711.61/573 Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 10—7:40 a.m.]
478. Kelley and I lunched with Litvinov alone today. He expressed once more the conviction that the British had decided to eliminate Mussolini. He said that Mussolini himself knew that he was beaten; that he had summoned Drummond on November 4th and had begun his conversation by the words: “I know that I have done wrong but I ask you to recognize that there have been extenuating circumstances.” Litvinov said that he believed the British would blockade the Suez Canal, if and when necessary. He said that he thought that Mussolini in the end would be forced to suicide.
Litvinov said that he felt that as soon as the British had finished Mussolini they would finish Hitler. He asserted that he felt certain that the British would work with the French and would under no circumstances work with Hitler. He again expressed the conviction that the Japanese were intent on dominating China and had no intention of advancing against Outer Mongolia or the Soviet Union.
Litvinov said that he wished he had been in Moscow when I had presented our note of protest against the actions of the Third International. He then asserted that he had an entirely clear conscience; that I must know that he had said to the President that he could not be responsible for the Third International; and that the President had replied that he would hold the Soviet Union to its pledge only in case of important injury to the interests of the United States.
I replied that my memory was entirely different: that I recalled that he had said he could make no promises about the Third International, [Page 265] but that the President had told him that he would hold him to strict accountability with regard to the Third International and that he, Litvinov, had subsequently signed the pledge. He replied that he had made his statement to the President after signing the pledge.
As this statement made his position even weaker, and as the conversation was growing acrimonious, I suggested that a discussion of present relations might be more valuable than further remarks about the past. Litvinov then made it clear that the Soviet Government would not in any way restrain the activities of the Communist International in the United States or the Soviet Union, or of American Communists connected with the Communist International in the Soviet Union. He expressed with his customary cynicism the view that there was no such thing as friendship or “really friendly” relations between nations.
Both Kelley and I had told him that the United States had desired really friendly relations with the Soviet Union but now felt that the direction of the activities of the Communist International by Stalin was incompatible with really friendly relations. Litvinov then expressed his views in almost exactly the words reported in my despatch 980, October 26,70 saying that the truth about the United States was that we desire to remain aloof from all active interest in international affairs. He did not add aloud but implied that therefore really friendly relations with the United States were of small importance to the Soviet Union.
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