793.94/2708½
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation27
Secretary: General Dawes, I called you to tell you I received your cable about future sessions of the Council and the proposal of Briand that you should sit at them.28 I wanted to say that I approve of your proposed course. I have talked with the President about it and he approves of it. He suggests that you let as many meetings go by without your going there as possible before you have to go.
Dawes: Do you think I will have to go? I do not think it will be necessary at all because I will tell you what has happened. Drummond came over this morning and Massigli came last night with the argument that I should go. Then this morning Drummond wanted me to write some letter at this time telling that in the future [Page 453] conferences … I would not write anything at all. I said I was not going to say anything at all and I was going to keep perfectly free and not make any decision about this. Japan wants … a wise and necessary course. I said that they were approaching from the standpoint of … between us … little inferiority complex. But I said that we wanted to support the policy of the League in every way but we must decide in what way it was best to support the League. That they could be perfectly sure that my action here would be such in the future as to show the cooperation that the United States furnishes the League at this time. I had to be a little firm on that. Just before the meeting here and not over twenty minutes ago Briand sent over here what he proposed to say in opening the League meeting this afternoon. He asked me to make any changes in it which I thought were best, and I changed it a great deal. He goes on to explain that the situation differs from what it was in Geneva and that the United States had an official observer there and all that sort of thing and recognizes the change in the conditions. He then went on to say that they had sent me here and he copied my statement which I had prepared very carefully—and that I had come here to confer individually with the members of the Council on those matters in which the United States had treaty rights and in the general effort for peace. I scratched out the part that I might find it necessary to sit and then assured him of close cooperation in the League purpose.
Secretary: The general objective of the League in Manchuria——
Dawes: Peace in Manchuria. I scratched out any reference to the sitting. As time goes on and I have a chance I will talk with you first. The whole thing is over now with Briand’s speech. I will read to you a copy of a telegram which is already on its way to you telling you what the present situation is.
Secretary: Before you do that let me repeat to you our position here. I feel that you have stated your position exactly right.
Dawes: Thank you.
Secretary: Briand has rather overstated what we did at Geneva. He has overstated it. What I really intended to do at Geneva is exactly what you have done here but they took Gilbert and ran him in and made a regular ceremony of it and tried to make it look as if he were sitting there.
Dawes: That is what they tried to do with me.
Secretary: You were right in keeping out of it. The point is to go ahead the way you have been. If it should be necessary for you to go in in order to confer about some matter in which we are deeply interested, particularly a treaty, you have authority in your discretion to do it, but I would like to know first so that I can back up your [Page 454] statement and the invitation by a statement here which will make it absolutely clear.
Dawes: That is exactly what was in my mind.
Secretary: Make sure that the invitation which comes to you from Briand is all right and that it does not overstate the position. You get hold of his invitation beforehand.
Dawes: I do not think it will be necessary.
Secretary: I am only talking about what may happen—so much the better if it does not happen.
Dawes: Yes.
Secretary: What I say is, if it should happen contrary to our present expectations, you make sure that Briand’s invitation is couched in the language which we have agreed upon as being the correct situation. Your cable to me was all right.
Dawes: Make it all the better. To confer individually regarding the treaty interests of the United States and then we can decide whether or not it is necessary to sit. I do not want to sit at all unless it is absolutely necessary from our standpoint.
Secretary: Let them know you are doing everything you can for peace.
Dawes: Otherwise we will open ourselves to unjustified attack by foes in the Senate. Whatever I do, I am not saying a word and I am not going to. What you see in the newspapers is not coming from me. I have not gone out of my room except to see Briand. I am going to see Sir John Simon at 6:30. He wants to see me. I am going there.
Secretary: What has happened—what is the news—have you anything new.
Dawes: Yes, I have. My first caller this morning was Sir Eric Drummond. Last night [apparent omission] prepared speech which Yoshizawa has expected to make this afternoon. It was furnished to Drummond and is now in the hands of Briand. The speech of Yoshizawa was prepared at Tokyo by the Japanese Government and wired to him here. Matsudaira received a copy of it last night and brought it to me this morning. I shall comment on it later in a despatch. The Chinese asked to have no speeches at this time except Briand’s opening speech followed by an adjournment by the Chairman. Drummond after reading Yoshizawa’s speech felt it was wise—speech however was not intended to present ultimatum. Briand might decide that that be done this afternoon. For the moment to stop the military operations of Chinese and Japanese. Because of the superior discipline of the Japanese troops. [,] They [they] are liable to reach a more stabilized position in two or three days. This successful military … for the moment by the extreme military elements in Japan [Page 455] makes it wiser [not?] to arouse Japanese public sentiment. And the settlement in this event will probably go further. He says in two or three days Japan’s position will stabilize the thing. Then after that it will be easier for the Japanese to withdraw from their more extreme position in the League. He thinks you [they?] had better not have that discussion between Sze and Yoshizawa this afternoon.
Secretary: Let me see if I understand that. Drummond’s position is that if these speeches are not made now, in a few days the Japanese will have stabilized their position in such a way that it will be easier for them to withdraw their troops.
Dawes: It is easier for them to withdraw their troops under this committee arrangement and to satisfy Japanese sentiment. Just now Matsudaira is very much alarmed and was afraid the Japanese would send him a message because they had not answered his message suggesting what you suggested, and he was afraid it would be adverse.
Secretary: I have read that this morning. I have read that telegram. Let me ask you this—Is it possible that the Japanese mean that in the meanwhile during these two or three days their troops will be able to lick General Ma’s Army and will be in a better position from their standpoint to hold the situation. Is it possible that during these two or three days the Japanese will advance and fight a successful battle against General Ma?
Dawes: Think better not to make the speech now, that it might be after two or three days because of the happenings in Japan. [——?]
Secretary: What they are trying to do is get a better situation in Japan itself?
Dawes: Yes.
Secretary: How about Manchuria? Are they going to be able to hold it steady there?
Dawes: Matsudaira has only got the idea of the general situation and the public sentiment in Japan. He has not got any other details.
Secretary: The critical situation is at the Nonni Bridge in Manchuria and I should like to know whether you have any information bearing on what the Japanese intend to do there.
Dawes: Yoshizawa is coming this evening and maybe I can get something from him.
Secretary: What I am concerned about is this. It looks as if the Japanese Army commanders were intending to push northward beyond the Nonni River up to the Chinese Eastern Railway, and I do not see any justification for their doing that. Have you any news on that?
Dawes: I have no information about that. I will try to get it. Drummond said that in general up to this time the Council thinks that their eventual recommendation will be this: that the Chinese and [Page 456] Japanese might meet on two separate committees, one considering the safety of the Japanese people and the other the five Japanese points, and also to suggest that the position of the previous committee should not be a necessary precedent to evacuation. I telephoned to Sir John Simon, asking if I could see him at 3:00 o’clock. After your call came through I told him I would see him at 6:30. I can endeavor to keep you advised up to the minute. Here is a paraphrase of the most important portion of the speech prepared by Tokyo for Yoshizawa.
Secretary: Have you seen that speech?
Dawes: I am just now quoting about ten sentences to give you the gist of it. Matsudaira listened to a part of the text which I dictated but did not wish me to cable the exact words of his speech. The following is a paraphrase:29
“The idea of Japan is that it is willing to withdraw its forces if satisfied that the five fundamental principles are substantially observed and practiced in the districts where those forces are at present. The Japanese feel that the efforts of local committees to preserve the peace, which were organized by resident Chinese, indicate that this is a proper method to secure the results which Japan desires in the way of troop withdrawal. Japan feels that because she has acted for the protection of Japanese lives in Manchuria, no one should feel that her desire for sincere friendship between China and Japan has weakened. Japan desires not to take a foot of Chinese territory and realizes the difficulties which confront China in the safety of their fellow-countrymen. It provides for what they consider their just and due treaty rights. Japan looks upon it as a duty”.
That is the principal part of Yoshizawa’s speech. I have got here a memorandum which Drummond sent over to me as giving his idea of what the League ought to do. I have not read it yet but if you have a stenographer there—it is confidential—I shall just have Shaw here read it to you.
[Remainder of memorandum not printed.]
- Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and General Dawes in Paris, November 16, 1931, 11 a.m.; omissions in this memorandum are indicate in the original and apparently show poor telephone reception.↩
- See telegram No. 740, November 14, 6 p.m., from the Chargé in France, p. 444.↩
- See last paragraph in telegram No. 744, November 16, 3 p.m., from the Chargé in France, p. 457.↩