800.51W89 U.S.S.R./72: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
31
Moscow, June 16,
1934—7 p.m.
[Received 7:35 p.m.]
145. I have just spent a most unsatisfactory hour with Litvinov. He began by refusing in the
most categorical manner to alter his position on payment of
indebtedness. I told him that I thought it was our duty to attempt to
overcome the “misunderstanding” which
[Page 109]
had arisen with regard to his verbal understanding
of the President. He replied “there is no misunderstanding” and asserted
that the Government of the United States was attempting to back out of
the verbal agreement. This statement I combated at once with the utmost
vigor stating that it was the belief of my Government that it was he,
Litvinov, who was attempting
to back out of the understanding.
We had a long argument on this subject the upshot of which was that
Litvinov said that he and his
Government were entirely ready to let the matter drop immediately and
permanently, that the Soviet Government had not asked for any such
agreement but had acceded to such an agreement at the request of the
President, that the agreement was clear and the Soviet Government would
not change its position. I told him that I felt this attitude on his
part might terminate any possibility of close collaboration between our
nations. He replied “I do not take the matter so tragically. No nation
today pays its debts. Great Britain has defaulted. Germany is
defaulting. And no one will be able to make propaganda against the
Soviet Union if we do not pay one dollar on a debt we did not
contract”.
Moscow, June
16, 1934—9 p.m.
[Received June 16—8 p.m.]
146. I then remarked that he must feel very sure of the future if he
were ready to throw away the possibility of collaboration with the
United States. He replied that he felt that such collaboration would
be established anyhow; that the British had just defaulted but Mr.
Norman Davis in Geneva had
continued to do just what Sir John
Simon had wanted him to do. I answered that I had no
information as to events in Geneva, then told him in detail why I
believed that his attitude would make the growth of cooperation
impossible. I said that the American Government would regard the
position of the Soviet Government as the following: we shall not
honor our agreement with the President. We shall make no payment
either to the American corporations or individuals whose property we
have seized. We shall make no payments on our indebtedness to the
Government of the United States and we shall buy nothing in the
United States. We shall, however, expect the Government and people
of the United States to work with us loyally and intimately. I added
that if in the future he should find the Government of the United
States most unwilling to collaborate with the Soviet Government he
would kindly remember that I had warned him that such would be the
case if he should persist in his present attitude.
Litvinov replied that it was
not the will of the Soviet Government but the Johnson bill which
prevented Soviet purchases in the United
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States. I answered that such purchases could
be made under present conditions and that the first thing of which
he had been warned on his arrival in Washington before recognition
was the certainty of the passage of the Johnson bill. He answered
that there would be no purchases until the Johnson bill had been
withdrawn or amended. I replied that there was not the faintest
possibility of the Johnson bill being withdrawn or amended.
Moscow, June
16, 1934—10 p.m.
[Received June 16—9:04 p.m.]
147. Litvinov then mentioned
my personal suggestion to Krestinsky in regard to a definite statement by the
Soviet Government of the purchases it desired to make in the United
States. I said to him that my expression of opinion, as Krestinsky had doubtless told him,
had been entirely personal and had not been a suggestion of my
Government or one which I had made on behalf of my Government. He
said that Krestinsky had so
reported. I added that I was extremely loath to see all possibility
of collaboration between our nations destroyed and that I felt there
might be some fresh basis of negotiation if the Soviet Government
would present to the American Government an exact statement of the
purchases it would make in the United States with any credits
extended.
Litvinov replied that all
purchases from America had been stricken from the present 5-year
plan, that the task of preparing a new statement of purchases which
might be made in America if credits were forthcoming was a very
difficult one, and that before asking the Commissars in charge of
the 5-year plan to make an exact statement of such purchases he
would wish to know that such a statement would serve some useful
purpose. I answered that I did not know whether or not any such
statement would be useful, that I merely felt there might be some
possibility of agreement if the matter were discussed in the form of
a series of concrete business deals. He then suggested that I should
inquire of my Government in regard to the matter. I told him that I
would much prefer to have Troyanovsky explore the question with the Department
so that he might receive from his own representative a clear view of
the exact state of mind of my Government.
Moscow, June
16, 1934—11 p.m.
[Received June 16—8:20 p.m.]
148. Litvinov apparently feels
much more sure than any of his colleagues that Japan will not attack
the Soviet Union and that the
[Page 111]
United States no matter how the Soviet Union
behaves will attempt to prevent war between the Soviet Union and
Japan and will support the Soviet Union in case of war. Furthermore,
I believe that he is convinced that the pressure of American
businessmen will produce either a ruling that the Johnson bill does
not apply to the Soviet Union or a withdrawal of the resolution of
the Export-Import Bank with regard to credits to nations in
default.
I believe that within a few days Troyanovsky will approach the Department. It seems
to me that on the occasion of such a visit the Department should
explore every possibility of agreement but should not hesitate to
express its disillusionment and its skepticism with respect to the
future relations of the United States and the Soviet Union.32
