knit, and therefore was ineffective, but which nevertheless, had it been led by a man of force, might have projected a coup d’état last summer when the Army generals were shot.⁴⁴ The general opinion is that there is no danger of an overthrow of the Kremlin group for a long time to come. If there should be such an eventuality it is generally believed that the succeeding government would be a continuation of state socialism.

Industrial Progress.

While there are many evidences and admissions of waste and inefficiencies, and the weaknesses incident to bureaucratic administration of industry and agriculture are obvious, nevertheless, this great bear is lumbering along and with impressive results despite these handicaps. There is such an enormous wealth that these wastes in comparison therewith are relatively small. The wealth of the country is increasing. Last year’s crop was the largest in history. The prospect for betterment from a material point of view is improving. Enormous expenditures for war preparations, diverting 25% of total revenues, is holding up distribution of betterments to the masses; but still there are many indications of improvement—notably the appearance of rubbers, boots and shoes.

Public Works—Schools.

Public improvements—buildings, roads, bridges, canals, and the like are impressive not only in themselves, but in the speed of their projection. The face of certain sections of this city was completely changed during the last year. Stalin, historically, will be recognized probably as the great builder in Russia, following Peter the Great. One hundred and fifty-seven schools are alleged to have been built in Moscow alone during the last year.

The Purge.

There are some indications that the purge is subsiding. The general opinion was that after the elections last fall these activities would abate. The wheels of the Secret Police are, however, grinding constantly, and “exceeding small”. This purge situation is nothing new. It was characteristic of many other previous times, to wit, the NEP period,⁴⁵ the liquidation of traders, prosecutions for gold hoarding, the kulak⁴⁶ situation, and others. The present purge is addressed to the Communist Party itself. It has brought the whole country up on its toes. It has reached and is reaching down into the smallest political sub-division. Arrests are still going forward all over the country, but perhaps not with the violence of a few months ago.

The Treason Trial.

Opinion, both in the Diplomatic Corps and among the journalists who attended the trial, has by this time been generally precipitated into practically a resultant common conclusion; that while there was developed much that was untrue and many crimes [were] alleged that were not proven, nevertheless it was established beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a very strong group of men in the Government itself who during the past five or six years had permitted themselves, from a position of legal opposition, to either drift into or be placed in positions of unlawful and treasonable⁴⁷ activities; that this situation was caused by the constantly growing oppression of the Stalin regime applied to critical expressions and freedom of speech; that these groups were not a closely-knit organization but that they actually did conspire to act and to overthrow the Stalin Government; that they had been ineffective because of the lack of a single and bold leadership; that the developments of the “trial” clarified and explained the developments of last spring and summer in connection with the feverish activity of the Kremlin, the execution of Army generals, and so forth. It is quite clear that the “Kremlin” last spring believed that there was real necessity for protecting itself, both against a palace revolution and against the activities of foreign enemies within the U. S. S. R. Stalin and his associates were thoroughly alarmed and acted with great vigor and speed.

The Terror.

The Terror here is a horrifying fact. There are many evidences here in Moscow that there is a terrifying fear that reaches down into and haunts all sections of the community. No household, however humble, apparently but what lives in constant fear of a nocturnal raid by the Secret Police (usually between one and three in the early morning). Once the person is taken away, nothing of him or her is known for months—and many times—never thereafter. Evidences of these conditions come from many sources. They are: statements made to myself or members of the staff from first-hand witnesses; statements based on actual personal observations of members of the staff (as in one instance, the sight of a struggling unfortunate being arrested and torn from his eleven year old child on the street in front of the adjoining apartment house at 3:30 a.m.); or statements made by Russian citizens who for some reason or other come to the Embassy in search of aid. The popular psychology in this situation and the extent of this Terror is again indicated by the fact that, almost daily through the kitchen and servants’ quarters, there come reports of whispered and fearful confidences of new arrests, new hardships, new apprehensions and new fears among their friends. The activities of the Secret Police have extended and reached down to the arrest of Soviet employees of foreign missions, including our own.

It is commonly alleged that the Secret Police of this Proletarian Dictatorship are as ruthless and as cruel as any during the old Tsarist regimes. It seems to be an old Russian custom. This particular purge is undoubtedly political. From expressions that I have heard from some of the leaders of the Government it is deliberately projected by the Party leaders, who themselves regretted the necessity for it, but who nevertheless will not permit themselves to be sentimental or weak in the performance of what they regard as their duty. They believe that great revolutions cannot be projected by spraying perfume; that previous movements in the interests of the proletariat have been destroyed by weakness and false sentimentality. They recognize and regret that there must needs be many innocent who suffer in this situation, but they take the position that they must do this to save their cause, which is supreme and that the successful elevation of the condition of life of the proletariat will, in historical perspective, justify their present course. They wrap themselves about in the mantle of the angels to serve the devil. They are undoubtedly a strong, able group of ruthless idealists. But tyranny is tyranny, whatever be its government.

War and War Psychology.

