Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2575: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Geneva, November 9, 1931—2 p.m.
[Received 5:05 p.m.]

293. (1) In a conversation this morning with Drummond he told me that, the other Council members having acquiesced, the Council meeting scheduled for November 16 will take place in Paris.

(2) This meeting, as you are aware, is of the status of an adjourned session and is not a new Council session. Thus the American representation technically would still continue (unless altered) under the terms of the League’s letter of invitation and the Department’s acceptance thereof, amplified further by the statements at the Council meeting of October 16 by the American representative.

(3) Drummond has expressed to me and requested that I convey to you his most earnest hope of no change in the character of United States representation at the meeting in Paris. He desired me to add that he is joined in this by the British and French representatives, the only Council members who were aware that a change in American representation was at any time being contemplated. Any knowledge of this has been kept from other members of the Council.

Drummond bases his desire, which is expressed in the foregoing, upon certain points of policy, and he regards each of these as most important:

(a) One aspect of solidarity—in this instance, opposition to using armed force in any form—will “carry through” to the forthcoming conference on disarmament, bringing about its opening under auspices psychologically favorable and enhancing its likelihood of success.

(b) It would be extremely desirable to have an outward aspect of similar solidarity in respect of the negotiations between China and Japan. While not having any bearing upon the actual relations between the United States and the League of Nations in this matter, any “physical” alteration in the American representative’s position might be used by the Japanese press in order to stiffen public opinion in Japan to support the present Japanese position, giving the Japanese extremists, so to speak, a new lease on life, which might affect the negotiations materially. Moreover, the press of the world is beginning to discount as “news” any longer the relation of the United States to the League, including the American position on the League Council. Any change probably would arouse a species of speculation by the press, much of which perhaps would be harmful and unfortunate. This is possible particularly because of the American policy at present to conduct relations privately through American diplomatic channels with the Chinese and Japanese. As you are aware, Drummond is fully in accord with the American Government’s policy in this respect and feels, under the circumstances, that this special strategy is the best possible and is of incalculable value. However, since for this reason United States policy in relation to Japan remains in the background, it is most desirable to maintain and it would be exceedingly difficult to have anything replace the outward symbol of mutual confidence and of solidarity achieved by the American position at the Council table.

(c) Previously, when American withdrawal from the Council table was contemplated, Drummond recalls the almost insurmountable difficulty Briand faced at that time in formulating a statement which might explain such a change in a way which would be convincing or satisfactory or even believable.

(d) The Council members and the League states in general never conceived of the United States objective in its association with the Council as exceeding in importance its limitation to the invocation of the Kellogg Pact. This was considered to be simply a means to afford such cooperation. This association has been envisaged as the American Government’s desire to take the steps which, under the circumstances, seemed wisest toward attainment of an objective commonly held with other powers to endeavor to bring about a satisfactory solution of the Manchurian question within the bounds of modern world sentiment and of machinery for a peaceful settlement of disputes and to lend to such efforts continuing moral support. The association of the United States with the Council for this purpose was a departure from customary League procedure which was not agreed to without some sacrifice by members of the League, since there was in the minds of Council members a question whether the League’s integrity might not be threatened in some way by setting such a precedent. In this the Council members also felt responsible to other League states which were unrepresented on the Council. Extension of an invitation to the United States was influenced by the great powers on the Council, for these felt that they would be obliged to bear the burden in case of any trouble with Japan; but the chief reason for the Council members acquiescing in the invitation was due to their feeling that it would be responsive to the desire of the American Government. They would for this reason misunderstand a withdrawal by the United States, which undoubtedly would wound their sensibilities.

(e) The American representative’s position as an “auditor”, though one deeply interested, is understood clearly; and, viewing the situation from Geneva, Drummond does not see how, while this technical position is firmly maintained, anything could arise to prejudice the general position of the United States.

(4) I need scarcely say in respect of the above that in his conversation with me Drummond in no wise created an impression of trying to dictate or even to suggest what might be a desirable policy for the United States to follow. He merely was giving you in a frank manner, through me, his thought concerning this subject, as he has done respecting other matters relating to the United States.

Gilbert