793.94/2217
The Consul General at Mukden (Myers) to the Minister in China (Johnson)74
Mukden, September 26, 1931.
No. 449
Sir: Referring to this Consulate General’s
despatch No. 446, of September 20, 1931, in regard to the Japanese
occupation of Mukden and to subsequent telegrams reporting the extension
of this occupation to all centers along the South Manchuria Railway and
to other places along the Chinese lines built with Japanese loans, I
have the honor to submit further information on this subject. Mukden and
Antung were occupied during the night of September 18th and during the
next few days all cities along the South Manchuria Railway lines
including Newchwang and Changchun were also occupied. Japanese troops
subsequently seized Kirin and Tunhua, the eastern terminus of the
Kirin-Tunhua Railway, Liaoyuan (Chengchiatun), Tungliao and Taonan,
terminal points on the Ssupingkai-Taonan and Taonan-Angangchi Railways.
It was learned yesterday (September 25th) that the Japanese battalion at
Tunhua had been withdrawn to Kirin and that the occupation of Tungliao
has also terminated. A report of the imminent evacuation of Kirin has
also been heard. Indications are that the occupation of further
territory is not contemplated under existing conditions. It is evident,
too, that reinforcements would be required were the occupied area to be
extended. Official information is to the effect that the Japanese troops
in Manchuria
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number 15,000,
which number is within the quota of railway guards permitted by treaty
(15 men per kilometer). Reservists who were called to the colors, it is
claimed, have been released from duty. In the opinion of some observers,
the above figure is small.
The pretext for this occupation, as given out by the Japanese, was the
blowing up by Chinese soldiers of the South Manchuria Railway tracks
near the North Barracks (Peitaying). Consul Vincent visited the scene of
the explosion yesterday and his memorandum on the incident is enclosed.
The Chinese have denied that their troops blew up the railway tracks and
state that the Japanese troops attacked without cause. Like the numerous
other incidents which have occurred in recent years in Manchuria, the
Japanese and Chinese versions are totally different and contradictory.
In this connection it may be added that there is good reason to believe
that the Chinese troops were ordered to offer no resistance and
according to information believed trustworthy orders to this effect were
received over the telephone from Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang shortly after
11:30 p.m. on September 18th. The Japanese losses in the attack on
Peitaying of two killed and about 20 wounded after four hours of
“furious fighting” is sufficient testimony of the absence of any
directed resistance on the part of the Chinese.
The immediate pretext, after all, is relatively unimportant. That the
Japanese have been preparing for such an eventuality is plain from the
rapidity with which the occupation was effected. Since the killing of
Marshal Chang Tso-lin,75 the
Japanese have built concrete turrets or blockhouses at every bridgehead
and tunnel on the South Manchuria Railway lines. Prior to that time
trenches, reinforced in some cases with railway ties, were only to be
seen. Barracks, too, in several places were enlarged in the past few
years and it had been reported that the transfer of the headquarters of
the Kwantung army from Port Arthur to Mukden or Liaoyang was planned.
During several weeks just prior to the occupation, the local Japanese
troops held manoeuvres almost every night in the railway settlement and
on one or more occasions staged a sham fight to the accompaniment of
rifle and machine gun fire. It seems possible, therefore, that the
alleged pretext was a signal for action, following, as it did, so
closely upon the Japanese Cabinet crisis over the Nakamura case. The
present is no doubt an opportune time for effecting a solution of the
outstanding questions between China and Japan over Manchuria and the
recent announcement of the Japanese Government indicates that this is
intended. The Japanese view that Manchuria is vital to the safety and
welfare of Japan, a view which is widely or universally
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held in that country, will probably have to
be recognized by the Chinese. Needless to say the situation is charged
with possibilities.
The Japanese Government has stated that it regards this occupation as a
local issue, one obviously to be negotiated with Mukden rather than with
Nanking. The Japanese authorities here are anxious, it is understood, to
secure the return of some of the high officials of the Mukden Government
who are now at Peiping or elsewhere. Overtures to that end have been
made, it is reported, both to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and General
Chang Tso-hsiang76 who is now in mourning at Chin
Hsien, his home. It is not thought that the latter could be induced to
accept the responsibility of forming a government and of handling these
negotiations. Marshal Chang, on the other hand, seems to be the logical
person for this difficult and thankless task. Unless he accepts it his
position both in Manchuria and China is bound eventually to be
impaired.
