793.94/3139: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
867. From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from Sweetser:
“Briand today submitted to the Twelve the following letter from Yoshizawa dated December 8th:
‘I did not fail to telegraph to Tokyo the contents of your note of yesterday evening and I reserve the right to reply to it eventually.
As I said to you during our meeting Baron Shidehara thought it possible to forestall an immediate danger through an agreement with the Chinese upon the principle proposed by them. The only way of forestalling this danger seemed [to be?] to have the Chinchow region evacuated by Chinese troops. Apart from the objective in view the question of the exact limit was essentially secondary as moreover I observed to you yesterday. The essential thing was to have the Chinese and ourselves begin conversations. Baron Shidehara had hoped that the Council would understand this and would support his efforts to avoid any collision. This was why he had urgently requested your intervention with the Chinese.
I have just received a telegram from Tokyo which informs me that the Government has no intention, after the limits of the zone has [have?] been fixed, to station troops east of the zone. No force would be sent there except under exceptional circumstances such as the necessity for repressing the activity of bandits. This telegram added that at present we have a small detachment in the Hsinmin region the presence of which is still necessary to preserve order and conditions do not permit their immediate withdrawal.
I wished to inform you of the foregoing thinking that it would perhaps allow you to give some new information to the Council.’
Briand also reported a long cable just received from the French Ambassador in Tokyo giving the substance of a talk with Shidehara regarding Chinchow. Shidehara had explained to him the exact location of Japanese troops and their desire not to occupy points nearer Chinchow but simply to repress banditry therefrom. He claimed there were many Chinese regulars nearby who should be brought back to Chinchow and then to Shanhaikwan. The Ambassador said he had insisted with all possible vehemence against any new military movement at the very moment when a special diplomatic settlement was being reached in Paris and expressed the view that any Japanese military advance would bring the whole laborious effort to naught. [Page 655] Shidehara replied that he had never ceased to endeavor to restrain the military but could not guarantee the nonoccupation of Chinchow unless the Chinese troops withdraw. Japanese military leaders felt they had been duped by the Chinese and, in view of the menace to the Japanese position, might quite well feel it necessary to take action which probably would not stop before Chinchow. As regards the Paris negotiations, Shidehara had said that Japan could not admit any discussion of the clause on police measures which would destroy the Japanese position thereon.
A discussion then followed amongst the Twelve as to whether the Japanese reply quoted above justified any future effort at negotiations regarding Chinchow. Cecil said that he did not yet understand what it meant; that it seemed to him extremely vague; and that the only definition of ‘east of the zone’ would seem to mean the ocean. He did not understand whether the Japanese would permit Chinese administration between Chinchow and the Liao River. If not disorder would of course follow and Japanese troops would have to go in. Drummond thought it might be well to transmit this reply to the Chinese; Cecil thought it would do no good. Mutius thought the reply only a polite acknowledgment without any opening for new negotiations. Briand then expressed the general view that the Council had no choice but to let the matter rest on the basis of this Japanese answer.
A brief exchange then followed on the plans for this afternoon’s meeting. Drummond anticipated no difficulty as regards the resolution itself; Briand said he did not see how after all these negotiations it would be possible to raise any difficulty on any point and certainly not one sufficiently serious to justify a rupture. Up to lunch time the Japanese had not received their instructions.
One point as to future action after Council adjourned was also touched upon. Briand said that in order not to be left entirely alone with the whole responsibility for this problem and in order also to avoid even the slightest impression that the Council had abandoned its task he is planning to suggest in his final speech, after the adoption of the resolution that the members of the Drafting Committee who had been of such great help throughout should remain in touch with him. These members are Cecil, who could be replaced if necessary by some one from the British Ministry, Madariaga, newly appointed Spanish Ambassador in Paris, and Colban, Norwegian Minister here.
Briand also made a brief and cautious report on his interview with General Dawes yesterday. He said that the General had come to see him and had renewed his expression of the American Government and its agreement in the general program laid out. He had said the Government was disposed to aid in any possible way and to reinforce insofar as it could the action taken here. Already Briand recalled it had several times done so notably regarding steps for the prevention of further hostilities. Briand thought the American Government might take some similar action as regards the resolution which would of course be important.
Cecil said it would be very worth while if General Dawes could come to the Council and state this publicly. Briand seemed hesitant at this suggestion. Cecil added that, after all, the Council members were not dangerous; if Dawes did not want to come personally, he might write a letter. Briand said he himself had been very cautious on this [Page 656] particular point; he had not wanted to go beyond where the General could follow. Scialoja wondered if the Council could not give General Dawes the opportunity to make some kind of declaration. Cecil thought this a possible course; that General Dawes could perhaps come to the meeting, make a declaration, and then depart without, however, actually taking a seat at the table. Such a course would obviously greatly undermine [sic] the common efforts for a peaceful solution and dramatically demonstrate the unity of all agencies endeavoring to prevent further hostilities. Drummond explained that the American Government seemed anxious to do all it possibly could to help the Council particularly in its representations to the two Governments but obviously did not wish to be asked to appear at the Council table. The matter was left with Briand stating he would make discreet soundings which would not be pressed to the embarrassment of either side.[”]
- [Dawes]
- Shaw
- Telegram in five sections.↩