Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2640

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] November 10, 1931—3 p.m.

The Japanese Ambassador called and began by telling me that the Japanese Government was substituting 4,000 new troops for 4,000 troops now in Manchuria. He said that originally, at the beginning of the trouble in September, there were 10,400 troops there; that subsequently 4,000 were added to these and now 4,000 of the total are being replaced by 4,000 new troops. (2) He told me that the Japanese memorandum which he handed me yesterday⁹² has been withheld from publication by the Japanese Government but has been confidentially communicated to Sir Eric Drummond. (3) He told me that at present the bridgehead on the Nonni River remains in the possession of the Japanese who, however, will not proceed northward; that the situation has improved; that a part of the Japanese contingent at the bridge have returned to South Manchuria, but a portion remains; and that the Japanese do not take seriously the declaration of war by General Ma, who has only a very small force of men with him at Tsitsihar, and whose declaration of war has already been disavowed by Nanking. (4) In Tientsin he said he is satisfied with the reports which have been made by our Consul General Lockhart as reported in the press, namely, that the Japanese did not cross the boundary of their own reservation.

He asked me about the report that the League had requested us to send an observer to Paris. I said that that was not so, but I then told him I was about to send General Dawes to Paris so that he would be there to confer with the representatives of the other nations including the Japanese and Chinese if that should become desirable. I explained to him the reasons for sending General Dawes, winding up by saying that it was not a gesture hostile to Japan but quite the reverse, and he said he understood perfectly.

The Ambassador then brought up the question of the “fundamental principles” mentioned in his memorandum and reverted to the Treaty of 1915, in regard to the lease of the South Manchurian Railroad, telling me how important it was to Japan because otherwise the twenty-five year lease to Russia would have expired in 1923. He said the terms of the Russian lease were known to be purely fictitious in order to save China’s face and that the Russians had gone ahead and made improvements contemplating a long stay. I told the Ambassador I had no objection to Japan claiming title to her rights in Manchuria either by negotiation, or arbitration, or conciliation, or in any pacific way; that our only objection was to her trying to base or improve those rights by the present warlike move in Manchuria. He argued at length on the Washington matter to prove that the United States had given up its reserved objections to the 1915 Treaty, but I produced Willoughby’s book and read him Mr. Hughes’ statements in which those objections were reserved in 1922.⁹³ He then said that I was evidently a good lawyer. In the course of the discussion about Shantung, I reminded him that China and Japan had not been able to make any progress there until they had laid aside all juridical claims and had based their discussions on factual claims, and I asked him why they did not do so now. He said that was very interesting.

H[enry] L. S[timson]

92. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 39.
93. Westel W. Willoughby, China at the Conference (Baltimore, 1922), pp. 256–260.