793.94/2622: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:25 p.m.]
434. Your 326, November 10, 8 p.m.2 In accordance with instructions therein to keep you informed regarding not only the actual developments but also the envisaged possibilities, I wish to report my conferences this afternoon with the Japanese Ambassador and the British Foreign Secretary. In the judgment of both Sir John Simon and myself, it is most important for Matsudaira to be in Paris when the League Council meets, and Matsudaira rather expects his Government to ask him to go there. He appears to feel that, speaking broadly, there are no differences between the plans and purposes of his Government and of the League which cannot be resolved amiably if the matter is wisely handled, with due regard for the prestige of both the League and Japan. Upon my inquiry he stated his feeling that, in case the League removed the time limit on Japanese evacuation, Japan probably could in return make some helpful gesture toward bringing about the cessation of hostilities. With us, he felt the immediate objective at present was the cessation of hostilities through an armistice, pending the discussion of best methods and agencies for a final settlement.
Simon said in his talk with me that notwithstanding the fact the League might have the better juridical argument, Japan probably had the argument in its favor with regard to the necessary location of troops. Simon told me he was inclined to think the League had [Page 427] best propose stopping hostilities without suggesting changing the status quo of Japanese troop locations at present, until there was agreement on methods and agencies of obtaining a final settlement. In short, the immediate objective ought to be an armistice. He said this appeared to be the view of the Prime Minister, in a short talk he had had with him. When I informed Simon that practically the same opinion had been expressed to me by Matsudaira, Sir John asked me to arrange for the three of us to meet tomorrow to talk over this matter. It is significant that he instinctively recognized, as did you, the lack of wisdom of the clause for a time limit in the League’s proposition. Simon thought it should be withdrawn and that such withdrawal was practicable. He thought use might be made somewhere in the effort of the procedure by which Messrs. Balfour and Hughes appointed observers in the Shantung conference about which you telephoned me. The terms in which Simon, Matsudaira, and I talked were only tentative. To both of them I explained, using your words, that the American Government desired neither to push nor to lead in connection with this overstepping matter; that the objectives of the League Council and the United States were the same, to seek to prevent war and to bring about a peaceful solution; and that I would be present in Paris simply in order to confer individually with Council members on a matter of common concern and on mutual treaty duties and interests. As you say, it is very necessary for me to proceed with caution and, if I may add, also with humility. Your press statement phrase, “it is not anticipated that General Dawes will find it necessary to take part in the meetings of the League Council but he will be in a position to confer with the representatives of the other nations present in Paris in case such conference would seem desirable,”3 greatly helped and relieved me. I did not intend, as a matter of fact, under any circumstances, to be present at any Council meeting, except under your positive instruction. Your phrase, however, makes this easy without offending the susceptibilities of the League or requiring me to explain.
- Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 41.↩
- Quotation not paraphrased.↩