793.94/2852: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:43 p.m.]
784. From Ambassador Dawes: Sweetser reports on the Council’s private meeting from 10:30 a.m. to 1 p.m. today as follows:
The 12 Council members, excluding Japan and China, were presented by Briand with the draft resolution prepared in yesterday’s negotiations between Simon, Drummond, and Briand. The latter explained the draft was based upon the Japanese proposal for a commission, which had been surrounded, however, with impossible conditions, and during the past few days efforts had been made to remove these conditions and to add other material on evacuation and cessation of hostilities, points which would enable the Chinese to accept and which accorded with the principles the Council had been called upon to defend. Briand’s effort was, if possible, to get unanimity; otherwise a break would result. If the commission could once be set up, one of two alternatives immediately would become clear; namely, either the two parties would have on the spot the means of [Page 546] conciliation and agreement, or it would be evident that no way out was available. However, Briand saw great difficulties in obtaining acceptance of the proposal. Parts of it the Japanese would not like; and the Chinese already had announced last night in their memorandum that they must be satisfied on the evacuation question. Briand felt for the moment that his best course would be to present this draft to the Chinese as the best which it seemed possible to obtain from the Japanese and then see what would be proposed by the Chinese. It must still be the Council’s hope to be able step by step to build up an agreement.
There followed a discussion which showed certain Council members had grave hesitations in regard to whether the draft resolution went far enough either to obtain Chinese agreement or to safeguard the Council’s already announced principles. Madariaga of Spain found it very paradoxical that, while the Japanese in the beginning had resisted any interference at all in a matter they regarded as strictly between Japan and China, now they were proposing a commission to study all phases of relations between the two countries with the exception, so far as he was able to judge, of the presence on Chinese soil of Japanese troops. Madariaga questioned the limitation statement which appeared to exclude any consideration of the military aspect from the commission’s task and likewise the relegation to the speech of the Council President of the right of either side to raise any point it desired before the commission. After 3 months’ effort he did not like the appearance of covering up the principal problem of the presence on Chinese territory of Japanese troops nor being diverted from the one immediate issue to other more extensive issues beyond.
Agreeing that unanimity was desirable, Colban of Norway did not see how this could be obtained after reading the memorandum by China and knowing the view of Japan. However, if unanimity was impossible, the Council could not adjourn with a text which gave the impression of accepting the Japanese invasion of Chinese territory. Colban hoped the draft would not be presented as definitive to the Japanese, thus justifying them in false hopes. Unfortunately, however, he had no alternative to offer. Fotitch of Yugoslavia expressed the fear lest the text be interpreted as admitting concurrence between the commission and the occupation and as actually legalizing the latter.
Simon agreed on the necessity to make it clear that Japanese evacuation should not be put off until the end of the commission. Evacuation should take place prior to and not at the close of the commission’s labors. Unless this were made plain by the Council, there would be no chance of Chinese acceptance. Evacuation should be independent of the commission, and it was most important for the commission not to be taken as an excuse to delay evacuation. To this effect Simon proposed an amendment to point 5 that “it was further understood that the deliberations of the commission should not be regarded as any ground for delaying the evacuation of the Japanese troops.” It was agreed by Briand that he would attempt an improvement of the draft in this connection for the purpose of removing his colleagues’ impression that the text might be interpreted to legitimize the occupation.
[Page 547]Madariaga raised the question also as to whether the limitation in regard to no supervision of either party’s military movements would prevent consideration by the commission of the military aspect of the Manchurian situation. It would appear to him wrong to have a commission of the League in Manchuria possibly quite helpless at a time when military movements were afoot. He recalled that the Council had now put the question of evacuation four times. This was becoming now a bit commonplace, and he did not see how the commission would be able to disinterest itself from the main question.
In reply Briand stated that Japan did not desire the League to send a commission which would control Japanese armed forces. Drummond then added that the commission might report respecting military aspects but could not issue orders to the troops. The Japanese, for instance, wanted the right to take antibandit measures without having to ask the commission’s consent. Simon thereupon inquired if the Council might envisage an early public meeting. While the draft resolution of course must be discussed first with the two parties, he feared the prolongation indefinitely of private meetings. The public impression was growing that grave events were transpiring, while the Council was privately discussing the matter, without any effective action. Should not a public meeting be held at least before the week ended?
Briand answered that on November 21 a public session had been held just as soon as there was something of substance to be put before it. The Japanese had at that time suggested the idea of a commission, and now it was desirable to study this idea in order to try to have material ready for the next public session. However, the week should not end without deciding one way or the other; there should be either an agreement or, as on the previous occasion, a draft resolution.
Briand explained then that he would try to modify the draft by taking account of the preoccupations as expressed and that he would discuss the draft with the Japanese and the Chinese this afternoon. However, he would make it clear that this draft was only a plan which his colleagues had not yet approved and which was consequently still open to amendment by them. The results of his interviews would be reported at 11 a.m. tomorrow to his colleagues.
- [Dawes]
- Shaw