800.51W89 U.S.S.R./143: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:20 p.m.]
354. (Continuing my No. 353, October 10, 5 p.m.),74 I then got up to leave and Litvinov said that he had something which he wished to [Page 158] say to me before my departure. He then embarked upon a series of declarations which were obviously intended to impress me with the determination of the Soviet Government to make no concessions whatsoever to the Government of the United States, He first read me what he alleged were the interest rates on credits paid now by the Soviet Government in various foreign countries. He asserted that the Soviet Government was now obtaining credits from the Chase National Bank of New York at 4½% and from various large English banks at 5%. I replied that I had no knowledge of such interest rates, that Rosengoltz had admitted to me yesterday that the Soviet Government had not yet been able to obtain credits in England at less than 11%. This Litvinov denied vehemently and stated that the memorandum in his hand had been prepared by Rosengoltz. I again started to leave and he said that there was something which he wished I would make very clear to my Government. He alleged that he had heard that officials of the Department of State were spreading the report that he had broken his agreement with the President. He said that his position was that the President had broken the agreement. A discussion then followed in which I thought it advisable to preserve equanimity but which became extremely acrimonious on the part of Litvinov. He finally grew purple and said that if there was any more talk of this sort he would publish the memorandum of his conversation with the President. I replied that it was obvious that he had no wish for friendly relations with the United States. I went on to say that if a negative attitude with regard to a settlement of debts and claims should be followed by activities of the Comintern directed against the United States our relations would become so difficult as to be almost impossible. He replied “no nation ever starts talking about the activities of the Comintern unless it wishes to have as bad relations as possible with us. The activities of the Comintern are merely an excuse for breaking diplomatic relations”. I told him that the people of the United States as well as the Government of the United States were extremely sensitive about any interference in our internal affairs and that he might expect the most drastic reaction in ease the Comintern Congress should take place and there should be evidence of interference in the internal affairs of the United States.
Litvinov, reverting to debts, stated that he would discuss matters with Troyanovsky and that he would give Troyanovsky explicit orders, which would be definite and final, that any alterations made in the Soviet proposal would not differ greatly from the recent proposal made by Troyanovsky. I called his attention to the fact that a loan was impossible, had always been impossible, and always would be impossible. He replied that the Soviet Government had no desire even for a loan except at a very low interest rate; that it desired to [Page 159] let the entire matter drop; that if the question of payment of debts and claims were settled in any way whatsoever he would have grave difficulties in his relations with England and France. I told him that it was indeed curious that he was in the habit of saying to me that there were no difficulties in the matter of debts and claims except his relations with England and France; that there were no difficulties in the question of our consular districts except his relations with Japan and Germany; that there were no difficulties with regard to the use of our airplane[s] except his relations with Germany, Poland, and England. I told him that I considered it deplorable that he should allow the relations between our two countries to be controlled by his relations with those countries which he considered to be his enemies.
He finally said that he would make a final proposal through Troyanovsky and then would refuse to discuss the matter further. I replied that I deeply regretted that he seemed determined to kill all possibility of really close and friendly relations between our countries.
I had the impression today that I was talking with the traditional bazaar bargainer of the Near East.