Foreign Relations of the United States, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939

124.61/119

Memorandum by Mr. George F. Kennan of the Division of European Affairs

[Extract]⁵⁰

[Washington,] November 24, 1937.

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The observation and espionage to which a foreign ambassador is subjected in Moscow can be understood only in the light of the efforts made by the Government to convince the population that all foreign representatives are nothing more than “accredited spies”, engaged chiefly in endeavoring to inveigle unsuspecting Soviet citizens into entanglements. These efforts naturally create an atmosphere which contributes neither to the prestige nor to the peace of mind of foreign envoys in the city.

At the present moment a deliberate anti-foreign campaign of almost unparalleled intensity has been in progress for some time and shows no signs of abating. In this campaign few efforts are made to distinguish between various states in the “capitalist environment” and thus to spare the feelings of the representatives of those powers whose policy can in no sense be considered as anti-Soviet. The effect of this has been to extend to neutral foreigners, including Americans, all of the fear and suspicion on the part of the populace which would otherwise attach chiefly to Germans, Japanese, et cetera, who might normally be expected—in present circumstances—to be carrying on espionage in Russia.

In addition to inculcating into the population the impression that all foreigners are secret agents, the Soviet Government has made it clear to the average citizen that it is the foreign diplomats in Moscow who are the active organizers and directors of this espionage work. Soviet textbooks on international law, drawn up in part by Foreign Office officials, refer to the “espionage work of diplomats”^* and explain that the functions of certain diplomatic representatives “are inevitably entangled with functions of an espionage nature”,^† It is a rare Soviet propaganda trial which does not contain some reference to contacts of the accused with the representatives in Russia of foreign powers. Even the Journal de Moscou, reputedly the organ of the Foreign Office and evidently published partly for the edification of those diplomats who do not know Russian, did not hesitate to begin an editorial article, in the spring of this year, with the statement that not all the spies entered the Soviet Union by slipping across the border with false passports; many of them, the paper explained, came in comfortable sleeping cars and carried diplomatic passports.

In addition to broadcasting these admonitions to the population to beware of foreign diplomats, the regime has added considerable cogency to its arguments by seeing to it that most of the Soviet citizens who have had sufficient temerity to associate with foreign representatives—whether with official permission or not—eventually encounter misfortune. Statistics are not available, but foreign observers who have been in Moscow during the last few months have noted that the great majority of those Soviet citizens who have had anything approaching extensive social or official relations with diplomats during the last few years have now disappeared. There is reason to believe that they have been intimidated, arrested, exiled, or executed. With respect to the American Embassy, nearly every one of the Soviet nationals who could be said to have constituted the Embassy’s important contacts with the Soviet world from 1934 to 1936 has since suffered at the hands of the Government. Many of those who were in official position have been disgraced and removed. These include, among others, Neiman, long head of the American Section of the Foreign Office; Krestinski, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Bubnov, Commissar for Education; Rosengolts, Commissar for Foreign Trade; Arosev, head of the official Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; Kurts, head of the Intourist company, et cetera. Many others could be added to this list. In addition to these persons whose official capacity brought them into contact with the Embassy, there have been a number of others whose connections with the Embassy were more of a personal nature. Bukharin and Radek were outstanding among this category. Bukharin has disappeared; Radek’s fate is too well known to need description. Another conspicuous figure was Boris Steiger, who served for many years as unofficial contact man between the diplomatic corps and certain influential Soviet circles. Here, again, many other examples could be cited.

To these social acquaintances of our Ambassadors must be added those Soviet employees of the Embassy who themselves have been arrested or who have seen members of their family suffer in this way. Three members of the Soviet staff have been arrested at various times by the secret police. The arrest in each case was sudden and without warning or advance explanation to the Embassy. None of the arrested persons has been released or permitted to resume his work at the Embassy. In addition to this, the husband of one of the employees has been arrested in a similar fashion. In all cases of the arrest of employees of the mission, the Foreign Office has been unable to give satisfactory explanations. It has merely assured the Embassy that the measures taken had nothing to do with the activities of the employee in question as a member of the Embassy staff.

There is nothing to prove that any one of these people—whether an official, a personal acquaintance, or an employee—has been arrested or persecuted on account of his connections with the American Embassy. But the fact remains that the Soviet public is very actively aware that most of those who have had relations with diplomats sooner or later come to a bad end.

In consideration of all these facts it seems reasonable to conclude that the Soviet Government is engaged in a deliberate and successful effort to undermine any prestige and popularity which foreign envoys might otherwise enjoy in the eyes of the Soviet public.

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50. For other portions of this memorandum discussing the position of the American Ambassador and difficulties experienced by the Embassy in Moscow, see p. 446.
51. Diplomatic and Consular Law (Russian) Moscow, 1934, written by Sabanin, Chief of the Legal Section of the Soviet Foreign Office. [Footnote in the original.]
52. Essays on International Law (Russian) Moscow, 1935, written by Pashukanis, subsequently Assistant Commissar for Justice of the U. S. S. R., with the collaboration of a number of Foreign Office officials. This reference was to military attachés, but naturally applies by implication to their chiefs as well. [Footnote in the original.]