793.94/2864: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Shaw)
[Paraphrase]
Washington, November 24,
1931—midnight.
592. For Ambassador Dawes: Embassy’s No. 792, November 24, 3 p.m.
- (1)
- As bearing upon your problem, favorable news has just reached me from Tokyo.93 Baron Shidehara together with the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff agree and have issued orders to the effect that there shall be no hostile operations in the direction of Chinchow. Shidehara also agrees to the clause in the draft resolution prohibiting hostilities on condition it is so phrased as to allow protection against marauding banditry. He asserts that the remainder of the troops will stay in Tsitsihar only for the few days required to succor the wounded and to pick up the dead. Therefore, there appears now to be no substantial likelihood of opposition by Japan to the Council proposal.
- (2)
- When the Council proposal is compared with the Chinese counterproposal, the only irreconcilable elements of the Chinese plan are (a) the withdrawal time limit, and (b) the proposed conference of the powers, both of which appear impossible.
- (3)
- I am, under these circumstances, a little afraid of too much American finesse. Briand is entitled, I think, to know the favorable reaction of the United States Government to his proposal in order to aid in getting it through. I should prefer having his proposal published before this Government’s approval is published, but I should be ready to take the chance of leakage instead of risking failure on Briand’s part for lack of American help. Actually I have crossed the bridge already, because just prior to receipt of Embassy’s 792 the French Ambassador called to read me a digest of the proposal and inquired whether I approved, to which I said I did and added I had cabled you to this effect. Should the proposal fail by reason of opposition by China or Japan, it will be comparatively easy, I think, to focus responsibility where rightfully it belongs and to avoid criticism of the United States Government. I would rather have the public believe an honest conciliation proposal like this had failed despite active American assistance than for an absence of it, and the responsibility would rest all the more heavily upon the disputant which had caused such failure. Today I have already confidentially educated the leaders of the American press on the subject and believe they would help, as thus far they have uniformly done.
- (4)
- You may, under these circumstances, go ahead and act entirely in your discretion. Endeavor to have Briand keep the American approval confidential pending his receipt of the Chinese reply to Sze and until Briand has been able to decide in regard to putting the matter to a vote in the Council. When you learn the decision, you will know whether or not this Government’s position should be made public.
Stimson
- See telegram No. 234, November 24, 10 p.m., Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 50.↩