Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2592½

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation⁸²

November 10, 1931, 9:30 a.m.

Secretary: This is Secretary Stimson. Is this General Dawes?

Dawes: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary: I have an important message for you. The President and I have an important job for you to do,—a really he-man’s job—and that is to go over to Paris next week or the end of this week and to be there during the special conference of the Council of the League of Nations on the subject of Manchuria. The situation, as you must know from the press, is extremely critical, and yet from the messages I get I am hopeful—very hopeful—that it will be possible with some of the astute good sense I know you to have, to have a settlement finally worked out that would vindicate the peace treaties and save peace in Manchuria. I am sending you by cable today a résumé of the situation to help you.⁸³ You see at present the Paris Embassy is stripped. Edge⁸⁴ is over here. Norman Armour⁸⁵ is on leave, and Marriner⁸⁶ is here. So I am sending Howland Shaw⁸⁷ from Turkey. He is one of the best men in Europe.

Dawes: I do not get that name.

Secretary: Howland Shaw. He is to be Attaché and he is stopping (this is confidential) at Geneva on the way up to confer with Gilbert. I can if necessary have Gilbert go up too but that might make a little excitement in the press here. The point is that we want to be represented by you because we require the necessary personality to give effect to our views in conferences which will be held with people like Briand. We do not want anybody to sit on the Council. We do not want you or anybody else to actually sit in the meetings of the Council but we want them to come to you.

Dawes: Yes.

Secretary: And confer with you and you to confer with them on matters which this country is interested in. Our position in general has been to endorse the position of the League so far as possible, that is to endorse its general objective, which is the preservation of peace in Manchuria. We have actually cooperated in the discussions only when they concerned the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but we have conferred independently through the diplomatic channels on the general situation. The Kellogg Pact business is practically over so far as making representations under that is concerned but the general work of trying to get those two countries together in actual negotiations is the hard part. We have been giving a great deal of attention to that. The difficulty has been that the League we think has gone off a little bit too rapidly.

Dawes: The November 16th date, for instance.

Secretary: We have never agreed with that and we think that was a mistake so far as we can see from here, but we have never said so and we have simply reserved our independence of action and judgment in respect to that and in respect to all matters. The vital point, General, is this. Both parties, both China and Japan, are anxious to negotiate but China will not negotiate so long as Japan is occupying the new territory. And Japan will not evacuate until China negotiates about some long standing disputes they have had from the past. Do you see?

Dawes: Yes.

Secretary: On that last point we think Japan is wrong because it is using the pressure of military force to compel the settlement of certain political and national questions which long antedate this trouble. We have told Japan and we think she is beginning to hedge a little. We have received an answer which on its face would meet our wishes, but I think they will probably try to renew their old demands in spite of that. The thing to do is to work out on the one hand—I should expect you to keep your hand on the shoulder or coat collar of Briand and not let him go too fast, and on the other hand, it would be fine if your acquaintance with Matsudaira⁸⁸—who I hope will go over.

Dawes: You don’t know whether he is going over or not?

Secretary: I do not know, but it would be a great thing if he would. I do not like to suggest it because then it might keep him away, but if there is any way of putting it into his head it would be a very good plan.

Dawes: Do you suppose I could talk personally with Matsudaira about going?

Secretary: In view of your relations with him I think you could.

Dawes: I think I could.

Secretary: Yes, because the thing is a tragedy, General. I have been going over the negotiations carefully since Sunday and they indicate that the parties are close enough together to get together, but they have been kept apart by mistakes on both sides.

Dawes: Is it a fact that if the Japanese should withdraw their troops from some points outside of the Railway Zone that the Japanese nationals there would be in danger of assault?

Secretary: To the best of my information, in some of those places that would be true. As to some places, the original action of the Japanese has resulted in overthrowing the only law and order they have.

Dawes: Would it be a constructive step or a step in advance if Japan could be induced to indicate what her intentions were as to the controversy to withdraw her troops from those places where they can do so without endangering the lives of Japanese nationals, even if they did stay in some other places.

Secretary: That would be a great constructive step. The underlying trouble is that the Japanese Government—that is with our old friends Wakatsuki and Shidehara do not entirely control the situation.

Dawes: That is what Matsudaira tells me.

Secretary: The army has gotten out of hand and has several times got away from them.

Dawes: It is the domestic situation in their own country which makes it difficult.

