740.00/193: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Davies ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:05 p.m.]
164. In the course of a confidential conference Litvinov spoke freely on the European situation and conditions here and with apparent [Page 387] frankness. He stated that the recent visit of Rumanian Royalty to Poland was distinctly anti-Soviet but was not of serious consequence.33 Insofar as it played into the hands of Germany, it weakened the Little Entente, and thereby adversely affected France and European peace. That in the last analysis, however, it was not serious, for the actions of smaller states or blocks of smaller states were realistically of little importance as in his opinion European developments depended upon the actions of larger nations. In commenting on the Czechoslovakian situation he stated that the Weigel incident34 in his opinion was part of a deliberate plan on the part of Germany to create a record in justification for future hostile acts against Czechoslovakia at a time when it would be opportune for her to act. In answer to my direct question he stated it as his opinion this would not be this year. With reference to Spain he stated that conditions were bad and that the outlook was very dark due to “cowardly conduct” of European democracies who were running away from the situation which they refused to face while the Fascists were definitely and aggressively smashing forward with the immediate result that the Non-intervention Committee was probably destroyed which was no great loss because it was ineffective and a smoke screen anyway; that the objective of Fascist countries was to procure belligerent rights for Franco on the sea and to deny belligerent rights to the Spanish Government on soil; that such a plan would be seriously prejudicial to the Spanish Government for it was obvious that England on the one hand could not physically furnish war material and that because of national policy and law United States on the other hand would not furnish war material; while the Fascist States usually supply Franco without limit. He stated that England was so intent upon preserving peace at any cost and seemed to be so anxious to appease Germany in this situation that there was danger of yielding to the Fascist States in the course of pending discussions although he could not think that England would recognize belligerent rights to Franco. In reply to my question as to whether in his opinion France would permit the establishment of a Fascist Franco state on southern border of France, he stated, “What can they do about it.” They will not do anything without England and they are doing nothing now while later it may be too late. I asked him whether he saw indication of the weakening of the London-Paris-Moscow axis by reason of reactions in Western Europe because of events here—alleged treason in Red Army and alleged confusion and weakness of Government disclosed by necessity for wide-spread purge of Party. To this [Page 388] he made no direct response but intimated strongly that he did not think such an opinion could obtain or that it would affect the situation. He asserted vigorously that there was no governmental weakness here but actual strength which in his opinion was demonstrated by the fact that probably no other country in the world could have sustained the loss through death and removal of so many heads of military and civil branches of Government because of treason and still preserve its stability, direction, and force to the degree where “business went on as usual every day”. In reply to my question as to the possibility of England agreeing that Germany should have free hand in Eastern Europe in consideration for concessions to preserve peace in Western Europe he stated that the English Ambassador in Berlin35 was violently pro-German; that Eden meant well but that there were indications that Eden did not have the same “free hand” with Chamberlain as he had with Baldwin, but that he still believed in the assurance which Eden gave him in London that England would not be a party to any such arrangement. In reply to final question, he stated that, while the outlook for peace in Europe was very dark, he did not think there was danger of military aggression this year.
- King Carol II and Crown Prince Michael visited in Warsaw and Cracow at the end of June 1937.↩
- Bruno Weigel, a German, had been arrested in Prague in November 1936 on a charge of Nazi activities. He had been released on May 20, 1937, but Czechoslovakia had been forced by Germany to reinvestigate the case.↩
- Sir Nevile Henderson.↩