793.94/2785½
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation52
Secretary: Hello Dawes. Yes, I can hear you all right. I just this minute received your telegram asking me to call you.53
Dawes: Did you get my telegram after I saw Sir John Simon?
Secretary: I got your telegrams 762 and 763 and they give me the story you got from Matsudaira and it gives me the substance of what took place in the meeting of the League Council this morning.
Dawes: I have your 569.
Secretary: What is that?
Dawes: I want to give you my ideas, which I think are your ideas, conveyed in part of your telegram No. 569. The situation has developed so that it seems to me absolutely essential that this Government should maintain its position along the lines of your idea in 569 and clear up this situation. It is impossible for the League to clear it up. The League is at present working on opposing views.
Secretary: You gave me those opposing views in your 763.
Dawes: It is perfectly evident that our Government’s influence comes from that independent stand and it is to its interest to have it still [Page 489] maintained. Without any question it is a big help. The League people here are now very anxious to call me in over there and the situation, as it has been submitted to me, is that the League doesn’t know all that I know because Sze has come to me with the position he is willing to take. The League is discussing much the same proposition but there is some difference of opinion and in some way I think that you have got to make a statement for them in which you outline, as you say, that this situation which Japan has created is not going to change for the better but only get worse so you are protecting yourself in the matter of the public opinion—in the matter of the United States interceding in the matter and maintaining also in the public mind, that fact that you are maintaining independence of judgment of action. If I should go over to the League in any capacity, we then will be in the position of playing up to the League and agreeing with it and the League is going to lead us nowhere. They are going to bring pressure upon me. I have an appointment to see Briand at 6:30 tonight and what he is going to do is to invite me over there. Briand does not know that Sze came to me with a proposition which they propose putting to the League regarding invoking Article 11; they propose to then start action under Article 15 and that action being proposed, they will tell the League to invite me.
Secretary: That is just the time you ought not to be there because that means that they are going to take up the question of sanctions.
Dawes: Yes, I agree. … would do nothing except that they would come to us for our advice.
Secretary: I will tell you for your confidential guidance that in case the League should take up the proposal of an embargo by the League, I have no doubt that this Government would do its best not to interfere with that embargo but I don’t want to have it announced beforehand. I don’t want to have that announced until after the League has done its own action and I doubt whether it is advisable for the League to go on with an embargo but in case they should——
Dawes: I am going to read you a statement. It is evident to me that for your own protection and for the protection of our independent position it is desirous for you to make some statement of the case up to this time and then say what you will about the League—about the United States support of the policies of the League and the force of public opinion so far as it is not inconsistent with our treaty rights or something of that sort. But then make it perfectly clear that your action will be taken in cooperation with the League if their action is conducive in your judgment to settlement. You are still independent to make a decision as to what extent you are willing to cooperate with the other Governments against Japan; that if I go over there the United States just falls in with the League program and that leaves the [Page 490] enemies of the whole situation in the United States and elsewhere to count us out in their calculations. What I want to suggest is that you make a statement—I think you should get out a statement. I think that if the request for me to come over is given, in which Briand is going to join, we should have a statement as to what our action is going to be. If we are going to make such a statement, make a statement first and if they get the statement first, then we would be looked upon more or less and yet you can make your statement so that we sustain fully the general policies of the League but do not confine ourselves to the program necessarily of the League. They are going to get into such a mess. They have got to wait for this decision which they think important and the United States can not afford to wait to have this decision applied in effect by the League. In our relations as one of the League, instead of the position that we will take action absolutely independent of the League but cooperating with it, seems to be reasonably conducive to the interests of the situation for peace.
Secretary: Let me say something to you.
Dawes: I will read you the proposition.
Secretary: What proposition is this?