Secretary: I have been really afraid that almost any day the army would succeed in putting the Cabinet out of office and so you have to proceed very delicately. But I do feel that Shidehara is very anxious to hold this down so far as he can and is very anxious to make a settlement, and our policy has been to try to reinforce his hand without inflaming the national sentiment. He is in a very ticklish position. In other words, the whole situation is one which requires the utmost patience, and yet it requires also absolute firmness on the ultimate point which is that these negotiations so far as they go into long standing matters—old matters—must be free from the pressure of military occupation. Here is a good slogan for you. We have not used it yet but in talking with the President yesterday he suggested it and I think it is a very good one. The negotiations which we believe in and want to have done must be carried on in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and not in the spirit of military occupation. If you read the terms again of the Kellogg Pact, you will remember that the different countries agreed they would settle all their disputes by pacific means. Let me say one thing more. The situation in Manchuria in some ways resembles a situation that we have had to confront on the borders of Mexico and in Central America. Japan has undoubtedly suffered great aggravation in the past, but in making this attack in September she went far beyond, to the best of our information, any proper intervention in behalf of lives and property. Of course she does not admit that, but reports which I have had from independent investigations show that and I will send them to you as quickly as possible.

Dawes: I would like to ask this. It occurs to me that of course any settlement that Japan is willing to make must be one so worded as to cause the least domestic opposition as possible.

Secretary: That is her side of it, and on our side it must vindicate the peace treaties.

Dawes: Isn’t it just possible that some formula could be devised by which Japan, while really making proper concessions, could create the impression in Japan in some way that concessions have been made to her. I do not know whether anything of that sort could be done but the way Matsudaira talked, I think that they would be glad to do anything that they could which would not overthrow them at home. It might be possible that in some way you could get some sort of a settlement made which would indicate that at home there were some concessions to their principle. For instance that they would be allowed to keep their troops where nationals were in danger.

Secretary: So far as we are concerned we would not object to that. To the best of our belief, it would require time to effect an evacuation and they must be given that time. It is very largely their fault that this is so because they have disrupted the original governments there which were maintaining the peace. Now we are confronted with the fact, and we do not want to be the cause of producing anarchy in Manchuria. We do not want that. Let me give you a suggestion that has already been conveyed to Briand. It is based on a historic example. At the time when Japan made the twenty-one demands⁸⁹—you remember in 1915—which included the occupation of Shantung which she had taken from the Germans, this same situation arose—in fact some of the existing disputes which they want to settle now arose out of that same transaction. But when the Washington Conference in 1922 came up, Japan and China had been wrangling over the occupation of Shantung for several years without being able to get together and settle it or to persuade Japan to withdraw her troops. Then during the Conference at Washington, it was suggested that Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour sit as impartial observers in the negotiations after some demurring on the part of Japan, that was done and the trouble was settled in very quick order.

Dawes: Who did you say besides Balfour?

Secretary: Judge Hughes. Secretary Hughes. Charles E. Hughes.

Dawes: A Japanese?

Secretary: No. Hughes, our present Chief Justice of the United States.

Dawes: Oh, yes.

Secretary: He was the President of the Conference here—the Washington Conference—which was going on at that time. The Japanese and Chinese were finally persuaded to get into direct negotiations at the same time as that Conference was going on and Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour were nominally the neutral observers who sat with the Japanese and with the Chinese in the negotiations and the presence of these outside observers reassured China that they would not be overawed by Japan and at the same time they were able to straighten out several difficulties. That is a very striking case in a similar situation to the present one and it has occurred to us here in the Department that we might possibly be able to get them together in that way. The one thing we must avoid is trying to suggest ourselves as a government any solution of these longstanding problems in Manchuria.

Dawes: That would be very dangerous.

Secretary: Very dangerous indeed—they can only be settled by the parties concerned.

Dawes: What is that?

Secretary: That can only be settled by the parties concerned.

Dawes: The more we are in the background so far as Japan is concerned the better it would be.

Secretary: Our interest in the situation is to preserve peace under the terms of treaties to which we are parties. Our only interest in Manchuria is to prevent war.

Dawes: That is right.

Secretary: We do not care what solution is reached between China and Japan so long as it is done by pacific means.

Dawes: That is very good summing up. Mr. Secretary, when I go there are you going to make an announcement of that so that it won’t be necessary for me to say anything?

Secretary: We will announce it from here. In the meantime I should like to have it kept confidential. I think it might be a good thing if you went over a couple of days earlier.

Dawes: So far as any announcement is concerned, you will do that there.

Secretary: I will do that here and I will give the text of our position.

Dawes: You will give the text of our position.

