894.00/338
The Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 2, 1932.]
Sir: I have the honor to supplement my despatch No. 383 of November 7, 1931,93 regarding the autonomous power of the Japanese Army.
The autonomous power of the Japanese Army rests principally on the right of the Chief of the General Staff to enter the presence of the Emperor and to obtain his sanction of military policies and war plans without the approval of or interference by any other organ of the Government. As this right—more briefly known as the “right of direct access” (i-a-ku jo-so)—is also possessed by the Chief of the Navy General Staff, comment in this despatch respecting the power of the Army is equally applicable to the Navy. There are also other officers of the Army and the Navy with this right: namely, Army Division Commanders, Commanders of the Chosen, Taiwan, and Kwantung Armies, the Inspector General of Military Education, Commanders-in-Chief of Naval Stations and Fleets, and Commanders of Minor Naval Stations.* As any such officer, however, obtains Imperial sanction only in connection with matters lying within his sphere of duties, the right of direct access gains its principal significance by the fact that the two Chiefs of Staff control strategy and tactics. The senior member of the Supreme Military Council also has the right to enter directly into the presence of the Emperor, but only in an advisory capacity.
This right of direct access has had, I am convinced, a very vital connection with the Manchurian affair. Had this right not existed, the incident at Mukden of September 18th could scarcely have developed into the present serious situation. In fact, it is quite possible that no incident would have occurred.
Before entering, however, into a discussion of the relation of the right of direct access to the Manchurian incident, a brief description of the division of power that exists in the Japanese Government may help to clarify the discussion. In Japan all power is technically in [Page 690] the hands of the Emperor.† The Emperor is advised by the various Governmental organs that have the right of direct access after which, theoretically, he makes decisions—actually, he sanctions whatever course of policy or action may be presented by the head of the organ “advising” him. The following diagram indicates the various bodies which are directly under the Emperor. Each one has the right of direct access. In some cases an organ may have no relation to any other organ, or it may have a connection that is more or less tenuous.
This chart illustrates the independence of the Army and the Navy of control by other branches of the Government. The connecting link with the Cabinet is the presence on the Supreme Military Council of the Ministers of the Army and of the Navy, who report to the Prime Minister the proceedings of the Council. As the Supreme Military Council‡ does no more than advise the Emperor with respect to such matters as may be presented to it and as it seems in practice seldom to meet, this connection is not especially significant. (In actual practice the Cabinet’s one effective check on the military is control of supplies, a check that, if not exercised with the greatest caution, might precipitate a serious crisis.) The presence of the two Ministers on the Supreme War Council is, technically, the Prime Minister’s only source of information of what the military is contemplating. As neither Chief of Staff needs, in practice, to submit to the Supreme War Council his plans affecting strategy and tactics [Page 691] but may submit them directly to the Emperor for sanction, an important policy or action can be initiated without the knowledge of other branches of the Government.
(In a subsequent despatch I shall discuss in detail the civilian organs of the Government which have the right of direct access and which are wholly or partially independent of one another; namely, the Audit Bureau, which is independent of the other organs; the Imperial Household Department, whose connecting link with the Cabinet is the Minister of the Imperial Household but which has powers beyond the control of the Cabinet; the Courts, whose only connection with the Cabinet is the transmission of decisions to the Emperor through the Minister of Justice, the latter being, however, according to one of the framers of the Constitution, “no more than a messenger boy” in this case; the Cabinet, which presents administrative measures to the Emperor; and the Privy Council, which “advises” the Emperor with respect to certain measures of the Cabinet.)
This independence from other Governmental organs, which either Chief of General Staff enjoys, made possible the military action of September 18th that developed into the virtual control of Manchuria by the Japanese. I have been informed by a sound and very conservative authority that the procedure in this case with respect to Imperial sanction was in general as follows: the Chief of the Army General Staff foresaw that eventually Japanese lives and property in Manchuria would suffer from Chinese aggression; that he therefore obtained Imperial sanction—some time before September 18th—to take whatever measures might be necessary for protection of Japanese lives and property in case of Chinese aggression; that the Commander of the Kwantung Army was informed that this sanction had been obtained; and that “when the Chinese destroyed the South Manchuria Railway tracks near Mukden on September 18th”, the Commander of the Kwantung Army thus had Imperial permission to take “whatever action he might deem necessary” for the protection of Japanese lives and property. My informant concluded scornfully—for he is apparently not an admirer of Baron Shidehara—“the Minister for Foreign Affairs knew nothing about it.” From this it may be inferred that he meant also that the civilian organs of the Government did not know of the plan of the Japanese military against the Chinese. When they did learn of it, the power to decide what measures against the Chinese were necessary lay with the military.