Dawes: I am reading you the proceedings of the Council as taken in the sessions of the League held this afternoon. It was a private meeting of twelve members of the Council. Briand reported that the two parties named are exceedingly opposed and that it might be a loss of time to make further efforts. Japan believes that there could be no evacuation until there was an accord. The Chinese refuse to pay for evacuation at a high price. It seems impossible to still hope for conciliation. Should they go into the question of the time and conditions … could they relate to one line or the other. You should make a statement of the situation. Lord Cecil is not here—he is in London. The Council was proceeding toward unanimity and no unanimity has prevailed since September 30th. There now seems absolutely … discuss.
Secretary: If you lower your voice I can hear you better.
Dawes: If there was a public meeting where both sides could state their views … world opinion had a right to be informed. Thereafter a small committee was appointed to draft a report for the next public session and bring in all that had been done under Article 11. This article is mediatory. The Council can act only with agreement of the parties. Article 11 was then exhausted. It might be best to explain the facts and to consider what steps would next be taken. General Dawes asked whether any contact had been made with him.
Secretary: Who made this question?
Dawes: The Chairman. Briand said that General Dawes had assured him at the outset that they had thought it best, as he had said in [Page 491] the first public meeting, that the United States would continue its cooperation with the League for the preservation of peace. He had explained that he had no desire to take part in the meetings but that if at a given moment the Council wished him to take part, he would be glad to consider the suggestion. That up to now the meetings had been undetermined and Briand had not considered it necessary to invite him to come. Now, however, the Council believes that the moment had arrived when he could be invited before it—even today. In addition to the statement, he had seen a good deal in the press particularly the American press in connection with the nine power treaty which permits of confirmation should the Council consider this also. But in any case agreed that he might see General Dawes today. The members of the Council received the Japanese statement as to the relation between evacuation and the signing of an accord. The Council would certainly have in mind the commission but also promises the League that our efforts in invoking that article … If the Council could get a definite promise but it was not sure that Dr. Sze would consent to this project. The situation is getting worse. He then therefore went to see General Dawes at once. Japanese reply … and try to add to it and if he considered it, China is willing to continue under Article 11. Von Burro [Bülow]54 agreed with this viewpoint. He thought it wise that they did not take action at all—every last avenue was destroyed. The Secretary General brought out that should the American Government agree to General Dawes’s presence there they should consider whether that should take place in the formal council or at the private discussions. The latter presence, however, would be less important.
I will now read you what Dr. Sze brought in here this morning. He is the Chinese member.
“Confirming my conversation with you of this morning, I beg to state that my suggestions are as follows:
- “First: Increasing military activities from November 16; heavy fighting north of the Nonni River. This was understood to have been made in Washington and London and created a new situation. This situation was made clear last night when Yoshizawa told the Council that it is insisting upon … to China and direct negotiation on military occupation. This policy is an open violation of Japan’s treaty obligations and means the closing up of the Washington Nine Power Treaty and shuts the open-door in China which is a flat defiance of America’s traditional policy in Japan.
- “Two: Mr. Stimson’s note of October 12 to the Council declares that the United States will bring forward the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris ‘if the time should come when it would seem advisable.’
- “Three: I am of the opinion that this time has now come. I am proposing to suggest to the Council that it appoint a committee to study [Page 492] the whole situation in the light of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. The United States should be invited to join in this committee. In this way it would seem that the United States would be able to act effectively and concurrently with the members of the League and at the same time maintain independence of action. There seems to be some misunderstanding on the part of the members of the Council as to the attitude of the United States with the result that the Council has not taken … possibility if the main purpose to these the United States would agree. This illustrates the urgent need of facilities …
That is Sze’s memorandum. He is perfectly right. The Council can not take any position at all until they know what the position of the United States is. If we go over there and join them——
Secretary: It strikes me that the way to meet that situation is not by an announcement by us on the line that you spoke of because I have made many such announcements. It is perfectly clear here. I have again and again said that we would follow the general objective of the League, reserving our independence of judgment of action. I can say that again but it is no more than I have said several times. I should say off-hand that the way for you to meet the problem that is now put up to you about this invitation to go and meet with the League, would be to have a conference, not with the League, but somewhere else, if necessary in your rooms, with the same gentlemen representing the different countries where you could talk just as freely. That would make the necessary stage difference between going in to their meeting of the League and in that you have got to keep separate. The thing I don’t want to have played up here is that you take any part in the League action particularly now that they are reaching the point of discussing sanctions.
