793.94/2900: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
804. From Ambassador Dawes: Following is Sweetser’s report.
“The twelve members of the Council meeting at 5 o’clock today in entire privacy at Drummond’s suggestion in order to avoid any premature publicity, took note of information received as to the views of the United States and decided to issue a résumé of the draft resolution as it now stands. The Council members also considered a statement from Sze.
Meeting shortly after in ordinary private session, Briand drew attention to a communication from the Japanese speaking of a Chinese concentration at Chinchow and asking that the troops be withdrawn. This was in the form of a request and not a demand but it seemed to Briand a little strong to ask that Chinese troops withdraw from Chinese territory. Cecil then stated that Sze had told him that they could not withdraw unless neutral troops took their place. Briand [Page 567] said that a note had been received to that effect asking that a neutral zone be established under control of foreign troops in which case they would withdraw behind the Great Wall. Already he noted a number of foreign observers were on the spot. Evidently Koo was preoccupied to avoid armed contact and was taking only defensive measures.
Cecil thought that special action should be taken by all the Governments including the United States if it were possible. The seizure of a great town like Chinchow would be a deliberate insult at this moment when the Council was meeting to elaborate plans for a settlement. Briand then proposed two things: first, that he as President send a new appeal [to] both parties in special relation to Chinchow; and second, that the individual Governments intervene in the same sense and also send observers if possible. Accordingly an identic cable was sent this evening by Briand and [sic] to both Governments in the name of the Council pointing out that the Council’s efforts for peace would be vain if new incidents occurred and drawing special attention to the situation around Chinchow. Already certain Governments had sent observers there; the responsibility however rested with the two Governments to prevent further loss of life.
The Council members then took up again the draft resolution to which some slight verbal changes were suggested to make it still clearer that the commission while not in[ter]fering with actual military movements was nevertheless fully entitled to report upon the military side of the situation as well as the other sides.
A draft statement to the press summarizing the resolution as it now stands was then presented. Briand pointed out that it would be better to give a summary on good authority than to give the full text as thereby the Council members would not be bound to actual phraseology.
Madariaga however once again expressed the disquietude felt by himself and certainly shared by several other members of the Council lest the publication of any such statement might appear to commit the Council members and thus in case China refused put them in the position of voting against her. This would reverse the situation in that previously Japan had been alone but in this contingency China might be isolated.
Both Briand and Cecil spoke against this interpretation. The former stressed the fact that the Council was still working under article 11 and that necessarily it must make the effort to secure unanimity. The case was very exceptional, given a Japanese-controlled railway on Chinese soil. No one not even the Chinese had suggested any other article than 11; the commission would be of great value to China; it would even provide a kind of internationalization for Manchuria.
Cecil thought the Council members must get on to a result. They had previously approved a draft resolution, given it to the parties 48 hours ago, and ought to inform the public of its general lines. World opinion was somewhat mystified by conflicting reports; the Council must shortly have another public meeting.
Briand also mentioned for the first time some kind of general statement to accompany the draft resolution. It was not quite clear what he meant; Cecil however urged that the first thing was to publish the communiqué tonight reserving until later any additional [Page 568] explanation of the juridical side of the matter which obviously must be gone into with great care.
The next meeting of the Twelve was fixed for 4 o’clock tomorrow with the possibility of a public session on Friday at 10:30. It was expected that the Chinese reply would be received during the course of the day tomorrow.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw
- Telegram in two sections.↩