Chinese officials disappeared as rapidly as the occupation was effected
and consequently Chinese administration in the occupied territory ceased
to exist. However, in interior districts it is believed that it still
functions. The efforts of the Japanese thus far to secure Chinese
willing to cooperate with them in carrying on the primary functions of
government have met with little success. A municipal bureau, with a
Japanese mayor, has been formed at Mukden. It has organized a Chinese
Police force with an ex-magistrate (Feng Ching-yi) as head, which so far
has not been provided with arms but due to the spread of robbery further
steps for the maintenance of peace and order will have to be taken. The
latest step in this direction was the formation yesterday of a
commission comprising nine Chinese ex-officials, among whom Yuan
Chin-k’ai, Yü Ch’ung-han, Li Yu-lan and K’an Shao-hsi are the most
prominent.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Consul at Mukden (Vincent)
Mukden, September 26,
1931.
On September 25th, the writer was invited by the Japanese authorities
to visit the scene of the explosion on the South Manchuria Railway
which occurred the night of September 18th, and of the clash between
Chinese and Japanese armed forces which ensued. The members of the
party making the visit were Major General Miake, Chief of Staff to
the Commander in Chief of the Kuantung Army; Mr. Hayashi, Japanese
Consul General in Mukden; the British Military
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Attaché and Aide from Peiping; and the
writer. Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto, who commanded the Japanese
troops attacking the Chinese military camp on the night of September
18–19, was in charge of the party and acted as our informant. Major
Watari, a retired army officer in the employ of the South Manchuria
Railway, acted as interpreter.
The day before, September 24th, Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto had
taken a group of newspaper correspondents and Captain Mayer and
Lieutenant Brown of the Legation, and Lieutenant Cranford of the
Embassy at Tokyo, to make an inspection of the same nature. As the
two officers from the Legation are making reports to their
respective offices which will be available to the Legation, the
writer will not attempt to give a detailed account of the
occurrences from the military standpoint.
Upon our arrival at the site of the explosion, about five miles north
of Mukden on the South Manchuria Railway, Lieutenant Colonel
Shimamoto began his lecture by giving a summary of the violation of
Japan’s treaty rights in South Manchuria and irritating incidents in
general which have occurred during the past half year. Most of the
incidents enumerated have been reported to the Legation in this
Consulate General’s despatches. They included such occurrences as
minor clashes between Japanese and Chinese soldiers and police,
attempts at damage to South Manchuria Railway trains by placing
rocks on the track and throwing missiles at passing trains, insults
to Japanese women, et cetera. It is interesting to note that no
mention was made of the Nakamura case or of the Wanpaoshan incident
although the enumeration was not confined to incidents directly
affecting the South Manchuria Railway.
On the night of September 18th, six Japanese soldiers commanded by a
lieutenant were holding patrol exercises along the railway. They
were proceeding in a southerly direction away from their barracks
which were about a mile and a half distant. They had just passed by
the site of the explosion when they were startled by the detonation
and running back saw several Chinese in uniform fleeing down the
embankment. The Lieutenant ordered his men to open fire. We were
subsequently shown the badly decomposed bodies of two Chinese in
uniform near the site of the explosion. Blood stains along the side
of the track were also pointed out to us. Shimamoto stated that for
humane reasons the bodies should have been buried but that they had
kept them there to prove that it was Chinese soldiers who were
responsible for the explosion. Visual evidence spoke louder than
words, he added.
Two new rails had been put in to replace the ones damaged by the
explosion. Our attention was invited to these but in answer to the
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writer’s inquiry we were
told that the rails which had been damaged had been removed. (The
day before a section of the damaged rail was shown to the visitors
and Lieutenant Brown gave it as his opinion that it did not appear
to be a rail which had seen much use.)
The lieutenant in charge of the patrol party sent one of his men back
to the company barracks (a distance of one mile and a half) to
notify the company commander while he, with the remaining five men
exchanged rifle fire with Chinese who were hiding in a nearby field
of kaoliang. The company was able to arrive on the scene in twenty
minutes because they were drilling at the time. (The day before the
visitors were not informed that the company were in readiness when
the news was received, an oversight which excited comment because of
the time element involved.) Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto, who was
out on a party, was also informed and brought up the other two
companies of his battalion from near Mukden, arriving about
midnight. He also sent to Fushun for the remaining company of his
command which arrived some time later in the night.
Shimamoto then described the engagement which resulted in the capture
of Pei Ta Ying, the Chinese military camp. The camp is located about
a quarter of a mile from the site of the explosion, to the north. It
is about an eighth of a mile to the east of the railway and is
adjacent to and north of the kaoliang field. We were not taken to
the camp, the description of the encounter being given to us from a
vantage point on the railway embankment.