Dawes: That is perfectly right.
Secretary: It seems to me you ought to be able to reach that point of common counsel in a different way. It is merely a matter of stage setting, so to speak, something that will prevent the newspapers from misrepresenting you. You are in Paris for the purpose of conferring with all of these men, the representatives of the Governments. The only danger comes from misrepresenting your conferences with them as a participation in the League conferences. I should think you could arrange that. This is only a suggestion—in inviting them to confer with you.
Dawes: That is the point, whether they would consider that consistent. The first thing in their mind over here is preserving the League.
Secretary: We have got to preserve our own position.
Dawes: I am sure if I can’t go over there as one man to meet twelve they as twelve would not come over to meet me.
[Page 493]Secretary: Then try some neutral place.
Dawes: That would create a wrong impression again.
Secretary: I don’t want to affront their dignity but think it over and discuss informally some way of choosing a neutral place which would avoid the misunderstanding. I think you must insist on this.
Dawes: I do not think——
Secretary: They were the ones who made the trouble at Geneva and they must therefore not repeat it now. I should think you could find some way of conferring and even discussing it.
Dawes: They have been conferring with me. I have seen Briand a number of times. I have seen Simon. Matsudaira comes here. Cecil comes here but the trouble is that the question in their minds, which seems more important than the settlement of this dispute, is to preserve the dignity of the League and clear up over the World the indication that the United States should now come in behind the League.
Secretary: You are not there to do that.
Dawes: I will have to tell Briand so.
Secretary: I am afraid you will if they insist on it. You are there to confer with the representatives of those different nations on the situation which is now existing in Manchuria and they have got to meet us on a basis which will avoid misunderstanding.
Dawes: Now that is one thing. When the United States Government does that it means something. I think you ought to say that and say that you have instructed me. Say that I am here for a conference with the members of the League individually just as I said in my statement and that you have instructed me not to attend those meetings, in order not to have that action misconstrued as it might be and that we reserve the right of independent decisions. It could be framed in these words.
Secretary: I can try that if you think it will help you.
Dawes: It will be looked … after what I said to Briand.
Secretary: I don’t want to give it out in any given instruction to you in the form of a communication to the press. I think rather to send it as a telegram to you; then you can give it out if you want to.
Dawes: That won’t help me any. I might say … put them off for they all come around and they all understand that I am not going to say anything at all. This evening I am going to see Briand. Make the words read that I construe the attitude of our Government as that—and myself decided that—the attitude of our Government was to cooperate in every possible way with the League but we reserve the right to take full rights of action independently upon our judgment as to what constitutes our own interest in the situation.
[Page 494]Secretary: I can read you a statement I gave out the last time. I can give it from memory. I am sending for it now.
Dawes: They used your words. You have said that the United States was not attending the meeting itself because the United States is not ready to decide to what extent it can give cooperation with the other powers against Japan. Those are your exact words.
Secretary: I don’t remember that.
Dawes: What is the decision of the United States as to the extent to which it will cooperate with the other powers and that statement of yours makes it more impossible and difficult for us to go there because it is going to be said that we have made a decision and they are going to want to know what it is if we have made a decision to cooperate with the League and if I go it will put the Government in a wrong position. I haven’t thought of any formal words. I think probably—just as you say—that it is better for me to make some statement and I don’t want to make any statement until I have decided upon the words with you. It is a very delicate thing. We don’t want to offend the sensibilities of the League, yet we don’t want to say something that will destroy our present position of independence.
