793.94/2955: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
815. From Ambassador Dawes: Following is Sweetser’s report:
“Doctor Sze accompanied by Doctor Willoughby12 and Colonel Olds presented to the Drafting Committee this morning China’s suggested changes to the Council’s draft resolution. He prefaced the discussion by saying that while China was entirely willing to discuss these details in Paris a new situation seemed to be developing in Manchuria where the Japanese appeared to be either unwilling or unable to carry out their agreements. He wondered therefore if the negotiators here might not be obliged to await the turn of events.
Drummond drew his attention to reassuring press despatches appearing in the afternoon papers and giving definite indications of withdrawal around Chinchow. Cecil, after stating that British official information indicated no disturbing change in the military side beyond the appearance of a Japanese aeroplane over Chinchow, decided as Chairman of the Committee that these broader questions were outside its competence.
The only amendment suggested to the first paragraph of the Council’s resolution was the addition of the phrase that the withdrawal of Japanese troops be ‘attested by neutral observers’. Cecil and Madariaga both felt and Sze agreed that this provision could better be inserted later.
Then followed a substantive amendment (1a)
as follows:
Cecil pointed out that this presented the old time limit difficulty which would destroy any possibility of unanimity in the Council. He himself would have liked a date but the others could not be brought to agree on it. Experience already had shown a date to be impossible; the appointment of a commission considerably changed the situation as its very first task would be to consider and to report upon evacuation. In reply to Colonel Olds’ inquiry as to what would happen in case of a dispute between the commission and one of the Governments, Cecil pointed out that the matter could be referred to the Council and stated that the events of the last few days had shown that the Council’s wishes had weight with the proposal.
Sze again urged, however, that China must have some definite assurance as to the termination of the evacuation; it must have confidence in one way or another that the Japanese troops would be withdrawn reasonably soon. Cecil agreed with this desire but pointed out [Page 584] that, if it came to trying to fix a definite date, the Japanese might quite well urge that the Council does not at the moment have sufficient information and was in fact appointing a commission for the very purpose of securing information on this and other subjects. Madariaga suggested replacing all of the paragraph after the word ‘areas’ with the provision that in case of disagreement between the parties they could appeal to the commission who could in turn report to the Council. Cecil hesitated, however, making the commission so much a court of appeal.
Leger thereupon suggested adding a sentence at the very end of the resolution to the effect that, should evacuation not have been possible before the arrival of the commission, the latter should assure itself for the information of the Council as to how far the measures undertaken by China for the protection of Japanese lives and property had become effective. He pointed out that what China wanted was a guarantee against excessive demands or prolonged occupation. The commission would not necessitate delay; it was being sent out without prejudice to evacuation; it could, however, report on the efficacy of measures taken by both sides. Cecil supported this view saying that the Council could indicate that one of the first tasks of the commission would be to consider evacuation and recommend as to date if that evacuation has not already taken place; the Council could hardly, however, dictate to the commission in advance.
Olds urged again that the total absence of any stated period looked to the Chinese like a postponement to the Greek kalends. If a provisional date could be put in, even if made subject to adjustment, it would help greatly. What the Chinese wanted was a definite goal and not a complete uncertainty.
Colban found Leger’s suggestion very acceptable. He felt it would give China very definite guarantees of withdrawal. The Council would continue its jurisdiction in the matter; the commission would represent it on the spot; he did not think China should fear indefinite occupation. Evacuation is the counterpart of security; the commission can report on both and thus give real, not paper, satisfaction.
In reply to Sze’s question as to whether the commission could
make an interim report on this special subject, Cecil said the
Council wanted the commission to be as authoritative and
powerful as it could possibly be. They wanted to secure the very
best possible membership and must therefore give the commission
the widest terms of reference. The situation involved was one of
immense international complexity unlike anything else in the
world. He thought however that the President of the Council
could make a full declaration on these points. In reply to Olds’
renewed query as to whether the commission could make an interim
report on evacuation without waiting for its report on the whole
of Manchuria, Madariaga drew attention to the first paragraph
putting withdrawal in the very fore, but at the same time urged
a certain elasticity in order to meet the circumstances in the
case. It was then agreed at Sze’s suggestion that the commission
[Committee?] would give him a draft
on the lines suggested by Leger. The Committee then passed to
(1b) and (1c)
of the Chinese proposals reading as follows:
Also an addition was suggested to paragraph 4 as follows: ‘and to get into touch with the parties as to the localities and subjects with regard to which either of the parties wishes this information’.
Cecil, however, said it would create difficulties to attempt to establish a system of League representatives on top of the government observers—now on the spot. At the moment there are already nine observers at Chinchow; it would not be possible to get so many through the League and it would even raise the question of unanimity with Japan. Olds, however, wondered if there were not a difficulty about government observers; if, for instance, they sent in a scathing report, the government receiving it might not want to pass it on. Both Cecil and Colban thought that League observers could not report as freely as government observers; they must necessarily be very cautious; government observers could be freer and thus send in fuller information. Colban suggested that the system of cooperation among the government observers already arranged might be explained fully by the President of the Council showing that several Governments had sent observers; that the Council had suggested that they cooperate; that several Governments had issued instructions in this respect; that the observers were actually working in this sense; and that the Council was being informed. In response to Olds’ suggestion that the present provisions on this subject were inadequate, Cecil agreed that the President of the Council would do well to state what had been done and how the whole system of information was being organized. A further paragraph (4a) was also suggested.
- ‘(4a) It is understood that against the withdrawal of the Japanese troops the Government of Japan shall retain within the railway areas only such guards as it claims a treaty right to maintain there.’
Sze said this provision was very important. It was involved under the Portsmouth Treaty and other agreements and led to the question of reciprocal withdrawal. Cecil, however, felt that such a provision would be very difficult for the Council in that it would do the very thing they had avoided so far of drawing the Council into a discussion of treaties. Drummond also said such questions could be brought before the commission; Cecil felt that the commission’s most important task would be to explore these treaties.
Sze stated he would later wish to put forward ideas regarding the commission, especially as to its terms of reference. Cecil reiterated the Council’s desire to give it the most general powers and did not want to cut them down in any way but that he would be glad to have any suggestions on the subject.
It was thus left that the Committee would send Sze a formula on evacuation; that Sze would send in his views on the commission; and that the Drafting Committee would report to the Twelve at 4 o’clock.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw