793.94/2359
The Consul at Dairen (Langdon) to the Chargé in Japan (Neville)80
Sir: As of possible interest to the Embassy, I venture to make certain observations on the recent Japanese coup in Manchuria.
[Page 86]Circumstances of Occupation
Nobody here, not even the Japanese themselves, appears to credit the Japanese claims that the Chinese provoked hostilities and that the Japanese forces acted in self-defence. The very nature of the Japanese measures, punitive from the outset, precludes belief in their self-defensive character. Outside of stereotyped statements for foreign consumption, the local Japanese authorities, residents, and press seem to have forgotten the original charge of Chinese aggression, and look upon the occupation of South Manchuria as a political measure to settle international disputes of long standing.
Anyone familiar with the low level of intelligence and initiative of the Chinese soldier dismisses as absurd the claim that he mined and blew up a railroad bridge and attacked the Japanese soldiers guarding it. Such an enterprise could only have originated and been directed by the high Chinese command, but this theory too cannot be supported with logic. Why would the high Chinese command, knowing the temper of the Japanese Army over the murder (or irregular shooting as a spy) of Captain Nakamura in Eastern Inner Mongolia, challenge Japan and yet be so absolutely unprepared to fight? There appears to be no question about the completeness of the surprise of the Chinese. On the other hand, the evidence that the Japanese had a carefully laid plan of action is overwhelming.
The recent propaganda regarding Japanese injuries in Manchuria conducted by the War Office, the urgent conference in Tokyo of the Supreme Military Council just prior to the occupation, the reported opposition of the Japanese Foreign Minister to the War Office’s “plan for dealing with the Manchurian situation”, the coincidence of the coup with the arrival in Mukden from Tokyo of Colonel Doihara, the special representative in Mukden of the General Staff, the precision and suddenness of military movement, the simultaneous occupation of so many strategic centers, in fact every phase of the incident points to careful preparation in every detail.
Causes of Occupation
The cause of the Japanese occupation of South Manchuria is not believed to lie in military men’s indignation over the murder of a fellow officer, or in any one or a cumulation of disputes with the Chinese, although the recurrence of such disputes and their exaggerated publicity made Japanese public opinion favorable to extreme action. The cause is unquestionably of more fundamental character: the growth of Chinese economic and political independence in Manchuria and Japan’s declining influence there. Regarding Manchuria as her special field for capital investment and economic exploitation, [Page 87] Japan has viewed with envy and concern the exclusive economic activity of the Chinese, some of it reserved to her by treaty and some of it actually competitive with her own enterprises. Particularly has she been dismayed over the declining receipts of the South Manchuria Railway in contrast to the prosperity of the new Chinese railroads, and over the dullness of cargo movement in Dairen compared with the relative activity of Newchwang and Chinwangtao. Having a forward political policy also, Japan has with difficulty concealed her displeasure at the increasing liberty of action of the Chinese, such as their adoption of the Nationalist flag and union with Nanking over Japan’s opposition, the construction of railways and harbors to compete with Dairen and the South Manchuria Railway system, and finally the isolation of Dairen from domestic trade by Customs legislation. The occupation of Manchuria is believed to be an effort to halt Chinese control before it becomes absolute, and to establish Japanese political and economic mastery in the region. To sum up my views, the recent coup was deliberately planned to shear the rising Northeastern Government of all power as well as to crush the increasingly dangerous and hostile Northeastern Army, and to clear the way for renewed Japanese economic activity.
Effects of Occupation
While it is idle to speculate on the outcome of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, it is reasonably certain that the Northeastern Government for some time to come will be devoid of any real fiscal, constructive, or administrative power. An important buyer of American construction material and equipment will thus be lost for the time being. American and European firms and banks which have supplied the Northeastern Government with credits may lose sums of money besides. Forwarding agents in Dairen state that up-country import business, which was improving somewhat in anticipation of the winter season, has come to a standstill as a result of consignees’ and dealers’ anxiety over future political developments. The question of specie cover for Northeastern Government banknotes in circulation with the Northeastern Government no longer functioning is also a disturbing thought to merchants. There is no doubt that the Japanese coup has dislocated, for some time at least, well-established and smoothly running economic arrangements in a wide area, and added a small measure to the world’s distress at the moment. On the other hand, the severity of the Japanese Government at this time may give the Chinese authorities a greater sense of responsibility in foreign relations, with ultimate benefits to foreign trade and residents in China.
Respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul at Dairen without covering despatch; received October 27.↩