In addition to the great latitude of action, derived from the right of direct access, this right has also had, I believe, a profound effect on the mentality of the Japanese military, an effect that has been a very important factor in the Manchurian affair. Had the right of [Page 692] direct appeal not existed, it seems probable that the attitude of the Japanese military toward civilian branches of the Government would have been less arrogant and less impatient of non-military direction. For an accurate description of this attitude, a brief historical survey is necessary.
Following the Restoration of the Emperor in 1868 by the loyal clans, a group of men began the modernization of Japan. The feudal armed forces were succeeded by a modern army. In the organization of this army that group of men first modeled it after the French army and then, following the defeat of France in 1870, after the Prussian. The independence of the military from civilian control was an important factor in each of those military systems.
There were three outstanding reasons why this system of an independent military should have appealed to those Japanese who modernized the army. To gain the loyalty of the country in support of the restoration of the Emperor and to discredit disaffected clans, the group in power emphasized consistently that the ancient prerogatives of the Emperor were being restored to him after having been usurped by the Shogun since the time of Yoritomo (1192 A. D.). The placing of the army (and the navy) directly under the Emperor was described as a return to the Emperor of one of those traditional prerogatives. Secondly, those men who restored the Emperor and who modernized Japan were themselves warriors or members of the loyal warrior clans. It was natural that they would look with disfavor on any system that would subordinate the military to civilian control.* Thirdly, the Napoleonic and Prussian systems were, indeed, the nearest approach to Japanese experience, for from antiquity to the Restoration the control of political power in Japan had been retained only by armed force.
The Office of the General Staff was created in 1878. Dr. Minobe, the leading living commentator on the Japanese Constitution, wrote in 1927 in this regard as follows: “The (Japanese) General Staff Office … is a replica of the German (Prussian) General Staff Office. In Germany (Prussia) a clear distinction or demarcation was established between military power and political power, the General Staff Office being vested with an absolute power to control the army quite independently of the Government … (In Japan) there exist two different bodies or organs advisory to the Emperor, one for the [Page 693] exercise of his supreme power over general political and administrative affairs (the Cabinet) and the other for the exercise of his supreme power over the Army and the Navy (the General Staff) … Those matters belonging to the latter are not included in the sphere of the functions of the Cabinet Ministers … Those who are in a position to advise the Emperor on military or naval affairs … belong directly to the Emperor and are not under the control of any Minister of State.”93a
In a recent conversation with a member of my staff, one of the framers of Japan’s Constitution, a staunch supporter of ultra-conservative ideas, repudiated the suggestion that the Prussian system had been imitated. He maintained stoutly that modernization of the Japanese army had been no more than a return to pre-Yoritomo days. The truth, I believe, includes both arguments.
As a result of the theory that the right of direct access with its corollary that from earliest times the army has been under the direct control of the Emperor—except when that power was illegally usurped,—the Army regards itself as heir to a noble tradition, the historical protectors of the Emperor’s person and the Emperor’s honor. This belief, together with other principles of the Emperor cult, is instilled into officers and men, I am informed, during their period of military training. It is not unnatural, therefore, that the Army in Manchuria felt humiliated by quiescence before Baron Shidehara’s conciliatory policy in Manchuria; believed the honor of the Emperor and of the Army impaired by the attitude of Chang Hsueh-liang and his army—an attitude issuing from the conciliatory policy; and that, finally, when Imperial sanction had been obtained and a pretext found, destroyed Chang’s power with vigor, determination, and éclat, brooking no civilian efforts at control.
Herein, it would seem, lies also the explanation of the reported insubordinate action of younger officers in the face of higher authority, whether civilian or military. The alleged plan of a military coup d’état and establishment of a dictatorship† is an illustration of this mentality in its most exaggerated form. But there have been indications also that junior officers in Manchuria have gone further than their senior officers had commanded. Such indiscipline has been chiefly due to, it seems to me, the effect on the military mind of the right of direct access to the Emperor and all that it implies.
