Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/1907: Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Neville) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Tokyo, September 28, 1931—3 p.m..
[Received September 28—noon.]

162. Your 169 of September 24.⁷⁹

(1) It is not likely that the Japanese Government will now consent to an investigating commission from a third party. Baron Shidehara said as much to me at the time I delivered the note. I believe the Japanese are ready at any time to negotiate with the Chinese directly.

(2) What is in the minds of the Japanese, or at least of those in control in Manchuria, appears to be a settlement there of a number of outstanding issues. Some of these issues are claims, such as the Nakamura case; other issues are broader, such as the status of Koreans in Manchuria, land rights and taxation, and railway construction, and still other issues are borderline questions, such as alleged boycotts, interference with legitimate business of Japanese, etc. It is claimed that seldom have the Japanese been able to arrive at definite understandings concerning any of these matters and that the Chinese in many cases are either unwilling or unable to execute the agreements actually made.

(3) It is believed by many Japanese that the South Manchuria Railway must have extraordinary protection and that at times the property and even the lives of Japanese are endangered. They think the recent Chinese action in destroying, or trying to destroy, a part of this Railway is a sample of what may be expected in South Manchuria. The military authorities and at least part of the Japanese public are convinced that at this time a demonstration was needed of Japan’s will and ability to protect Japanese rights.

(4) The Japanese are determined not to have any contending factions of Chinese in Manchuria. A great many Japanese believe Manchuria would without Japanese troops be given over to bandits, since the Chinese lack public spirit or military discipline. This notion is borne out somewhat by the fact of a small Japanese force being able in a few hours to take charge of Mukden and its famous arsenal despite the alleged proximity of 20,000-odd crack Chinese troops. There were supposed to be more than 60,000 Chinese troops in the Changchun-Kirin area, yet both places were occupied by the Japanese with less than 5,000 soldiers. The Chinese at Mukden and Kirin had many more men than the combined Japanese contingent in Manchuria. My best military information bears out the statement by Japanese that they have not gone beyond the 15,000 men permitted as railway guards. Many Japanese feel that this incident indicates such a degree of indiscipline as to be dangerous if others had to rely upon it, and they intend to make the Chinese realize that legitimate Japanese interests cannot be interfered with by them with impunity. The Japanese wish to obtain assurance, by fear if no other way is open, that Japanese rights will be respected.

(5) To what extent the conservative elements in Japan share this attitude I do not know, but I know Shidehara was in dread of such an incident. I do not believe the Tokyo Foreign Office approves using force now, and I think the big business leaders deem it as a mistake. My information is that Japanese business has already been affected in other parts of China through the cancellation of contracts. This may be due also to a fear of war and to the fact that since the fall of the British pound many lines of goods may be bought in Britain.

(6) If a joint Chinese-Japanese conference can be arranged, I am inclined to think the Japanese delegates would be conciliatory, particularly if the Foreign Office directs them. So far as I can see, there is little chance in any case of getting for the time being any other arrangement from Japan.

Above repeated to Peiping.

Neville

79. See last sentence of Department’s No. 341, September 24, 6 p.m., to the Minister in China, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 10.