793.94/3052: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
846. From Ambassador Dawes: Following is report from Sweetser:
“Ito appeared before the Drafting Committee this morning with the suggestions from Tokyo as to the resolution and the President’s declaration which he frankly stated did not constitute good news.
The only amendment suggested to the resolution was the omission of that part of the fifth paragraph establishing a link between the commission and evacuation. Ito explained at length the spirit in which his Government had proposed the commission which it felt to be a very constructive idea. Japan, he said, had cooperated with the League most faithfully ever since its inception but that had naturally applied to matters predominantly in Europe. Japan felt however that the League’s work should be extended outside Europe but necessarily adapted to a somewhat different basis. Last year when the [Page 623] technical collaboration with China was suggested Japan had welcomed the proposal in this spirit. Her Government felt that the League should begin in this way and little by little gain ground until it could enter the political field.
Now however the League was face to face with a problem of the utmost complexity. Japan regretted that it had come so quickly but felt that the best way to initiate this political cooperation was to make ‘a vast inquiry’ to bring out the whole situation in the Far East. His Government wished consequently a commission not of technicians or experts but of statesmen commanding the confidence of the whole world. In this way the double objective would be secured of effecting a better understanding of the Far East and of initiating a wide cooperation between the League and that part of the world. Approaching the question in that spirit the Government had found it very difficult to accept any modifications in the text. Especially was this so in connection with the provision in question which was taken to mean a final date for withdrawal. It seemed also to contradict the previous provision that the commission should have nothing to do with military movements. If the commission were put in these terms his Government would have to reconsider the whole question of its desirability.
Cecil immediately replied that he did not understand the difficulty at all. If evacuation were completed by the time the commission arrived as Japan has constantly seemed to promise the question would not arise. If evacuation were not completed the Council would want to know the facts. Japan had constantly recognized that evacuation was desirable at the earliest possible moment and had herself agreed that the commission should have very wide powers. Consequently he could not see wherein the difficulty lies. Leger urged that Japan should not worry about the time element; evacuation was definitely stated to depend upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. Ito said he understood this; that his delegation had cabled his Government exactly these reasons which he found excellent; but that his Government maintained its view.
Madariaga pointed out that the Council also had to consider Chinese susceptibilities. They had also taken out the phrase as to the point to which the Council attaches great importance and had inserted this as a balance. Colban felt it was so evident that the commission would have to consider evacuation that, even if the Chinese had not requested this paragraph, it would have been the Council’s duty to insert it as the question of evacuation was primordial. Ito said again however that his delegation had not been able to make the Government understand this viewpoint.
Drummond thought possibly the Government feared the commission’s right to make recommendations and interpreted this right as being direct to the parties. In that case the recommendations could be definitely stated as to the Council. Cecil offers a redraft to the effect that, as it had not yet been possible to carry out the engagements taken on September 30th, it would be a first duty for the commission to succumb and report to the Council. He asked if it were a question of putting the matter in a way to meet difficulties which do not really exist or if the whole discussion were really useless. If the Council could meet the Japanese difficulties by redrafting, all right; if not he [Page 624] thought it best to have a public meeting and thresh the whole matter out.
Ito stated quite frankly that his Government interpreted this phrase as constituting an obligation to withdraw on a fixed date and, as anticipated, evacuation by the time the commission arrived. Cecil reacted very strongly to this. Surely he said the Japanese Government could not think the commission would not investigate that question. It would be almost fantastic not to inquire into this central point and would be treating the commission as children to prevent them from doing so. He could not see what Japan’s object was; it would appear to the world that Japan despite all her promises did not intend to evacuate and Ito agreed as to this danger but his Government’s view was very strong.
Colban pointed out that on September 30 Japan had agreed that evacuation was so urgent that the Council could meet on October 14. Now the Council only asked that the commission report on evacuation when it arrived. This was infinitely less than Japan had already accepted. Ito agreed that that viewpoint was reasonable but his Government considered the matter as vital and this view had penetrated to the spirit of the people. There are a million Koreans in Manchuria; if Japan cannot protect them the situation between Japan and Korea would be very bad. What people are saying privately in Japan, he added, is that 36 years ago Japan had come to a good settlement with China when the three powers intervened42 and forced them to give up all they wanted; now again they feared the entry of foreign intervention.
Cecil concluded this part of the discussion with the request to Ito to know if the Japanese delegation had either any other drafting or any other proposal to meet the difficulty. The Committee of Twelve he said had fixed this principle and would not abandon it. Ito would have to give the commission this power and was not ready to agree to its omission. Ito promised to reply today.
As regards the President’s declaration Ito submitted a new draft, the most important part of which concerned Japan’s rights to take police measures. The whole last part of the declaration after the word ‘subjects’ would be replaced by the following paragraph, ‘in these, it is well understood that the resolution is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of the Japanese subjects against the dangers of bandits and lawless elements. Such action is admittedly an exceptional measure, pending the restoration of normal conditions in Manchuria’.
Cecil expressed the opinion straight away that the Council would not be prepared to accept this wording and that it would be better therefore to leave out the whole paragraph. Ito then pointed out that police action against bandits was a wholly normal and usual procedure which had been necessary for many years and which was even in the interests of the Chinese. No one had ever seen any inconvenience about it; since the trouble it was even more necessary and frequent. He did not understand the Council’s preoccupation in the matter nor was it [Page 625] materially possible for Japan to attach observers to these police movements.
Cecil said the Council’s fears were obvious in that the pursuit of bandits had led to the occupation of large parts of China. He understood the abnormal conditions prevailing in Manchuria and the necessity of certain police work, not least of all, in the interest of the Chinese themselves. The Japanese phraseology however would allow the establishment of a military protectorate over any part of Manchuria desired. To this of course the Council could not in any way agree. He therefore suggested leaving out the provision altogether with the Japanese making whatever declaration they wished. This would protect the good faith of the Japanese and save the Council from accepting a formula contrary to the Covenant and to international law.
Ito explained that there were two types of police action, the first, that which had been done for years for the sole protection of the railway zone, and the second, which was purely temporary, for the protection of Japanese in certain centers now occupied. He had tried to avoid police measures from in any way assuming a military form. Also he personally would have preferred not to include this provision in the declaration and his delegation had so telegraphed Tokyo, but Tokyo attached great importance to it. Cecil said it was hopeless to ask the Council to agree to this draft; some members had even doubted if they had not gone too far in their own draft. He again urged that Ito request the delegation to consider the advisability of dropping the whole matter out of the declaration, which Ito agreed to do.
Ito also suggested certain other minor changes which probably will be accepted in part.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw