793.94/2764: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 19—4:23 a.m.]
764. From Ambassador Dawes: Referring Embassy’s 763, November 18, 9 p.m., the Committee of Twelve met privately this afternoon questioning Yoshizawa for nearly 2 hours and Sze for an hour with discouraging results. Sweetser reports proceeding as follows:
“Yoshizawa said that Japan considered points 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the October 24 resolution as quite insufficient and unprecise. The second point, for instance, of ‘hostile agitation’ was very vague and far removed from what his Government had in mind. Similarly, Japan’s request for effective protection throughout Manchuria for all peaceful occupations was not at all met. Japan attaches great importance to this, particularly agricultural exploitation by Koreans, and the failure to cover it is a cause of deep discontent. Point 4 was also insufficient, [Page 482] though no reason was given, while point 5 does not give proper recognition of railroad questions.
Mr. Yoshizawa then introduced a new thought to the effect that the first four points of the October 24th resolution may be said to be only headings for the first four Japanese fundamental points and that when they are actually negotiated Japan would want to go into far greater detail. Hence, the expressions used in the resolution were wholly insufficient.
Taking up Briand’s questions, he said that as regards the point wherein Dr. Sze’s letter raised doubt as to whether China intended to question the validity of certain treaties, Japan could not for a minute allow treaties signed and ratified to be questioned. China had even sought to bring up at Washington the treaty embodying the 21 demands which Mr. Hughes had recognized.
As regards the second question as to whether Japan will be content with a general declaration relative to respect for treaties or would desire a declaration enumerating particular treaties, he said that she would not be content with such a general declaration even if it contained details, as China does not respect treaties, but Japan would insist on a new treaty reaffirming the old treaties.
As regards the third question as to what degree questions of security are implied in the treaties specially foreseen by him, he said that Japan was interested not only in the security of her people but also in the safety of property, though he did not expect many details would be here involved.
Briand then began a cross-questioning of Mr. Yoshizawa to know whether evacuation would begin upon the fixing of a program of negotiation and the naming of the negotiators, or only after the negotiations had been completed and an accord reached. Mr. Yoshizawa in his first reply said that Japan intended to complete evacuation only when she had arrived at an accord with China on these points. Bitter experience had shown that fair documents might be signed but would not be fulfilled. Japan did not intend to suffer again in this way. She must have agreement first.
Briand rephrased his question three different times in an evident attempt to get the Japanese to agree on earlier evacuation. He thought, for instance, that when the program of negotiation had been settled and the mediators named it might not be necessary to wait until complete success was achieved; otherwise, the delay might be very long. Again, he pointed out that perhaps when China had shown its good will and a program of negotiations been drafted Japan’s conditions might be considered fulfilled. Mr. Yoshizawa, however, remained firm; Japan did not wish to complete evacuation until she had completed the accord and had been fully assured of China’s good faith. This accord, however, was one of principle, not of detail, and ought not to take long. Similarly, troops could be withdrawn from certain places where order was established. Japan did not intend to occupy Manchuria permanently but felt that security was possible only after agreement on the fundamental points.
After one more attempt by Briand, and a statement by Scialoja45 that these points were too difficult to handle orally across different [Page 483] languages, the Japanese agreed to put their understanding of this point into written form.
Dr. Sze then came before the committee. He began with a prefatory statement that China was not willing to pay out a price for Japan’s agreement to withdraw her troops. To do so would be to condone a flagrant violation of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. China could not be expected to pay for rights guaranteed by treaty. Briand here explained that the Council had no such idea in mind but had asked this question simply in view of the doubt raised by Japan.
Sze then repeated that China felt herself bound, as with all members of the League, to a scrupulous respect for treaties. In addition she was willing to have arbitration on any doubtful points as promptly as possible under article 13 of the Covenant. He recalled that at Washington the parties, except for China, had agreed to file their treaty agreements. If Japan should bring up a treaty which is out of date or invalid, China thought the proper course was to arbitrate. A general discussion of treaties at this moment might take a long time; no one knew what treaties Japan had in mind. He thereupon read the text of the Washington provisions for registration of all commitments.46
Sze laid stress upon the point that China is bound as regards Manchuria, not only to Japan but to other nations. Under the Nine-Power Treaty, for instance, she has obligated herself to other states to maintain the Open Door and equal commercial opportunity. If there is any difference of interpretation China was prepared to arbitrate.
If, however, Japan has in mind the 21 demands China is not going to resign them to buy evacuation. Since their day, China has become, bound by the Washington Treaty. Sze pointed out that this statement contained nothing new but was simply a reaffirmation of what he had said at Washington.
The question as to treaties, he said, is not one of China respecting her obligations, but Japan. The latter, he claimed, had already violated the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. Japan had promised 2 months ago to withdraw; she had not done so; she was always pressing new demands; one wondered when she was going to stop. Thereupon, in reply to a question, he gave the history of the 21 demands, saying they had been presented secretly, with a 48-hour ultimatum, signed under military pressure, never ratified, and since repeatedly protested.
Sze took the occasion to inform the Council that he was constantly receiving urgent cables from China. Since Monday the Japanese troops north of the Nonni had greatly increased, with artillery, tanks, aviation and cavalry. Something must be done to stop the bloodshed. If there were difficulties under article 11 he gave notice that he would take the opportunity of the first public meeting to invoke articles 10, 12, 15 and, if necessary, 16. He felt that the time had come to speak plainly; that Japan had not fulfilled any of her agreements as to the withdrawal of troops, withdrawal of bombing planes, not penetrating north of the Nonni, and the like.
[Page 484]The next meeting is fixed for 11 o’clock tomorrow morning, with the probability of having before it Japan’s written statement of her views of the relation of the evacuation to the negotiation of the accord on the fundamental points. An atmosphere of gravity settled over the Council at the end, with the feeling that there was very little prospect now of settlement by mediation. Those who have been pressing for a public affirmation of principles, as the British and German representatives this morning, and who have, up until now, held back to give Briand full chance of negotiation, are likely now to press their views vigorously.”
- [Dawes]
- Shaw
- Italian representative at League of Nations Council meeting.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 355.↩