Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2592: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, November 10, 1931—2 p.m.
[Received 2:45 p.m.^91a]

903. Following from American Consul General at Harbin received today:

“November 7, 3 p.m.

1. Secretary Chao has just informed me that General Ma at Tsitsihar telephoned local Foreign Affairs Commissioner this morning at about 11 that his troops had been driven back by the Japanese soldiers to Sanchienfang last evening, that the left and right wings of his force had fallen back to Angangki Station last night to dig trenches there, that he could hold Sanchienfang for one day, that the defenses at Angangki were weak and that the Japanese were preparing for an attack but had not yet attacked this morning, that if Sanchienfang is lost, the way to Tsitsihar city will be opened to the Japanese and that conditions in the city were at present not much disturbed.

2. Ohashi, the local Japanese Consul General, informed me an hour ago that he had received news to the effect that arrival of Japanese reenforcements from Changchun via Taonanfu had enabled the Japanese forces, which had suffered severely in attempting to storm the first defense line of the Heilungkiang troops, that after a fierce attack under an artillery barrage, getting on an advantageous position in the first line, whereupon their Chinese opponents were forced to retreat, that the defeated troops were retreating toward Tsitsihar in disorder and that he had no information in regard to how far the Japanese troops had advanced.

3. From a fairly reliable Russian source at Tsitsihar Station on the Chinese Eastern Railway I received this morning a report on the situation late last night to the effect that wounded Chinese soldiers were arriving at that place in an uninterrupted stream, that Japanese troops were 18 kilometres south of the Chinese Eastern Railway and were expected to reach Tsitsihar Station and city on November 7th, that on the 6th three Japanese airplanes flew over Tsitsihar Station and threw bombs at Chinese troops and a Tao-Ang Railway train just outside of this station and that a tremendous panic prevails amongst Chinese and Russian refugees at Tsitsihar Station.

4. Secretary Chao, who is Ma’s representative here, has failed in negotiating a peaceful settlement of what he terms a misunderstanding between the Japanese and Heilungkiang troops, as China and Japan are not at war, with the local Japanese consular and military representatives, who insist that the Heilungkiang troops hoist the white flag and that Ma resign as Acting Chairman of the Heilungkiang Government. Chao is attempting to have the local consuls come here to arrange a cessation of hostilities.

5. The local Japanese-controlled press and military representatives openly admit that large forces of Japanese troops, perhaps several thousand, consisting of infantry and cavalry, supported by artillery, and airplanes, have been brought to the Nonni River front. It is reliably reported that Major General Tamon, who forced Hsi Chia to form an independent government and who commanded the troops at Changchun, has arrived at the south side of the bridges and is directing the operations of the Japanese forces.

6. In my opinion, this combined Japanese-Chang Hai-peng attack against the Heilungkiang forces and ensuing 3 days’ battle is by far the most serious military engagement since September 18th. This is actual warfare. From what I learned at Tsitsihar on November 7 and 8, I can only conclude that the Chinese engineers connected with the Tao-Ang Railway were well able to repair the bridges, although there was an indication that they were against finishing the repairs until after November 16th, the date of the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. The Japanese military objective was Tsitsihar and that repairing of the bridge and the defense of the South Manchuria Railway workers thereon were but pretexts used to start a clash with the Heilungkiang troops. I believe the Japanese military leaders were surprised at the Chinese resistance which was unexpected. I have reason to believe that the Chinese military leaders in North Manchuria had come to the conclusion that by not fighting the Japanese they lose their influence, so they decided to resist the Japanese in order to bring about interference of the outside powers or possibly of Soviet Russia.”

Minister informed.

For the Minister:

Engert

1. Telegram in four sections.