One-fourth of the national revenues were appropriated last year to war purposes. This amounts to approximately twenty-five billion rubles. At the current bootleg gold value of the ruble, this approximates two to two and one-half billion dollars. Expenditures this year will probably be still greater. There are indications of an almost feverish preparation for war. Immense stocks of foods and supplies, including military equipment, tanks, submarine chasers, airplanes, trucks, and so forth, are reported by travelers as being sent to the Far East in an unending stream. There is a shortage of fabrics here in Moscow, which did not exist last year, and which is alleged to be due to war requirements.

Those industrial organizations which are directly connected with war requirements have been recently placed under direct Army control and supervision.

It is variously estimated that the Far Eastern Army consists of from 250,000 to 500,000 men. It is alleged to be completely self-contained with an adequate two-year supply of food and military requirements. Annually 1,200,000 youths are called to the colors for training. There are constant rumors of roads and fortifications being secretly and hurriedly built all along the western frontier. The current strength of the Army is reputed to be 1,200,000 men.

The prevailing opinion of the military attachés here is that in man power the Army is first class; that in technical equipment and mechanization it is very good; that in the air it is excellent in both personnel and equipment; that in officer equipment it is good, but lacking possibly in experienced leadership at the top. The German Military Attaché⁴⁸ has stated that the Army was first class except that its officers were the weakest part, for the primary reason that “they were by tradition and training not of the officer class”. It is generally considered that the Army is loyal to Stalin, but that the morale and confidence may have been shaken by the purge. The weakest point is unanimously accepted to be as to whether the second line of defense—industrial conditions—could withstand a long war.

Tendency Toward Soviet Isolation From World Affairs

The Closing of Foreign Consulates.

A most significant development and one fraught with portentous significance for the future has occurred within the last year. It is the rapid development of a policy of ruthless hostility directed against all foreigners in the country—individuals or governments.

The present movement undoubtedly began with Stalin’s speech of a year ago, in which he pointed out the hostility of all capitalist states and that the U.S.S.R. was surrounded by enemies. It has been stimulated undoubtedly by the disclosures of alleged espionage and spying activity of foreign nations and foreign diplomatic missions in the Soviet Union.

Foreigners all last summer were being expelled from the Soviet Union. Representations even by the French Ambassador in connection with French nationals were unavailing. The Secret Police were implementing this policy and were thoroughly hard-boiled in their attitude and conduct. They have reached into practically every foreign institution, foreign newspaper bureaus, foreign business offices, and even Embassies and Legations to apprehend and arrest Soviet employees on charges of one kind or another.

The consulates of fourteen different nations were closed. The dogmatic and overbearing manner in which these things have been done indicate an almost serene unconcern as to the sensibilities of foreign nations, even—in some instances—to the extent of an apparent indifference as to whether or no it would result in the termination of diplomatic relations. Literally, thousands of foreign nationals, I am told, have been shipped out of the country and returned to Greece, Turkey, Persia, and so forth. Along the entire Afghan border of 2,000 kilometers a strip fifty kilometers in width has been provided as a quarantine zone to afford protection against any infiltration.

The purposes of the fascist governments of isolating the U.S.S.R. among the nations of the world and placing them in quarantine, so to speak, seems to have worked not only successfully from without this country but also seems to have been most effective here. The Soviet Union in retaliation, or for reasons of its own, appears to be perfectly willing to out-Herod Herod in this respect. And they have a faculty for hitting first and hard if they think they are in danger.

Soviet Self-Confidence.

Despite the purge, the terror, war propaganda, and the threats of hostile neighbors, there is no doubt but what this Government has supreme confidence in its ability to take care of itself. Kalinin, the President; Molotov, the Premier; and Litvinov, the Foreign Minister, have each of them expressed to me (and I think sincerely) that attitude. Only recently Commissar Litvinov expressed regret that the democracies of the world were not willing to go along for collective security and international peace, but was very explicit in saying that in the last analysis the Soviet Union was quite content, if the democracies pursued “their course of present folly and indifference to international peace and justice”, to rely only upon itself; and that they had every confidence that the Government could maintain itself indefinitely without fear or favor, and quite without fear of the result in the case of outside aggression.

Diplomatic Opinion as to the Permanency of the Regime and Possibility of a Coup d’État.

No foreign diplomat with whom I have talked believes that the Stalin regime is weak politically or in any immediate danger. Expressions are quite generally to the contrary. Stalin’s natural death in their opinion would not change the regime, particularly if time were afforded the organization to place his successor in power before the news was generally known. If Stalin’s death were by assassination and/or accompanied by a palace coup d’état directed and executed by a strong group of the Army, the present regime would probably be overthrown. In such an event, however, it is the prevailing opinion that still a socialist state would persist. It is generally thought that Stalin has the situation well and strongly in hand, with the various elements of strength balanced off each as against the other and each responsible to him. With the enormous power of the Army, the Secret Police, the press, and all propaganda agencies in good working order there is little possibility of an overt act, barring accident. In the long run, however, this regime, in my opinion, cannot survive. He that lives by the sword shall perish by the sword. With tyranny and oppression, denial of human liberty, and destruction of the sanctity of human life a government will inevitably destroy itself. If not by a coup d’état such a government will be ultimately overthrown by a revolution that will spring from the very sources of power which this Government itself is creating, to wit, a mass of educated intelligence in the youth of the country. Ultimately the anomaly will present itself here in a condition where there will be the usual revolt of youth against the established order and that movement will take out its radicalism in fighting for the restoration of the conservative concept of individualism and for the restoration of the liberty and freedom which a democratic state will assure.

