793.94/3314
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the Chinese Chargé (Yen)
Dr. Yen came by appointment made at his request.
He stated that he had a telegram from his Government stating that they were definitely informed that Japan intends, unless the Chinese evacuate, to attack Chinchow. He said they were informing our Minister at Nanking and the League of Nations. They wondered whether there was anything that we could and would do about the matter.
I asked Dr. Yen what he would suggest that we could do. He said that it would seem to him that we might protest. I asked him whether he meant protest in anticipation of or protest after an attack, if intended, had been made. He said that he meant in anticipation of. I said that we were already publicly on record with regard to the matter. He said that the expression of the Secretary of State’s views at the time when the Japanese troops were moving toward Chinchow a few weeks ago had resulted in the halting and withdrawal of those troops and he thought that a similar expression might again have the same effect. I pointed out that in the interval the Council of the [Page 699] League had adopted the Resolution of December 10 and the Secretary of State has expressed his approval of its provisions; and that among those provisions is one in which the disputants undertake to cease hostilities and to refrain from further hostilities.
Dr. Yen said that, notwithstanding that provision, the Chinese Government is convinced that it is Japan’s intention to force the remaining Chinese troops south of the Wall—with hostilities, if need be, for that purpose.
I asked Dr. Yen what he thought China was going to do if presented with an ultimatum or an attack. He said that it was a very difficult political problem; and that it looked as though it would be necessary for the Chinese troops to put up a fight. I said that this Government had expressed to both sides its view that the Chinchow problem was one with regard to which it ought to be possible for the disputants to make an agreement without letting the matter come to battle. Dr. Yen replied that it might look that way, but that it was easier to reason with regard to it than to conceive and make good an agreement. He said that it seemed to him that the important thing at this moment was to concentrate on preventing an attack by the Japanese—such attack, he said, would be unwarranted and purely an act of aggression with a political objective.
I said that I would report what Dr. Yen said to me.