761.00/260
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that the contemplated meeting of the Communist International has caused violent discussions in the Kremlin during the past two weeks and that the entire position of the Soviet Union in world affairs has been discussed by Stalin with his chief political and military assistants.
I have no reliable information as to the content of these discussions; but I have had so many talks with leaders of the Soviet Union during the past few months that it occurs to me the Department perhaps might be interested in a statement of the conclusions I have reached with regard to the present and future policy of the Soviet Union.
Contrary to the comforting belief which the French now cherish, it is my conviction that there has been no decrease in the determination of the Soviet Government to produce world revolution. Diplomatic relations with friendly states are not regarded by the Soviet Government as normal friendly relations but “armistice” relations and it is the conviction of the leaders of the Soviet Union that this “armistice” can not possibly be ended by a definitive peace but only [Page 225] by a renewal of battle. The Soviet Union genuinely desires peace on all fronts at the present time but this peace is looked upon merely as a happy respite in which future wars may be prepared.
If this basic postulate of the Soviet Government is understood, there is little or nothing in Soviet domestic or foreign policy that is not clear.
I feel sure that the Department must have received many reports that the Soviet Government has abandoned the idea of world revolution and that the convictions I have expressed above may seem illfounded. I can only say that my own observations, without exception, have convinced me of the accuracy of my statements. I have yet to converse with a single leader of the Soviet Union who has not expressed his belief in the necessity of world revolution.
For example, a few evenings ago I said to Karl Radek that I hoped his communist friends at the meeting of the Third International would not behave in such a way as to break Litvinov’s pledge to the President and make the continuance of diplomatic relations between our countries impossible. Radek leaped to his feet with the most violent anger and shouted, “We have lived without the United States in the past and we can continue to live without the United States in the future and we shall never permit you or anyone else to dictate to us what we shall do in Moscow.” Upon his departure, Mikhailsky, one of the oldest of the Bolsheviks, who overheard Radek’s remarks, said, “You must understand that world revolution is our religion and there is not one of us who would not in the final analysis oppose even Stalin himself if we should feel that he was abandoning the cause of world revolution.”
I have had so many conversations of this nature, though not of this violence, that I am sure that the present restraint of the Soviet Government with regard to world revolution does not mean abandonment of this aim, but is merely tactical policy, “reculer pour mieux sauter.”
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The Soviet Union is, therefore, in a favorable position for defense but in no position to attack and will not be in a position to attack for a number of years. The present strength of the Soviet Union is, in the eyes of the Soviet Government, weakness compared to the strength which will be the Soviet Union’s at the end of a decade. Everything possible, therefore, is being done to postpone the conflict which is regarded as inevitable. It is the primary object of the Soviet Foreign Office to maintain peace everywhere until the strength of the Soviet Union has been built up to such a point that it is entirely impregnable to attack and ready, if Stalin should desire, to intervene abroad.
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[Page 226]… The Soviet Union fears nothing so much as a general reconciliation of European hatreds, especially a reconciliation between Germany and France. The key to the desire of the Soviet Government to be present at all possible conferences and to have a finger in every pie is its desire to prevent any real agreement among the states of Europe. The reasons for this policy are two fold: (a) The Soviet Union fears that reconciliation in Europe may be based upon permission to Germany to obtain the economic outlets which she needs by acquisition of the Ukraine; (b) War in Europe is regarded as inevitable and ultimately desirable from the Communist point of view. The Soviet Government fears war in Europe at the present time because the Soviet Union is unprepared and it is feared that war this year or next in Europe would grow into world war with simultaneous attacks on the Soviet Union by Germany, Poland and Japan. But it is the conviction of the leaders of the Soviet Union that if war in Europe can be postponed until the Red army is prepared and the railroads of the Soviet Union rebuilt, the Soviet Union will be able to intervene successfully in such a war, and will be able to protect and consolidate any communist government which may be set up as a result of war and ensuing revolution in any European state. To keep Europe divided and to postpone the war which will certainly come if Europe remains divided, is the substance of Russian policy in Europe.
The most conspicuous example of action proceeding from this policy was the conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with France.47 The fundamental cause of the desire of the Soviet Government to conclude this Treaty was the fear that France might welcome reconciliation with Germany. To keep the flames of Franco-German hatred burning brightly is regarded as a vital interest of the Soviet Union.
The single nightmare of the Soviet Government is, of course, the fear that if Japan attacks in the Far East, Germany and Poland will attack in the west. The policies of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Japan are also clear. They are: (1) to build up as large and effective a fighting force as possible in the Far East; (2) to avoid war so long as possible by making the minimum concessions necessary to make sure that Japan will not attack. It is the conviction of the Soviet Government that within ten years the Soviet Union will be so much more powerful than Japan that Japan for all future time will be as unable to attack the Soviet Union as Mexico is to attack the United States. But there is considerable doubt in the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union that the Far Eastern Provinces of Siberia can be defended successfully [Page 227] against Japanese attack and today any necessary concessions will be made to Japan which do not involve the cession of Soviet territory.
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It is, of course, the heartiest hope of the Soviet Government that the United States will become involved in war with Japan. If such a war should occur it would be the policy of the Soviet Union to remain outside the conflict and to gain whatever wealth might be acquired by supplying the United States with war materials via the west and supplying Japan with war materials in the east. To think of the Soviet Union as a possible ally of the United States in case of war with Japan is to allow the wish to be father to the thought. The Soviet Union would certainly attempt to avoid becoming an ally until Japan had been thoroughly defeated and would then merely use the opportunity to acquire Manchuria and Sovietize China.
The final conviction of the leaders of the Soviet Union with regard to the war they desire so ardently between the United States and Japan is that Japan would be defeated, that a Communist Government would then be set up in Japan, and Japan and the Soviet Union would then move happily hand in hand to establish communism in China.
There is genuine admiration in the Soviet Union for American technical efficiency and there is full realization of the fact that the Communist movement in the United States is still completely impotent; but it is believed that the people of the United States will not have sufficient political sense to cope with the problems of the productivity of the modern machine and modern agriculture and that after a series of recoveries and crises the United States too will fall (or rise) into the “heaven” of Communism.
To summarize: The aim of the Soviet Government is and will remain, to produce world revolution. The leaders of the Soviet Union believe that the first step toward this revolution must be to strengthen the defensive and offensive power of the Soviet Union. They believe that within ten years the defense position of the Soviet Union will be absolutely impregnable and that within 15 years the offensive power of the Soviet Union will be sufficient to enable it to consolidate by its assistance any communist government which may be set up in Europe. To maintain peace for the present, to keep the nations of Europe divided, to foster enmity between Japan and the United States, and to gain the blind devotion and obedience of the communists of all countries so that they will act against their own governments at the behest of the Communist Pope in the Kremlin, is the sum of Stalin’s policy.
Respectfully yours,
- Signed on May 2, 1935; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxvii, p. 395.↩