793.94/2713: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Shaw)
574. For Ambassador Dawes: Again Embassy’s 750, November 16, 11 p.m. A more detailed reply to your request for observations on the Simon memorandum herewith:
As to paragraph 1: The Chinese already have affirmed repeatedly their willingness to respect the treaty rights of Japan; and Sze has pointed out expressly that this is one of the solemn obligations which the League Covenant imposes and each and every League member assumes. Much of the difficulty involved in present issues arises from the fact that with regard to the extent and character of these rights the respective views of the Chinese and the Japanese Governments are at variance. The contention of Japan includes agreements allegedly entered into in 1905, plus the entire series of treaties and agreements of 1915 entered into on the basis of the so-called “21 demands” of Japan. The Nanking Government may conceivably be induced to give formally a blanket assurance of respect for Japan’s treaty rights in Manchuria, but, in view of the fact that the stronger party is likely under such circumstances to insist subsequently upon its own prescriptions and definitions, it is likely that the Chinese may hesitate to do this. Might not the inclusion of such an assurance in a Council resolution be all the formality which this point Would require, and would this not be a measure which might prove more readily acceptable to the Chinese?
The same applies with respect to paragraph 2.
As to paragraph 3: Your observations appear absolutely pertinent. Both economic and political factors are involved in the underlying issue of the railways. This is highly complicated, and I am inclined to think that, insofar as the railway question relates to the so-called [Page 504] “parallel” lines, it might advisedly be omitted at the present time from discussion of the problem. However, if the question is discussed and if a commission is suggested, should not it be specified that such commission would commence its work together with or following withdrawal of Japanese troops?
As to paragraph 4: It should be noted that the provisions of the first three paragraphs do not cover the problem of effective protection of Japanese lives and property, which is an immediate problem, the settlement of which is declared by the Japanese to be their principal objective. May it not for this reason be doubted that, even should both disputants be brought to an agreement on paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, thereupon Japan would be ready to make and carry out the proposed undertaking in paragraph 4?