793.94/2711
The Secretary to President Hoover (Richey) to the Secretary of
State
Washington, November 12, 1931.
Dear Mr. Secretary: The President has directed
me to send you the enclosed copy of memorandum.
Yours sincerely,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by President Hoover
[Washington,] November 12,
1931.
It seems to me that two or three more points might be put up to Mr.
Dawes for consideration:
First: It is obviously impossible for the Japanese to withdraw their
troops on the one hand or the Chinese to restore order on the other,
unless some form of properly established civil government is set up
in Manchuria. The Japanese will not have Young Marshal Chang in view
of his failure to preserve order hitherto. It would seem that the
solution of this end of the problem lies in the setting
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up of a civil government
which will be recognized by the Japanese that would be responsible
to the Nanking government. It would seem also that the Nanking
government ought to be glad to get rid of the young marshal and
establish its full and final authority over Manchuria, and that
therefore if something in the nature of a viceroy of Manchuria could
be appointed by the Nanking government and accepted by the Japanese
the whole question of the establishing of civil government and order
would fade out of the picture, as then the Japanese could proceed to
withdraw as fast as he had established the situation, and the
Nanking government could quite well agree to support the new viceroy
in obtaining control of the troops and other agencies in
Manchuria.
The second point that might be emphasized to Ambassador Dawes is that
if these people would be prepared to negotiate the specific
provision, that the negotiation should be carried out in the spirit
of the Kellogg Pact. It might do away with the necessity to have
foreign observers at the negotiation. Both sides would be quick
enough to appeal if there was any infraction.
