793.003/740: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Paraphrase]
Shanghai, June 24, 1931—4
p.m.
[Received June 25—12:59 p.m.]
[Received June 25—12:59 p.m.]
Department’s June 16, 5 p.m., and June 22, 6 p.m.
- (1)
- I told C. T. Wang that I expected to return to Peiping, and he replied he would take advantage of this to have a short holiday himself. He expressed the hope that documents might be received before long from Washington, allowing negotiations to be completed here.
- (2)
- Respecting the Department’s views in its June 16, 5 p.m., paragraph (3), I see no reason why at this time we should be rushed. The Chinese Government is in a life-and-death struggle with the Communists and radical groups which now control Kiangsi Province, and I think this will last all summer. If the Government emerges successfully, it will naturally be in a stronger position than hitherto and probably less conciliatory in its mood. If it should fail, I do not see any prospect of a Government as strong, with the grave danger that its failure would be followed by chaos.
- (3)
- The British negotiations in any case have set the line for us to follow.
- (4)
- The complete text of the terms worked out by the British with Dr. Wang is now before the Department. The parts which are to be unpublished are those the Chinese would not agree to include in the published treaty, chiefly for the reason that they were deemed to be derogatory to China’s dignity as a nation. Having these texts in hand, the Department can work out with the Chinese Legation a draft and express its views on the text and the terms, to be sent me for final discussion with Dr. Wang.
- (5)
- Regarding the reserved areas, C. T. Wang has been adamant all along. I believe Lampson did his best in this regard, nor have I reason to doubt the sincerity of the reasoning Dr. Wang used with me in stating his attitude regarding Tientsin. In this connection I refer you to my June 23, 1 a.m. [p.m.] on the Japanese terms. Wang argued that he could oppose the placing of Japanese Concessions and their railway zone in the category of Shanghai because the latter was international, while the former pertain only to one nation. Therefore, it is apparent that when the reserved areas come up we will find the [Page 884] Chinese unwilling to accept even the 5-year period as tentatively agreed to by Lampson and Wang.
- (6)
- I personally believe the reservation of areas by treaty, as tentatively agreed to now, offers little by the way of protection to the larger business interests with agencies beyond Shanghai and Tientsin. Once extraterritoriality is gone outside those areas, the Chinese can always sue such companies outside the reserved areas. There is some argument in favor of reserving Shanghai in order to provide a breathing spell during which there can be reached arrangements to transfer the International Settlement to Chinese jurisdiction, but I feel Tientsin’s reservation to be of doubtful value to us.
- (7)
- My arrangement with C. T. Wang is for me to go north for a few weeks, to await there receipt from the Department of all documents agreed to tentatively in Washington, and then to bring them to Nanking for final discussion and agreement. I understand Lamp-son expects to come south, perhaps early in September, for a final settlement of the Chinese-British treaty.
Johnson