Secretary: This is what I said so far as I can recollect it. This was the shortest statement I made. It covered the general points about which you are talking. I said the attitude of this Government is unchanged; we are acting independently and reserving full independence of judgment as to each step to be taken. We are endeavoring to support the general objective of the League, namely, the preservation of peace in Manchuria.
Dawes: Here I have a statement the way it came over. Secretary Stimson gave an emphatic denial that the Japanese Ambassador had been given assurances that the United States is not following the League of Nations … decided upon the economic boycott of Japan. He added that if General Dawes had given out at the Council of the League … the reason was that the United States is not ready to make a decision as to how far it is willing to go in assisting against Japan.
Secretary: That is not my phrase. No, that is something somebody else has made up. I do not remember ever using that last phrase that you have just quoted “that we have not yet made up our minds”. I have never said anything like that. My position has always been that the United States can not commit itself beforehand to adopt a policy of the League before that policy has been adopted.
Dawes: That is right.
Secretary: That is what I mean when I say that we reserve our independence of judgment until the time of action takes place.
[Page 495]Dawes: That is right. The part I can say after my talk with Briand … See if I can not take that myself as an instruction from the State Department and that in my judgment I would because of this conception of the attitude of the United States.
Secretary: I do not quite get that last.
Dawes: Mr. Dawes said in his statement, I am to call on Briand at 6:30; that he had discussed with M. Briand the matter of his attendance at these meetings of the Council of the League. Ambassador Dawes said that he had informed M. Briand that the United States … That it was his clear understanding that this Government reserved independence of judgment until the time of action by the League. He said that his presence here has enabled both members of the League and himself to have every opportunity for the discussion of such matters as were of mutual concern to the League and to the United States. He stated also that in order that there might be no public misconception of this position of the Government, that he had decided that it was not best for him to attend the meetings of the League.
Secretary: Let me call you up again in a little while. In the meantime I will try to draw up something here. I want to try a hand at something either as a statement or an instruction.
Dawes: You have a statement in mind.
Secretary: I have that clearly in mind. Can you wait long enough for me to ask you a question?
Dawes: Matsudaira was in here just a little while ago to say that he had a telegram from his Government suggesting that the League appoint a commission to study the status quo of the situation. He is very anxious that the League appoint a committee under Article 15. He is anxious to have his government make that recommendation.
Secretary: He is anxious what?
Dawes: He has got no idea at all whether his government will let him do that and I don’t think there is any chance of there [their] doing it.
Secretary: Here is the situation as we see it. Beginning with September 18th there was a government in Manchuria which was not a very good government but it was the regular acknowledged government by China; namely, the government of the young Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang. Beginning on that day the Japanese Army has deliberately set out to destroy that government and it has done so very effectually. It has attacked it wherever it had forces regardless of the railway zone or the treaty limits for the Japanese forces, and it has culminated its action by going way up into northern Manchuria and attacking Tsitsihar just for the purpose of destroying the last remaining force of Marshal Chang. All of the talk about protecting [Page 496] nationals has been shown to be mere bunk. So far as the army is concerned it has been an intelligent and deliberate drive to destroy the existing Chinese government of Manchuria. That can not now be effectively denied and that act amounts to a complete violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and a complete violation of the Nine-Power Pact. That is our view today. That is the view which we have on top of this situation. You report from Matsudaira, and what Matsudaira says is confirmed so far as it goes by what we hear from Tokyo, that the army is entirely out of hand and is running the show in Japan. That makes a situation where any results of future discussion by the League seems very hopeless. It does not look as if there was any reasonable chance of a settlement, in the near future anyhow. The only thing that has been suggested by the President, in a talk I had with him to-day, which might crystallize the issue and make it affirmative would be if China would appoint some new viceroy or governor for Manchuria in the place of Marshal Chang. I see many objections and impossibilities to that because I do not think they could get one and it would make a row between China and Marshal Chang, who still retains some power, but I wanted you to know that that was in the President’s head as the only solution he could see for a constructive solution instead of a purely negative one. If such a thing could be done, if China could be induced to select a new ruler of Manchuria and then Japan afterwards endorse it, it might be possible to work a constructive solution out of it, but I do not myself see any chance of that.