Soviet Attitude Toward the United States

Despite some irritations, that must needs arise, in my opinion it can nevertheless be safely asserted that the Mission of the Government of the United States here has received more consideration and favor from this Government during the past year than has any other foreign state. I have it on the word of Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, himself, that the “Soviet Union would do more for the United States than any other nation”. This is probably due to the fact that the officials here, who are a very able and strong group of men, and also the people generally regard the United States with friendly favor. They feel that we are disinterested, friendly, have no direct designs on anything that they have, and have no selfish axes of our own to grind with their immediate enemies at their possible expense. The leaders, too, have great admiration for President Roosevelt and what they consider “his very wonderful achievements”. They also have very high admiration for the efforts of the Secretary of State to project international peace through economic appeasement.

This attitude of friendliness does not deter them in matters affecting their vital interests, as indicated by the debt and Comintern situations. They are thoroughly realistic. It is, however, indicative, I believe, of a real “most friendly” attitude and a disposition which is in direct contrast to the prevailing hostility toward foreigners here generally. There are hundreds of foreign nationals—Germans, Poles, and Italians—who were imprisoned, and to whom the diplomatic staffs of their respective nationalities have been refused access or conference until after trial of the prisoners. In the only two instances that have arisen in connection with our nationals⁴⁹ and where the question has been raised there has been a direct⁵⁰ compliance with our request in direct contrast to precedent; and with surprising speed in contrast to the treatment accorded other Missions. In both of these cases, representatives of this Embassy were permitted to see and confer with the accused before trial.

Conclusion

Many fine things are being done under the present regime. Many noble enterprises have been projected which arouse sympathy and inspire intense admiration. The pity of it all is, that one sees these wonderful things corroded, disgraced, corrupted and defiled by a ruthless, mistaken zeal for the betterment of humanity, which is nothing other than a terrible tyranny. For such this Government is. It is, moreover, oriental in its cruelty and in its complete disregard for individual life. “One life, one kopek” seems to be a fact. No degree of altruism, humanitarian effort or high and noble purpose, and no amount of material improvement in providing for things which elevate the standard of living of the proletariat can ever compensate for the denial of freedom, of liberty, and the rights of the individual even as against the king. The price is too high.

Whether this regime continues in power or falls, in my opinion, this Russian situation will continue to grow in international importance—both politically and economically. Enormous and even astounding strides have been made in industrial and scientific development and achievement within the past eight years. And the tiger has tasted blood. Nothing (not even revolution or change of government) can stop the continued exploitation and development of this country’s enormous resources and wealth. The ambitions of the country youth have been fired. Educational facilities have been afforded. Education, scientific and otherwise, is being extensively projected and made universal. Caste or class barriers to individual advancement have been broken down. The inevitable strength of this relatively young nation and a people, fresh from the soil, will inevitably project and continue this development. This country’s present position, economically and industrially, appears to me to be now at a point of development where the United States was about sixty years ago.

The next generation, in my opinion, will see these people here exercising a tremendous influence not only upon European but upon world conditions.

Despite many affronts, and despite what would appear to be obvious insults addressed to certain diplomatic missions of certain governments of Europe, these governments nevertheless persist in maintaining their diplomatic representatives and contacts in Moscow. It is, in my opinion, a wise and prudent policy. Great forces exist here and still greater forces are here in the making. They will inevitably have far-reaching reactions.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph E. Davies

[For an indication by the Soviet Ambassador that “the time may soon come” to reopen negotiations for the settlement of the debt, claims and credits question, see the memorandum by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs dated April 16, 1938, page 645.]

41. Yu Ming.
42. Poland demanded on March 17, 1938, that Lithuania reestablish normal diplomatic relations, and 2 days later Lithuania acceded.
43. See footnote 39, p. 541.
44. Regarding the trial in Moscow, June 11–12, 1937, of the Red Army generals and the execution of eight, see Embassy’s telegrams, No. 105, June 8, 1937: No. 113, June 11, 1937; and No. 117, June 13, 1937, pp. 376, 378, and 383, respectively.
45. The period of the New Economic Policy, 1921–28, a controlled retreat from pure Communism.
46. One of the class of well-to-do peasants.
47. Marginal note in the handwriting of Orsen N. Nielsen, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs: “i. e., as treason is defined in the Soviet Union.”
48. Lt. Gen. Ernst Köstring.
49. For illustrations of the arrest and detention of American citizens by the Soviet authorities, see pp. 491 ff.
50. This word has been twice underscored and a question mark placed above it in the Department of State.