Office of the Historian

793.94/1901: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, September 26, 1931—9 a.m.
[Received 4:50 p.m.]

141. The following are certain aspects of the picture respecting the Sino-Japanese question which may be of interest in evaluating the situation in Geneva.

  • 1. In line with a traditional Geneva attitude there is a strong feeling on the part of the small states that this question is a test of League efficacy in dealing with a great power and that a failure in this instance would be setting a precedent which would substantially weaken the League’s influence in the future and discredit conciliatory and security measures in general with a concomitant effect on disarmament. This is responsible for much of the agitation in Geneva that “something be done”. To prevent a discussion in the Assembly which would have [Page 71] had this sentiment as a background, recourse was had to a restriction of Assembly action as reported in Consulate’s 138, September 24, 7 p.m. The possibility still remains however that it might be brought into the Assembly under article 11, paragraph 2 of the Covenant or under paragraph 9 of article 15 although the legal status of such action is not entirely clear.
  • 2. While in the Council proceedings discussion for obvious reasons concerns itself with happenings in Manchuria, in the background and in corridor conversations the core of the problem is seen as lying in Tokyo. As to the situation in Tokyo there are two theses both evidently without a basis of definite information:
    (a)
    That Japanese action in Manchuria is the result of considered Japanese policy modified only perhaps by the military party precipitating the issue, and that thus a failure to bring Japan to terms as stated above endangers all future international conciliatory action.
    (b)
    That this is a military coup to which the Japanese Foreign Office is opposed [Paraphrase.] (this being a contention put forward here privately by the Japanese) [End paraphrase.] and that to bring too much pressure on Japan at this juncture might only serve to increase the power of the military party with perhaps disastrous results.
  • 3. It is obvious that in the formal proceedings no opinion on these points can be brought forward by any power in Geneva, if indeed there is sufficient information at the disposal of any power to give an opinion. Thus the present treatment of the problem here is felt by many to be fundamentally unsatisfactory.
  • 4. Of the great powers on the Council only Italy is at the present moment represented by a Minister of State, which results in a hesitancy on the part of most representatives to take a position.
  • [Paraphrase.] 5. It is being privately intimated by the Japanese that the American position is based upon paragraph 2 (b) above; as much has been said to me by one of them.
  • 6. The action of the Chinese is tacitly based upon 2 (a) above. However, the Chinese are beginning to show their concern over whether, should general action be based tacitly upon 2 (b) or if Japan is being favored for reasons of policy, the Chinese may not be drifting into a position of isolation. When I met Sze in the Secretariat corridor, he also intimated the foregoing to me directly. [End paraphrase.]
  • 7. Should pressure be put on Japan and should she prove recalcitrant, the question is gravely discussed as to what the powers could do impressed by the present world situation. It is felt that military pressure is out of the question and that there would be great reluctance to exert economic pressure which would further dislocate world trade. This anxiety appears also to influence action here.
Gilbert