793.94/2930: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
811. From Ambassador Dawes: Following report is from Sweetser:
“Sze called on Briand this noon to again urge the fixation of an actual date for evacuation even if that date had to be conditional. [Page 574] He stressed the necessity of this for Chinese opinion and some discussion ensued as to whether any method could be found for giving satisfaction. One suggestion now being considered is that the President of the Council in his declaration after the adoption of the report might express the hope that Japanese troops would be withdrawn by the time the commission arrived. Should, however, the question oi security not have been satisfactorily settled by then, the commission would naturally consider this question first of all. It was pointed out to Dr. Sze that as the whole emphasis of the Council’s resolution would be placed on evacuation it would be natural for the commission to begin its work in Manchuria and in connection with that subject.
Sze also expressed anxiety regarding the situation at Chinchow and presented a telegram from his Government that an imminent attack was feared and that small neutral detachments, if sent by only one member of the Council, seemed to be essential. Briand assured him that the Council members were giving very serious consideration to the Chinchow situation and informed him that the British and French representatives had last night sent telegrams in accordance with the form suggested yesterday. He also said that Shidehara had told the French Ambassador in Tokyo that after consultation with the Minister of War, strict orders had been given to the Japanese commanders in the field not to attack Chinchow.
Sze’s letter to the Secretary-General mentioned above was as follows:
‘I have been instructed to bring to your immediate attention the following telegram which I have just received from my Government—
“An imminent attack on Chinchow is feared in view of the information just received from the highest and most reliable sources of a neutral power. The position at Chinchow justifies the most serious apprehensions and may give rise to grave events at any moment. We are informed that the reports from British observers show that there has been no concentration of Chinese troops nor any troop movements from within the Great Wall. In view of the constant allegations by the Japanese to the contrary it is urgent and essential that this information should be published. The whole work of suppressing bandits will be done by the Chinese police so that there would be no danger of complications for neutral detachments. We consider that such detachments should be sent even if by only one member of the Council to see that a neutral zone is respected and that such a zone should be established with all possible speed by neutral observers. Please lay these facts before the Council as a matter imperatively requiring immediate action in view of the alarming situation.”
I venture to suggest in the light of the facts revealed by this message that even the instructions given to the neutral observers on the spot may not suffice to avert a catastrophe unless the observers, if in their judgment the local situation so required, could have at their disposal small neutral detachments to organize and supervise the neutral zone effectively.
I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter to the President and members of the Council other than the representatives of the parties.’”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw
- Telegram in two sections.↩