Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2945½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] November 28, 1931.

The Japanese Ambassador said he had come down to give me some fragments of hopeful news. In the first place he told me that the evacuation of Tsitsihar was practically completed; that it had taken a long time, owing to some 300 frost-bitten troops who had to be looked after carefully; and that now there were left there only two companies.

The Ambassador then told me that he wanted to reassure me about the movement on Chinchow; that he had every reason to believe that that had been stopped and that the troops which had been advancing towards Chinchow had in some measure returned. I pressed him on this point as to the date of his reports and he asserted his latest report, that he told me confidentially was from their Military Attaché, was later than my last report which was dated November 27, at 7:00 p.m.

The Ambassador went on to ask me whether I had heard about the suggestion for evacuation made by the Chinese Minister, Wellington Koo, and produced two papers, one being a suggestion made by Koo, and the other the reply of the Japanese Government, which are annexed hereto as “A” and “B” respectively. He said he thought this was of great importance.

I then brought up the report through Tokyo about the statement made by the Foreign Office based on a report of what I said yesterday. The Ambassador said he had heard it but that he attached very little importance to it. I showed him the copy of the alleged statement made by me which I had just received from Forbes, attached to his message No. 239, of November 28, 8:00 p.m.⁷ I asked the Ambassador to read it and asked him whether he believed I had ever said anything like that. He said no, of course not. I then told him that I had denied it and showed him the copy of the telegram of November 28th which I had sent to Tokyo⁸ giving what I had actually said, and let him read that. He said that the matter was of little importance in his opinion, except that he was very sorry that the spokesman of the Foreign Office had apparently lost his head and made an attack on me. I told him that I had not supposed the original despatch to me was confidential because it had not said in the body of the message that the remarks by Shidehara to Forbes were confidential, and had only contained the message at the top. He told me not to worry about that; that he would straighten it out.

H[enry] L. S[timson]

Annex A

Suggestion Made by the Chinese [Acting] Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Representatives of Great Britain, the United States and France at Nanking on November 24, 1931⁹

Pour éviter tout acte d’hostilité, et si le Japon insiste sur la nécessité du retrait des troupes Chinoises de la région de Kinchow jusqu’à Shanhaikouan, la chine est prête à accéder a ce désir. Et ainsi entendu qu’il ne s’agira que d’une mesure temporaire en attendant le règlement général de la question de Mandchourie intervenir, et sous les conditions suivantes:

Le Japon garantirait à la France, l’Angleterre et l[les] États-Unis que ses troupes ne pénétrerait pas dans cette zone où l’administration Chinoise continuerait de fonctionner, police comprise.

Annex B

Reply of the Japanese Government Handed to the French Ambassador at Tokyo on November 27, 1931

The Japanese Government share with the French Government the earnest hope that hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese forces may be averted in the region of Chinchow. Accordingly, should China withdraw her troops entirely from Chinchow and the neighborhood to Shanhai-Kwan and places west thereof, and maintain only the administration (including the police) of the district from Chinchow to Shanhai-Kwan, the Japanese Government are ready to undertake in principle that the Japanese troops will not penetrate into the zone thus evacuated by the Chinese troops, unless in the unlooked-for event of some serious emergency arising to jeopardize the security of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in north China and the safety of the Japanese garrisons stationed there. The Japanese Government are prepared to cause the competent Japanese authorities at any time to discuss locally with the Chinese authorities of the district the exact definition of the line above referred to, and the details relating to the execution of this arrangement.

7. Ibid., p. 51.
8. Telegram No. 248, November 28, 2 p.m., ibid., p. 54.
9. For English version of this document, see telegram of November 24, midnight, from the Minister in China, p. 558.