In conclusion, I should like to discuss briefly the legal source of the right of direct access in modern times, for I cannot help but feel that efforts will be made in the future by civilian organs of the [Page 694] Government to bring the military under civilian control. The difficulty of success in such an endeavor will be increased by the fact that the right of direct access to the presence of the Emperor seems to rest more firmly in tradition and usage than in the written legal word, and in the written word implication may prove to be more effective than exact expression.
The Minister of Justice, for example, said in a recent conversation that the right of direct access is granted by Article XI of the Constitution. As this Article no more than states that “The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy”, it is not very helpful in the settlement of one of the most perplexing problems of present-day Japan.‡
Dr. Minobe, the commentator, does not give the Constitution as the source of this right but Article VII of the regulations of 1889 defining the organization of the Cabinet, which was established in 1885. This Article reads:
“Article VII. Notice shall be given by the Minister of the Army or by the Minister of the Navy, as the case may be, to the Prime Minister of those matters that pertain to military secrets and command which are submitted to the Throne, excepting those cases wherein such matters are specially submitted to the Cabinet by order of the Emperor.”
Doctor Minobe states that this article refers to what is known as “direct access”. The article appears, however, to be inadequate as a definite, indisputable legal source of this right.
The only other regulations in which the right of direct access is mentioned (or implied)—as far as the Embassy has been able to discover after exhaustive research—are those regulations that govern the Office of the Army General Staff and those that govern the Office of the Navy General Staff. Article II of the former reads as follows:
“The Chief of the (Army) General Staff is appointed by the Emperor from among generals and lieutenant-generals of the Army and is placed under the direct control of the Emperor. He participates in military affairs of the Imperial Headquarters (Iaku) and controls all plans relating to national defence and military tactics, besides supervising the General Staff Office.”
Article II of the latter reads:
“The Chief of the Naval General Staff is under the direct control of the Emperor and participates in the important affairs of the Imperial Headquarters (Iaku) and also controls the official business [Page 695] of the General Staff. The Chief of the Naval General Staff is appointed by the Emperor personally.”
These regulations were issued in 1908, long after the right of direct access had become firmly established. Whether or not it was dealt with in previous regulations, extended search by the Embassy has not revealed. It is not, however, a vital question, as regulations of an office that delegate to that office so important a right could scarcely be regarded as the legal source of that right.
In short, written legal sources of the right of direct access to the Emperor by either Chief of General Staff is sufficiently indefinite to make the question one of great controversy among Japanese scholars. This very vagueness, it may be, is a source of strength to those who maintain that the military should continue independent of control by civilian branches of the Government. Advocates of the present division of powers would seem to have as their chief sources of strength both tradition and usage. I shall, however, discuss the legal aspect in greater detail in a subsequent despatch dealing with the right of direct access by other organs of the Government.
. . . . . . .
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- Page 256 of the Kempo Seigi (The Essential Meaning of the Constitution) by Dr. Tatsukichi Minobe, the leading living commentator on the Japanese Constitution. Published in 1927. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Dr. Shinyo Uesugi, one of the foremost commentators on the Japanese Constitution, stated in his commentary, published in 1924, that “The Emperor possesses in his palm the power of ruling and controlling all affairs of State and must not be treated on the same level with regard to the privileges of the sovereigns and rulers of other countries.” [Footnote in the original.]↩
- The members of the Supreme War Council are: the Field Marshal, the Fleet Admiral, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Army, the Chief of the Army General Staff, and Generals and Flag Officers especially appointed Supreme War Councillors by the Throne. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- In this connection, the recent statement of one of the men who wrote Japan’s Constitution is of interest. He said that at a meeting of those men who were modernizing Japan’s army, the question of control came up. Both General Saigo and Prince Yamagata objected violently to civilian control, pointing out that, if the Army and Navy were subordinate to the Cabinet, at some future time a political party might reduce either branch far below the proper strength. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Omissions indicated in the original.↩
- Despatch No. 382 of November 7, 1931. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Article XII of the Constitution is also usually cited in this connection. It reads: “The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.” [Footnote in the original.]↩