793.94/2455: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
274. I have just had a very long talk with Drummond in which he discussed the present situation in Manchuria and expressed his views on the League’s action thereon and possible American relationship therewith. I took up with him the question raised in the Department’s 124, October 31, 4 p.m. His reply was so tied up with the general situation that I shall for the sake of clarity bring it in in this telegram in its appropriate connection. The essentials of which Drummond had to say were as follows:
1. The immediate Sino-Japanese problem has obviously a most important bearing on disarmament and other world questions. In view of this the United States and the majority of the League states have a common objective in reaching a satisfactory solution in the shortest possible time. American cooperation in this is probably absolutely essential. This immediate objective is so important in the way of implications that questions of League prestige and similar considerations should be absolutely laid aside.
2. The draft resolution of October 24 as pointed out in Briand’s note to Yoshizawa (Consulate’s 270, October 31, 9 a.m.) has no juridical force. It thus cannot technically be regarded as definite League policy which is still based on the resolution of September 30th. The draft resolution may be considered however as possessing a moral force as explicit of what the Governments represented on the Council (with the exception Japan) consider to be right and fair under the circumstances. Moreover, with the foregoing consideration in mind it may also be found to contain suggestions which individual governments might deem it desirable to take up in Tokyo and Nanking.
3. The important part of the September 30th resolution is that which envisages a speedy withdrawal of Japanese troops to within the railway zone and the effective assurance of the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals incident to evacuation.
Briand’s note to Yoshizawa stressed this point and indicates that in his views as President of the Council the best method of effecting the foregoing would be that the proposal contained in point (5) of the October 24th resolution be adopted by the Japanese Government.
[Paraphrase.] Should this proposal once be in effect, with the discussions begun and proceeding satisfactorily between the Chinese and Japanese representatives, the question of a fixed date such as [Page 353] November 16 (which lacks legal force, as has been stated) becomes of secondary importance.
Of paramount importance at present is the question of obtaining Japanese acceptance of the immediate appointment of representatives and of the early commencement of direct conversations concerning points relative to evacuation. As late as October 30, it is understood, a note which the Chinese addressed recently to the Japanese requesting them to appoint representatives for this purpose had remained unanswered.
4. Drummond believes to be correct the information which the Department’s 124 reported with regard to the British attitude concerning the appointment of neutrals in harmony with the resolution of October 24. He understands also that the French Government so far has not been approached on this point by the Chinese. However, he feels if approached the French would agree. Since the October 24 draft resolution lacks binding force, the French nevertheless would probably confine their action to the utilization of their Military Attachés near the scene. As to the action of other Council members on this point, Drummond has no information but believes the French lead is likely to be followed.
5. It is Drummond’s feeling that the United States might perhaps perform a very useful service if it could induce the Japanese Government to appoint representatives for the purpose of holding conversations with Chinese representatives in accordance with the proposal discussed above under 3. However, he expressed as his own view that any démarche which the United States Government might consider it desirable to make in this regard might be more successful perhaps if the matter were privately taken up with the Japanese, for publicity might render more difficult an acceptance by Japan.
6. The press of various countries has printed articles since the middle of October, though recently these have not been so frequent, purporting to be based upon information from Washington to the effect that this capital and Geneva are divided as to policies toward the present situation. These articles have in particular intimated that the United States was not in agreement with the League of Nations in its “demands” on Japan. It is felt by Drummond that a useful purpose would be served at this juncture if perhaps Washington in a statement were to indicate in general terms that such a disagreement does not exist or if possible an American communication of a similar purport to the League might be made public.
7. I desire to make it clear that Drummond in his conversation with me made no direct request concerning possible action by the United States. I was aware, however, from the atmosphere of our conversation that he would appreciate greatly any expression of your [Page 354] views which you might find it possible to give him in line with the questions which are implied in the above. [End paraphrase.]
8. In view of the circumstance that questions of policy have been raised in the foregoing I will add that the matter of possible American policy in the premises has been frequently brought up by diplomatic representatives of various Governments in Geneva in the natural course of my contact with them. As of possible interest I submit the gist of their expressions in this connection:
Although technically the League Council is taking publicly the lead in this matter it is erroneous to regard the Council or the League as something above or apart from the states composing it. Especially in a case of this character Council policy possesses strength only in proportion as it is supported or implemented by the League powers; in this instance the great powers are almost solely concerned.
A certain hesitancy appears to exist in the Foreign Offices of the great powers inasmuch as, regarded individually, they are looking to America for leadership because of its great prestige and its important position in relation to the Orient and also because it is more powerful than any single one of the European states. They look for this leadership to be extended privately or publicly, either through a backing of Council policy, if Washington be in agreement therewith, or perhaps through a more individual form of leadership.
- Telegram in two sections.↩