793.003/694
Memorandum by Mr. Ransford S. Miller of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
The British Ambassador called upon the Secretary and Mr. Castle88 today and gave orally the substance of an instruction which he had received from his Government relating to the measures which might be taken in dealing with the Chinese Government in case that Government should make unilateral denunciation of the treaties.
The Ambassador stated that his Government believed that, should the Chinese Government denounce the treaties as a unilateral act, their action would not be in the nature of a face-saving gesture such as was their Mandate of December 28, 1929 (declaring extraterritoriality abolished from January 1, 1930),89 but would create a serious situation for the foreign government that would have to be faced.
As to means of meeting this situation, there had been suggested: (See Mr. Castle’s memorandum of February 12, 1931.90)
First, resort to force by seizing customs houses.
The British Government believed that the use of force for the protection of foreign interests, which were widely scattered throughout China, would not only be impracticable but would not have the support of public opinion at home. Moreover, it was suggested that such a course would be incompatible with the Kellogg Pact.91
At this point, the Secretary suggested that, while the protection of foreign interests throughout China might be impracticable, and had not been considered, the protection of foreign interests in the foreign concessions was a different and much simpler matter.
As the second and third means that had been suggested, the Ambassador mentioned: (2) the threat of the withdrawal of friendship and good will, and (3) the withdrawal of financial assistance for reconstruction purposes. The British Government did not feel that either of the above courses would be effective in influencing the action of the Chinese Government; and, on the other hand, the Chinese were always prepared to respond to such measures with their familiar boycott.
The Secretary remarked that he had not noted any keen interest on the part of either British or American financiers to make loans to [Page 791] China nor, on the other hand, any inclination on the part of the Chinese Government to make use of the Consortium.92
The Ambassador continued that, in the opinion of his Government, the real criterion of the situation was not whether the Chinese laws and administration of justice were satisfactory but whether the Chinese Government had acquired sufficient strength and stability to feel that they were able to denounce the treaties. When that time came, the British Government thought the wisest course would be to reach an agreement quickly and save as much as possible of foreign interests.
The Secretary asked the Ambassador what his Government would do at such a juncture concerning their Judge in China. Would they withdraw him or have him remain? The Ambassador replied that he had not considered this point nor the question of the withdrawal of any British forces in China.
It was agreed that the prospect that the National Convention would be postponed until July and the fact that the Chinese Minister here had recently presented a revised Chinese draft on extraterritoriality for discussion appeared to relieve the situation for the present.
- William R. Castle, Jr., Under Secretary of State since April 1, 1931.↩
- See telegram of December 28, 1929, from the Consul at Nanking, Foreign Relations, 1929, vol. ii, p. 666.↩
- Memorandum, dated February 13, of a conversation with the British Ambassador on February 12; not printed.↩
- Treaty for the renunciation of war, signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.↩
- For text of consortium agreement of October 15, 1920, see ibid., 1920, vol. i, p. 576.↩