Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/3120: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State

Paris, December 8, 1931—11 p.m.
[Received December 8—10:25 p.m.⁶⁴]

861. From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from Sweetser:

“Drummond tonight following General Dawes’ interview with Briand transmitted the following suggestion[s] as to possible action which the American Government might helpfully take should it feel so inclined:

1[st.] That it would be very helpful if the Government found it possible to say that it attached particular importance to the proposed commission, that it had noted with sympathy the suggestion that an American citizen be included amongst the members, and that should the Council decide to give effect to this suggestion it would look with favor upon the appointment. Some such statement as this would be useful not only in a general way but also to set at rest certain rumors which only this afternoon were brought forward by a member [of] the Council, Scialoja, that the American Government had changed its views in this regard.

2d. That the American Government felt that the appointment of this commission and the launching of a far-reaching program of study and conciliation ought to contribute greatly to an appeasement of spirit and especially to the removal of the danger of more extensive armed conflict.

3d. That the publication of reports from American military observers either in Paris or Washington as is the practice of certain other governments would contribute greatly to dispelling the many false rumors constantly circulating as to the military situation and to informing world public opinion of the exact situation.

Drummond particularly stressed that these suggestions were put forth only most tentatively and with full realization that for one reason or another they might not be found practicable.

Subsequent also to General Dawes’ visit the Japanese delegation asked if the public meeting scheduled for tomorrow afternoon could not be postponed because of their lack of instructions. It was explained to them that while it would be very inconvenient to postpone the meeting entirely and perhaps even unnecessary in view of the fact that their instructions might still arrive, it would be possible to postpone it after the reading of the resolution and the declaration provided they found it necessary at that moment to so request. They agreed to this arrangement.

Previously at a meeting of the Twelve it had been agreed that tomorrow’s session would begin the reading of the resolution and the declaration. It was hoped that a vote might be taken straight away before a declaration by either party but it was not thought that it would turn out to be possible to do so. If not, the two parties would make declarations on which the other members of the Council would comment just as little as possible. The only declaration other than those [of] the parties which is now mentioned would be that from Latin America[n] members to the effect that the protection of railway investments and property by military action, which had been mentioned in one of the Japanese communications, should not be accepted as a principle of international relations. Thereafter when the specific affairs of Manchuria had been terminated, the President would make a broad general declaration as to the advisability of necessity for peaceful settlement of international disputes, the avoidance [of] all sorts of force and the guarantee of treaties.

The Twelve also had a final report from Cecil on the last meetings of the Drafting Committee with Ito and Sze. The only comments made were on the new clause regarding police measures, the joint sentence of which both Fotitch and Mutius thought committed the Council to an indorsement rather than a mere statement of the Japanese viewpoint. A slight change was suggested to meet this difficulty. A further exchange also took place on Madariaga’s efforts to prevent nationals of only the five great powers from being members of the commission. While it was recognized that the members must be chosen predominantly for their personal capacities and not for their nationality, it was the consensus of opinion that the only practical way to find the best available men and make the best balanced commission would be to intrust the choice to the President with the assistance of the Secretary-General. The parties would of course be consulted to be sure that no one wholly unacceptable to them was appointed and the member[s] of the Council would be informed of the final choices.

At a previous meeting of the Drafting Committee Cecil stated that Matsudaira had told him that he was authorized to say that Japan did not intend to occupy Chinchow. He conveyed the impression to Cecil that Japanese troops would not go there unless they were drawn in, that is to say, unless a considerable Chinese concentration took place and they were obliged in self-defense to attack.”

• [Dawes]
• Shaw

64. Telegram in four sections.