Secretary: Yes, exactly. I will explain that. I was thinking that you might go over a day earlier to see Briand and he would give you a talk on that subject.

Dawes: When do you want me to go?

Secretary: I want you to go in time, if possible, to have a conference with Briand before the meeting.

Dawes: When is the meeting?

Secretary: The meeting is set for Monday, the 16th, I think. But I do not know the hour.

Dawes: All I am to do is to wait until I get a telegram from you?

Secretary: You will get a lot of information. I do not want to announce it for several days.

Dawes: I had better not say anything then to Matsudaira in the meantime.

Secretary: I think it might be a little dangerous until it is finally announced.

Dawes: All right, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary: I feel greatly relieved and I know the President will be greatly relieved to know that you will be willing to go.

Dawes: I appreciate your confidence.

Secretary: What we want is your personality and good horse sense.

Dawes: I will keep you advised so that you can advise me along the way.

Secretary: All right. Yes, we will be glad to help you all we can, but we recognize that a great deal will depend on your own good sense and judgment right on the ground. I shall try to give you all our background as far as possible beforehand.

Dawes: Mr. Secretary, I will advise you before any decision, so you will know exactly what would be in my mind to do.

Secretary: When the original step was taken at the last meeting in Geneva to let Gilbert confer with the members of the Council, the League complicated the matter by staging up a ceremony and a lot of formality that scared a lot of people over here which might not have been scared at all.

Dawes: I feel I can handle that part of it.

Secretary: Yes.

Dawes: I will lay low. I feel that any part we take should be very quiet.

Secretary: Extremely quiet.

Dawes: The less publicity about the thing the better and I will know from what you say about what to take my cue from.

Secretary: All right.

Dawes: You describe there the innocuous——

Secretary: No it is the plain common sense of the situation. It is not innocuous. You are being sent there because you are the most important man we can send.

Dawes: I mean to say that it would not be best to have too much publicity attached to it.

Secretary: Here is the situation. To us this is not so much a League matter as it is a conference of the nations of the world over a situation which affects everybody irrespective of the League.

Dawes: It is a matter of treaty rights.

Secretary: It affects the United States directly by reason of the fact that the United States is a member of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and it also is a signatory of the Nine Power Pact.

Dawes: Exactly so.

Secretary: In which we guaranteed the integrity of China, of which Manchuria is a part, and consequently it would be a good plan for you to read those two treaties and you will have them fresh in your mind and what our stand is. The situation which I want to get to this country is that here are the nations of the World concerned with this dangerous situation in Manchuria all met together in Paris and you are representing this country. Irrespective of any League matter, it would be highly foolish if we were not represented there and represented by the best men we could get.

Dawes: Thank you, I will do the best I can. I can go there one day earlier.

Secretary: That I will leave to you. I should try to find out what time Briand could see you beforehand and I think it would be a good plan to talk with him.

Dawes: I will go a day ahead—the Council meeting is on the 16th.

Secretary: Shaw will be there on the 14th. Shaw is stopping at Geneva on the way—he will be there on the 14th—Saturday. He will have all of that information and if you could get over there then you could spend two days getting the background and in seeing Briand.

Dawes: When will I get the telegram from you?

Secretary: I will send a message just as soon as we get the thing straightened out here and I have seen the President. I have to consult with him about the announcement.

Dawes: Sometime before Saturday?

Secretary: Yes, it will be before Saturday—as early as we can.

Dawes: That is Saturday of this week?

Secretary: Yes, I have a memorandum here. I think you will find that Atherton⁹⁰ knows a good deal of the background of this situation.

Dawes: Who?

Secretary: Ray Atherton, your Counselor.

Dawes: Atherton is in Paris now, I think. I will talk with him about it.

Secretary: You have in your Embassy a man by the name of Dooman.⁹¹ I am told he knows about it.

Dawes: All right. Much obliged.

Secretary: Good luck to you. Goodbye.

82. Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Ambassador Dawes in London, November 10, 1931, 9:30 a.m.
83. See telegram No. 326, November 10, 1931, 8 p.m., to the Ambassador in Great Britain, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 41.
84. Walter E. Edge, Ambassador in France.
85. Counselor of Embassy in France.
86. J. Theodore Marriner, Counselor of Embassy in France.
87. Counselor of Embassy in Turkey.
88. Japanese Ambassador in Great Britain.
89. For texts of the twenty-one demands, see Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 171–177.
90. Hay Atherton, Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain.
91. Eugene H. Dooman, First Secretary of Embassy in Great Britain.