861.00 Supreme Soviet/1
The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 10, 1938.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum51 on the recent electoral campaign and elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to discuss in the present despatch some of the most important features thereof.
Although the Soviet elections were a farce from the American or Western European conception of what elections are, several important factors should be pointed out which might give one to believe that certain initial steps have been taken along the path toward a more democratic form of government. The pre-election campaign, proclaimed by the Soviet press as a politico-educational campaign, was in fact nothing more than a pure propaganda drive for the purpose of popularizing Stalin and his adherents and consolidating their power and for persuading, at times by intimidation, the electorate to go to the polls and register their approval of the Stalinist regime. However, it should be emphasized that the seeds of a primitive democracy were planted in the minds of the electorate when the masses were [Page 402] given to believe that they were playing a direct part, exceedingly limited it is true, in the administration of the state which was to represent them. That this seed may germinate in the foreseeable future is problematical, especially when the personal dictatorship of Stalin over the Soviet State is taken into consideration. But it is important to note the implanting of this first vestige of primitive democracy.
An examination of statements made before and during the discussions on the draft constitution in 1935 and 1936 might lead one to believe that the Kremlin originally had planned to conduct elections in which more semblance of free expression of the wishes of the population would be present than were actually so in the recent elections. For instance, there can be little doubt that it was originally intended to have more than one candidate for each constituency, as was the case on December 12. It is possible that in future elections, as the government gains more confidence in its ability to manipulate the elections, there may be more than one candidate for each constituency. The Embassy does not believe, however, that the present rulers of the Soviet Union contemplate in the near future granting to the population the opportunity of freely expressing its views, likes or dislikes of either Stalin or his cohorts. It is obvious that in the present elections the “Stalinist” Party interpreted certain of the electoral regulations in such a way as to keep the elections well within its control. Possibly the Kremlin feared that if the population was permitted to express disapproval of any of Stalin’s adherents, it might acquire a dangerous sense of political power and therefore decided on the open system of nomination and on the single candidate.
Notwithstanding the plebiscitarian aspect of the elections in which the voter could cast his ballot only for the candidate chosen in advance by the Kremlin or court disaster by boycotting the elections or deleting the single name on the ballot, it is the opinion of the Embassy that the decision to introduce the secret ballot, admittedly of little significance in the present case, and the inculcation in the masses of the belief that they were playing a part in the administration of the State, are of considerable importance in any discussion of the Soviet elections. Certain Moscow observers are of the opinion that international considerations had a deciding influence on the decision to grant the above-mentioned limited rights to the electorate, for with the present growth of fascism as opposed to democracy, it is contended that the Kremlin, in grouping itself with the democratic states, decided to give an outward democratic dress to the elections, although always careful to keep in its hands, through the hand picked electoral commissions, complete control over the choice of candidates and the final elections. There is little doubt that the Soviet desire to ingratiate [Page 403] the Soviet Government with the believers in democracy of the western countries played a role in causing the Soviet leaders to have the elections conducted somewhat along the lines of elections in democratic countries.
Although at present subject to considerable conjecture, a second significant feature of the Soviet elections is believed to be the widening of the popular basis of the Government by the establishment of the so-called Party-non-partisan alliance. During the elections no distinction was made between the candidates in or out of the Communist Party. In other words, many observers believed that the leveling off of the political barriers between the Party and the non-Party masses, which has been going on for many months, was accelerated during the election campaign and that actual steps were taken to eliminate the Communist Party as a favored aristocracy. However, it should be emphasized that a new aristocracy is being formed of those members of the Party and of the non-partisan masses who are supremely loyal to Stalin and his associates. Naturally, this new grouping of Stalinites would only tend to strengthen all the more the personal dictatorship of Stalin over the nation, a dictatorship which has been functioning during recent years more through the Narkomvnudel (formerly G. P. U.) than through the Communist Party, and which has held sway over a people terrorized into obedience.
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In recapitulation, it may be categorically stated that the Soviet elections were a gigantic dumbshow in which the voters were not permitted to have any voice whatsoever. The Party, apparently disliking to put its strength to a test, did not permit the nomination of opposition candidates but in place advanced the theory of a united Party-non-partisan bloc to be represented by common candidates and the voter was offered one candidate to vote for. Aptly defined by the London Times, the elections were “no more than a shotgun wedding between Liberty and the proletariat, with dictatorship standing proxy for the goddess.”
Taking into consideration the manner in which the candidates were nominated and the opposition eliminated, it is almost unthinkable that the Supreme Soviet can be anything but a mechanical and pompous tool of the ruling Stalin clique. The Supreme Soviet will be made up exclusively of Stalin men to whom Stalin in his cynical speech of December 11 gave to understand that if anyone of them should dare to wander from the path of the Stalinist line, he would be cast from office, and, in all probability, arrested.
The ease with which all opposition was removed during the nomination period of the electoral campaign may be considered a tribute to the efficiency of the Party controlled electoral commissions and [Page 404] the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs. All opposition, actual or potential, was carefully eliminated in order to present Stalin with a rubber stamp government. Such notable Soviet officials as Mezhlauk, former Chairman of the State Planning Commission; Alksnis, Assistant Commissar for Defense Industries and Chief of the Air Forces of the Red Army; Yelikanov, Commander of the Trans-Caucasian Military Okrug; and, Bokis, Chief of the Tank and Armored Division of the Red Army, as well as many lesser party and government officials were nominated for the Union Soviet but were scratched at the last moment because of some unexplainable reason, presumably “political doubtfulness”, and were replaced by practically unknown and unimportant candidates. It has consequently been assumed that these men, as well as Krylenko, who was never nominated, have fallen into disgrace. It is even possible that some, if not all, of them have been arrested.
In the early days of the electoral campaign, it was believed by certain foreign observers in Moscow that the reign of arrests, executions and demotions, which has continued undiminished during recent months and which was in fact increasing as far as the man on the street was concerned, would come to a stop upon the election of the Supreme Soviet. The speeches of some of the most prominent delegates during the latter part of the electoral campaign in which repeated warnings to the Trotskiist-Bukharinist enemies of the people were made left little doubt, however, that the purge would continue. Marshal Voroshilov, to quote a typical example of such a warning advised his constituents in Minsk to remember “that those who desire to stand in the way of the victorious march of the millions of fighters for a new life would be crushed like worms.” The events during the first days following the elections (the reported arrest of various Soviet officials; the announced execution of Karakhan, Enukidze, Steiger, et al.) were sad omens of the continuation of the reign of terror, even after the proclamation of the “triumphant success” of the most democratic elections in the world.
Now that the elections have been carried out according to schedule, observers of the Soviet scene are looking forward with interest to the meeting of the first Supreme Soviet which is set for January 12, 1938. The question which is paramount—and to which no categorical answer can as yet be made—is whether Stalin will permit himself to be elected to the Presidency of that body and thus in a sense transfer the real power from the exclusive Party organs through which he has ruled the country for so many years to the higher bodies of the governmental apparatus.
Respectfully yours,
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