793.94/2874: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
795. From Ambassador Dawes: Sweetser reports on the League’s activities this morning as follows:
Drummond has been informed that a cable was sent by the three Japanese Ambassadors to their Government asking whether there were any truth in the press reports of Japanese intention to take Chinchow and stating that in such a case their task in Paris would be very difficult. Baron Shidehara in reply stated he had consulted the Japanese Minister of War and the Chief of Staff, who had told him they had no such intention. However, they had reserved the right to take any defense measures which might be necessary.
At 11 a.m. today the committee of 12 again met to consider the situation, when Briand reported having shown the draft resolution to the Chinese. Sze continued to press for Japanese evacuation but [Page 557] agreed, nevertheless, to communicate the text to his Government. He hoped to receive instructions either today or tomorrow. Drummond observed that Sze had especially emphasized with him the necessity of (a) having the Governments send observers to the spot, and (b) at once appointing negotiators for the evacuation. Drummond also said that he had informally transmitted the draft to the Japanese with the reservation that the draft was not final and was subject to Council amendment. He had the impression the Japanese would accept.
Lord Cecil said he thought the draft, especially the limitation on interference with the military, was not quite fully understood by the Chinese. He thought it would greatly help Sze if he understood that the commission could report regarding military phases but could not issue orders to the troops. As Cecil understood it, the commission could start work on its investigation and report concerning the military situation in Manchuria. If the commission reported in a certain way, the Japanese troop withdrawal could hardly avoid being expedited. The Chinese had from the very outset stressed the desirability of Japanese evacuation under supervision of League observers, and if the Chinese could realize that this proposal was a step in this direction they might be helped a good deal. He doubted that they understood the matter in this light; he thought they had obtained a good deal more than was realized by them; but he hesitated to press the proposal on them, for if they insisted too much on it this might frighten the Japanese. It was added by [Lord Cecil?] that Ito91 had called this morning to point out to him that at the meeting on November 51 the Japanese had not insisted, as previously, on discussing the fundamental points prior to evacuation; this was a definite change of attitude on the part of the Japanese.
Madariaga again stressed his distaste for the appearance even of the commission’s not being entirely free to consider whatever it wished or being prevented by limitation on military matters from discussing the main question at issue, and this was, after all, the Japanese military occupation. He would like to have a sentence added that the commission would have every right to obtain any information necessary in order to report to the Council on the security of Japanese nationals and the protection of Japanese property. Cecil commented that this might have precisely the opposite effect by providing a basis for continuation of the occupation pending the completion of the commission’s report; thereupon, Briand made the suggestion, with which the others agreed, that the point be met by a preface to the fifth article with the words “without prejudice to the execution of the above-mentioned measures”.
The representative of Guatemala drew attention to the November 15 note of Japan on the protection of railway interests and said that the point of view expressed therein would cause disquietude all over Latin America where almost all the railways had been constructed through foreign financing. He did not believe they could admit the idea of military occupation for the protection of such rail investments. The 1907 Hague convention indeed forbade a state using force to recoup [Page 558] the debts due its nationals by another state. Briand agreed that the thesis was untenable and that it could not be advanced even indirectly.
There came up also the question of the American attitude. Prior to the meeting Leger92 had stated informally, though on Briand’s behalf, that the United States could make a most useful contribution if it were able to make known its attitude on the draft proposal and, in the event of approval, to inform the Chinese accordingly. Briand mentioned this point at the end of the meeting and said the American representative desired to do anything he could to be useful, but Briand had hesitated to request him to call until there was something decisive to report. Briand felt that now, however, it would be very helpful to have an expression of the American views if the Government were able to make it, and so it might be wise for the matter to be taken up. Perhaps the best course would be for Drummond to attempt a visit this afternoon to see if the American representative could offer any cooperation or suggestion at this decisive moment.
- [Dawes]
- Shaw