793.94/1853¾
Memorandum of Tram-Atlantic Telephone Conversation55
Wilson: Hello—Mr. Secretary. I told Drummond of my conversation with you. As a result, the public session of the Council this afternoon was called off and a private session was held. In [Page 50] that session it came to light that no Japanese reply has been received to the telegram sent yesterday regarding the investigation committee.
Secretary: Have they telegraphed to Japan about an investigation committee?
Wilson: A telegram was sent to Japan yesterday suggesting an investigation committee. The Japanese Delegate said that the Japanese Government will refuse all responsibility for this. Lord Cecil then suggested another form of commission—the Japanese to appoint two neutral members, the Chinese to appoint two neutral members, and the Council to appoint three neutral members. The Japanese Delegate will send a telegram suggesting this to his government.
Secretary: Is the Japanese Delegate in favor of it?
Wilson: He did not express any opinion concerning it. Drummond adds that the Council very earnestly hopes for our participation in the work of the special committee. A resolution along the following lines will be presented to the Council at tomorrow’s session. The members of the special committee will have authority to seek the collaboration that may be helpful in their deliberation. Drummond says that the special committee will be glad to invite the United States in any form that may be agreeable to us. If you would like to have the invitation based on our interest as signatories either of the Nine Power Treaty or the Kellogg Pact or on the basis of general world interest it would be all right. The only other thing I have to add is this. The latest reports here from a Chinese source are that Japanese forces have gone south of the Great Wall.
I have made no press statement of any kind.
Secretary: In the first place, Japan I do not believe will ever accept any investigating committee.
Wilson: Do you think they may accept in the form of Cecil’s suggestion?
Secretary: No, I do not. I think that is chimerical. I do not think that is open to question and I do not believe in imposing a committee from the outside on Japan for I think that would play right into the hands of the enemies of peace. I have sent you a telegram today.57 It is on the wires now and I want to give you the sense of it. In it I am sending an answer to the action of the Council yesterday in their resolution about a note to China and Japan, in which I say I am in hearty sympathy with their action and that we will send a similar note, not an identical note, but a similar note to both parties urging a cessation of the hostilities and a withdrawal from the dangerous position in which they are. The rest of my telegram explains my attitude on the rest of the matters about which you have asked me. In general, my feeling is that the surest road to peace is by diplomatic methods in which we will try to back up any action taken by the [Page 51] League in such matters, to urge a settlement by the Chinese and Japanese themselves through direct negotiation between them. The first road to peace is to urge them to settle it by direct negotiation between China and Japan. In doing that, we will urge that method and cooperate with the League if they are urging it. Then if that method is not effective and if outside action becomes necessary why I think that in view of the fact that the League has the appropriate machinery under Article 11 and that it has already been invoked by China, the League ought to go ahead and that we will lend it all moral support that we can. We cannot participate, of course, in League action but we will make clear that it has our moral support. Then, and only in case that should prove ineffective for any reason, we would come to the other two treaties—the Nine Power Treaty or the Kellogg Pact. In other words, if the action of outside parties is necessary, I think it should be done by the League which is in session and acting now and it has our earnest sympathy and support. But I have made clear in this telegram the reasons for my fear for this outside committee of investigation. That is a word to the wise. I know something about the attitude of mind of those peoples. I have lived among them, and I believe (I want this thoroughly understood) that the Japanese Government, the civilian government, probably—of course we are all embarrassed by lack of evidence—is sincerely trying to settle this matter. I believe they ought to have a chance to do so and I believe that outside action by a lot of attachés or a commission appointed by anybody else would make trouble. I think that ought to be a last resort. Of course if any one of the parties should prove intractable to settlement, then under the machinery of the League the League will have to go its own way in opposition to that party, but as long as there is any chance of the parties settling the matter between themselves I think outside interference will make it more difficult.
Wilson: You understood about the Cecil resolution?
Secretary: Yes. But they would prefer negotiation. That is the method of Oriental people. They are not accustomed to judicial inquiry and I would not use that until you were sure you were going to get their opposition anyhow.
Wilson: As long as they are in the state of mind where they will negotiate you want to give them all the opportunities possible and if that fails then the League can go ahead with its own machinery and you will give it moral support.
Secretary: Precisely. But I think they should be given every opportunity to do it by direct settlement first. That is for your knowledge. I am making public here the note which I am sending in answer to the President of the Council. I am giving it out this afternoon here, because the President’s resolution has already been made public. The cable has gone to you already.
[Page 52]Wilson: Thank you very much.
Secretary: That is the situation. I am really afraid of the resolution of inquiry. I wish they would kill it for the present and not mention it.
Wilson: Maybe the Japanese will kill it themselves.
Secretary: I think they will, but it will make them feel badly to kill it. You can use your own discretion about telling confidentially the way I feel about this, but I do not want it made public because I think it is subject to misrepresentation. That is the best of my thought on the situation and I think that is the best way out of a very difficult position. Of course, do not have any misunderstanding; if either party proves recalcitrant and takes a position which is clearly in violation of the covenant of either of the two treaties to which America is a party we shall not flinch in our duty. But I very much hope that they will not do that.
Wilson: Thank you very much. That is clear.