Dawes: I do not, because Sze says that public sentiment is very greatly aroused and they can not afford to make any concessions.
Secretary: That being so, and going back to the original position, it is rather our opinion now that it would be worse for the world, for us to do anything which would condone what Japan has done than it is to stand off and say in some way or other and by some act or other that we disapprove of that action. This is confidential for you. We do not see how we can do anything more ourselves as a government than to announce our disapproval and to announce that we will not recognize any treaties which may be forced by Japan under the pressure of military occupation. We do not ourselves believe in the enforcement of any embargo by our own Government, although we would not probably in any way allow our Government to interfere through the fleet with any embargo by anyone else. We believe an embargo is a step to war and if an embargo is decided upon by the League, it would be very likely for that embargo to lead to war.
Dawes: That is what Sze wants to do.
Secretary: Yes Sze would like very much to get all of the nations of the world in war with Japan.
[Page 497]Dawes: Exactly.
Secretary: We have no sympathy with that and we do not intend to get into war with Japan.
Dawes: Simon’s position was that he wants to go to the limit.
Secretary: We do not want to discourage them from going ahead with that if they want to, but we do not want in any way to tie ourselves up to it because our principles are entirely different. That is the line which you must follow. We will not do anything to discourage their taking action under Article[s] 15 and 16 of the League if they want to. Confidentially, though you must not say this beforehand, I do not anticipate that this Government would allow its fleet to do anything to interfere with such an embargo if it was imposed. In other words, if that was done we would stand aside and not interfere with it and I think very likely a good many of our people would sympathize with that embargo and it would reduce the trade of Japan with this country. That would be entirely unofficial—not an act of government. So far as the Government is concerned, the only act we see we could do would be to publish the papers and the correspondence, announce our disapproval of the action of Japan, possibly calling it a violation of these treaties and then announce as we did in 1915 that we would not recognize any treaties that were created under military force.
Dawes: It is very evident that if the League proceeds under Article 16 that your position is going to be a little different from the other members of the League.
Secretary: It will be entirely different and for that reason I do not want to have you sit in the League while they are discussing those problems.
Dawes: If I say that I have been instructed not to sit in the meetings … If I go and sit with the League it would create the impression that we are going to follow the League all the way through. Therefore, I think that there is a better way; that I had better put this statement to Briand and to the press and so word it that it states your position freely, as you suggested, yet indicates that our … although you have different authority, it was the best of my judgment as to whether I should go over to the meetings and explain. But it is not necessary. It is useless anyway as compared with just what I could do outside. If I could give that impression, that will carry out the principal statement and everybody would recognize that you do not want to take these steps until you know the action of the League. There would be no harm done to the League or to anybody else if we do not go. I would like to sit down for a half hour and think over something of that sort and would like to have you write out something [Page 498] at the same time but the one trouble is that I have to see Briand at 6:30 and it is now 5:30.
Secretary: You have my statement of my position already so that if it becomes necessary for you to use it you can use it, namely, by saying that we have been trying to support the general objectives of the League while we still reserve our independence of action and of judgment.
Dawes: I have this statement of yours here. I believe I can have something ready in ten or fifteen minutes or so.
Secretary: We will try to call you back. I want to be able to try something myself.
Dawes: The only trouble is that it takes so long to put the call through and I have to see Briand at half past six.
Secretary: Make what arrangements you can with the telephone company. Can’t you postpone your talk with Briand if necessary. We will be through in a few minutes. We will call you again as quickly as we can, but I will have to speak to the President myself. Have Shaw take the message and follow you over there if you have to go and give it to you.
Dawes: I can postpone it with Briand.
Secretary: Postpone it with him. That is best.