Shimamoto thought at the time he ordered the attack upon Pei Ta Ying,
but was not certain, that there were ten thousand Chinese soldiers
in the camp. He had something over four hundred men in his command
at the time. Later when the Fushun company arrived he had a total of
about six hundred and fifty men. The writer inquired whether at the
beginning or at any subsequent time the Chinese soldiers in the
barracks took the offensive, to which Shimamoto replied in the
negative. The writer then asked Major General Miake, who spoke
English very well, whether he did not think it rash for so small a
body of men to start an offensive against such overwhelming odds,
and whether or not reinforcements were not readily available in
Mukden. The Major General stated that at this juncture an offense
was the best defence and that the number of troops in Mukden was not
sufficient to permit the despatch of reinforcements. (At
approximately the same time (midnight) that the attack was started
on Pei Ta Ying, the investment by Japanese troops in Mukden of the
Mukden Commercial Settlement, the Chinese walled city, and the
arsenal and aviation field, was commenced.)
One corner of the camp was occupied by the Japanese after a prolonged
and sharp exchange of rifle fire. When the Fushun company
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arrived, a general attack on
the barracks was begun which ended in the complete occupation of the
camp by five-thirty, A.M. The Lieutenant Colonel stated that
although there were reports to the effect that the Chinese troops
had been instructed to offer no resistance, he could testify that
they had defended themselves furiously. He stated that fortunately
he had found a loaded trench mortar inside the camp and that it was
only by firing it as [at?] a passage way
which the Chinese were defending that he was able to advance to the
interior barracks. From the time the attack was commenced until the
camp was completely occupied a period of approximately five hours
had elapsed. Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto then (5:30 a.m.)
personally led an attack on the kaoliang field and cleared it of
Chinese soldiers. The writer asked Shimamoto why, since the Japanese
had been originally attacked from the field by what they estimated
as being three hundred soldiers, he had not attempted to clear it
sooner. He replied that most of the Chinese therein had fled when
the attack on Pei Ta Ying had started.
Shimamoto stated that about three hundred Chinese had been killed and
an equal number captured. The writer asked how many Japanese
casualties there were and received the reply that there were two
killed and twenty odd wounded.
The party then returned to Mukden. The inquiries made by other
members of the party were concerned with the military details of the
engagement and have therefore not been included in this report.
Although there is strong suspicion that the Japanese account of the
explosion and engagement are not authentic, it will be seen from the
above that matters might have been as described above. It is not a
convincing account and the carefulness with which evidence is
displayed and the story is told tends more to arouse than to allay
suspicion. Discrepancies have been found in various Japanese
accounts of the incidents but they are of minor importance and might
have occurred in any similar circumstances. What actually happened
on the night of September 18–19 will probably never be known,
unless, of course, one is prepared to accept the Japanese as the
true version, which the writer is not.
The events of the week preceding the explosion, and the feeling and
desire of the Japanese Army have no bearing on the events as related
by the Japanese, but they are particularly pertinent to the unbiased
observer. Without trying to place the responsibility for the
explosion, the fact is that it was decidedly desirable from the
Japanese Army standpoint and quite as undesirable from the Chinese
viewpoint. The Japanese Army wanted, openly and anxiously, action in
Manchuria. For a while it appeared that the Nakamura case and the
Chinese attitude thereto would provide the desired provocation for
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action. However, on
September 16th and 17th a settlement of the case which would have
satisfied the Japanese demands seemed to be forthcoming at an early
date. (Consul General Hayashi has stated, subsequent to the
occurrences of Friday, the 18th, that he could have reached a
settlement of the Nakamura case through negotiation within a short
time if the explosion had not occurred.) The Japanese Army saw, in
the probable settlement of the Nakamura case through negotiation,
its opportunity for action vanishing. Therefore regardless of the
responsibility for the explosion, its occurrence at the time was
most desirable and opportune for the fulfillment of the wishes of
the Japanese Army.
It, of course, should not be overlooked that the threat of military
occupation was probably responsible in a large degree for Consul
General Hayashi’s success in handling the Nakamura case.
Furthermore, the Japanese, from their point of view, have had good
reason for being irritated with the attitude and actions of the
Chinese in Manchuria during the past year. However, while one may
sympathize with the Japanese in their difficulties in Manchuria, one
cannot condone the creation of a pretext for military action by the
Army which, to the writer, seems to be the true explanation of the
explosion and engagement which occurred on Friday night, September
18–19.
