793.94/2113
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Castle)
The Japanese Ambassador told me that he had just received a communication from his Government as to the latest developments in Manchuria. He said that the Japanese were trying to draw in their lines, in order to liquidate the present unfortunate situation; that it was also obvious that the Premier and Baron Shidehara had now got control of the situation, at least to a very large extent. He said that it was the feeling of the Japanese Government that the Chinese were consciously making a great deal out of the situation and were enormously exaggerating. This they believe to be due largely to political conditions, Chiang Kai Shek being himself in a very dangerous position and wishing to consolidate Chinese opinion back of them by taking a very belligerent attitude. The Ambassador said that it is very curious that violent anti-Japanese feeling seems to be centered in Nanking, that it is much less violent in Canton and least violent of all in the territories controlled by Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang.
Mr. Debuchi told me that since the lines of communication with Tokyo seemed now to be better established, owing to the fact, in his opinion, that the civilian elements in the Government have taken charge, he will be able to keep the Department much more closely informed as to the march of events than he has been able to do in the past. He said that the Japanese Government had received the request of the League of Nations for a commission of investigation to go into Manchuria, but that the Government had felt itself unable to accept the suggestion. He said that on this point Baron Shidehara and Baron Yoshizawa were perfectly definite. They feel that such a commission would retard rather than increase the speed with which something [Page 68] approaching a status quo ante can be reached, in that the commission would be exceedingly irritating to the military elements. He does not deny that some kind of a commission might later be necessary if Japan does not fulfill its obligations by withdrawing from an untenable position. On the other hand, he thinks strongly that at the present moment the situation is improving and the very best method of settling the whole matter would be through direct conversations with the Chinese. The Ambassador says that his Government is very grateful to this Government for its sympathetic attitude in the whole matter and hopes that we shall be content to let matters rest for the time being until Japan can prove by actions their good intentions. I told the Ambassador that this was very important, that, so far as we could see, there had been a violation of treaties, possibly without intention, and that neither this Government nor the rest of the world could sit quietly by in a situation as tense as the present, although I personally was only too glad to give the Japanese an opportunity to prove the good faith which I know they have. I pointed out to the Ambassador that the world had for years suspected Japanese intentions in Manchuria and that this made the world attitude more critical than it perhaps would be. For this reason I told him it was clear that the Japanese Government should act as quickly and as openly as possible in the restoration of legal treaty conditions. The Ambassador said that he was sure that his Government fully appreciated this and would so act. He spoke of the despatch of British troops to Shanghai some years ago and our own so-called bombardment of Nanking,68 but admitted that this was a different situation than the present in that at that time the question was international and that there could be no claim that we were seeking selfish advantages.
The Ambassador said that now that Baron Shidehara and Baron Wakatsuki69 were in control of the situation, he felt that things would improve perhaps more rapidly than we believe possible, but that it remained very important not to complicate matters by the imposition of some outside body for investigation or anything else. I pointed out to him that possibly another reason for prompt action might be that it was necessary within the range of possibilities—if not probabilities—that the Russians might take the attitude that they were friends of China and would help put out the Japanese; that, if anything of the sort happened, it would infinitely complicate the situation. The Ambassador said that his Government was fully aware of this possibility, but that he thought the evident determination of the Japanese to withdraw its forces from advanced positions had already shown the Russians that there was no intention of annexation of South Manchuria [Page 69] or of interference with Chinese control. I told him that I hoped most sincerely that his belief as to the facts would prove true and that we might see a steady amelioration in the present dangerous situation.
- For incidents in 1927, see Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. ii, pp. 56 ff. and 146 ff.↩
- Japanese Prime Minister.↩