793.003/550: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes)
71. Your No. 69, March 6, 5 p.m.71
1. British Ambassador handed Department on March 7 a third person note covering a memorandum containing “substance of instructions sent to Sir Miles Lampson”.
[Page 760]In the Note, the British Government expresses “trust that the policy laid down in these instructions will meet with the agreement of the United States Government” and expresses hope that this Government will instruct the American Minister in the same sense. The contents of the memorandum indicate that the British Government is prepared to concede ultimately practically everything except the surrender of jurisdiction in the International Settlement at Shanghai, provided Chinese assent to certain legal safeguards.
2. Department, although not in complete accord with the plan outlined in this communication, is gratified to observe that the concessions which the Foreign Office is prepared to make coincide with those which the Department has envisaged as possibly or even probably necessary.
The Foreign Office authorizes Sir M. Lampson to give up evocation as the first step. The Department regards this as advisable.
The Foreign Office believes that, in order to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion, the right of criminal jurisdiction will have to be abandoned. The Department concurs. However, the Department doubts whether assent in principle to relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction will, when given, contribute materially to the possibility of gaining assent of the Chinese to the principle of co-judges. The order in which possible abandonment may be made may be discussed between Lampson and Johnson.
The Foreign Office regards agreement upon certain legal safeguards as vital. The Department concurs, but notes that among the safeguards specified there are not included legal guarantees in regard to the rights acquired in immovable property, which rights the Department believes should also be made the subject of legal safeguards.
The Foreign Office believes that, as to safeguards, detail is of essential importance; that no agreement will be possible unless arrangements are made which will meet the requirements of British public opinion; and that if such requirements are met, it will be possible to proceed liberally. The Department’s views, mutatis mutandis, are similar.
The Foreign Office expresses, with reasons, the view that it may be advisable ultimately to give up the idea of co-judges. The Department concurs, but, as stated above, suggests that Johnson and Lampson confer as to order of possible abandonment.
The Foreign Office expresses the view that the exclusion of Shanghai is the most important interest at stake “even if the area excluded is limited to the International Settlement only”. The Department concurs, but, with regard to Shanghai, feels that, it is desirable to think constantly of “Greater Shanghai” and, for the present at least, of the additional treaty ports of Canton, Hankow and Tientsin. Department [Page 761] feels that, on this point as on others, in giving thought to what may be our maximum concessions, we should on each point have in mind possible provisions of such scope and phraseology as will be calculated to safeguard foreign interests in general and thus be likely to enlist the approval and support of the other most interested powers.
3. In the light of recent conversations with Wu and of other information, Department now doubts whether the Chinese Foreign Office has discretion in relation to the points of co-judges, criminal jurisdiction and reserved areas. Department regards as highly dangerous, and to be avoided for the present, assent, even in principle, to concession on these points except as simultaneously the Chinese may be found prepared to agree to (1) satisfactory formulas for specified legal safeguards and (2) exemption of certain areas at certain treaty ports, Shanghai of course being the most important. Department is inclined to believe that the procedure most likely to dissolve what approximates a deadlock would be to sketch tentative agreements comprehending concessions which might be made on the one hand in return for concessions which, if offered on the other, would be accepted, which sketches Wang could submit to the ultimate Chinese authorities with a view to effecting reconsideration of the restrictions under which Chinese Foreign Office apparently is working.
4. On March 11, in reply to the Chinese Minister’s statement of February 20, the Department handed to the Chinese Minister here a statement, the concluding sentences of which read as follows: “It appears from the statement under reference that the Chinese Government now seeks to place these negotiations on a radically different basis from that upon which they have been proceeding during the past two years. Under these circumstances, in order to save time and to facilitate the efforts of both Governments to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion, the Department believes that it is desirable at this stage that the American Minister to China discuss with the Minister for Foreign Affairs the issues thus presented, it being the Department’s understanding that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is discussing such matters with representatives in China of other extraterritorial powers. The Department is, therefore, instructing the American Minister to China to confer with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and hopes that, in consequence of such conference, there may be reached an understanding which will contribute toward an early and successful conclusion of a satisfactory agreement.”
The Department has instructed the American Minister along the lines of the above. The Department’s action does not constitute a definite transfer of the seat of our negotiations, but conversations here remain suspended pending, at least, indications of progress at Nanking. The American Minister is to act in close cooperation with but independently [Page 762] of the British negotiators. If further steps are taken here, notice will be given.
5. Please inform the British Foreign Office of the above.
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