793.94/2393
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The French Ambassador came in to tell me first of the appreciation and thanks of his government and the Laval and Pétain Parties for all the courtesies that had been shown them in this country.
Secondly, the Ambassador brought up the question of Manchuria. He had in his hands a note in French from M. Briand which he translated,36 [Page 343] which in substance requested him to get us to make a demonstration of our approval of the action of the League in their final resolution, this to be done at Tokyo, and saying that it would be preferable if some publicity could be given to it as there were rumors that we did not agree with the action of the League. The note indicated that Lord Reading was to make a similar démarche upon us through the British Ambassador.
I told the Ambassador that I was already at work on the consideration of a note on that subject. I said there were two points which would seem to be the basic points, which I was most troubled over—one was the time limit for evacuation set for November 16th which Japan would undoubtedly reject, and the other was the Japanese refusal to evacuate unless the Chinese discussed not only matters relating to the evacuation but fundamental treaties and treaty rights between the two nations. I said that on its face this last looked as if Japan was trying to force China to accept certain national policies of Japan’s by the use of this military occupation, which would be a clear violation of Japan’s treaty obligations under the Kellogg Pact and other treaties. I told him that I was more in doubt about the wisdom of the Council’s action in setting the time limit because I had had news from Manchuria through our own observers that it would not be safe to withdraw the Japanese troops from certain points in Manchuria by November 16th owing to the state of anarchy which existed. He nodded his head and said he had impressions of the same kind. I said I had these matters under careful consideration and was trying to determine what sort of an answer I could send which would make clear my general support of the League position and yet possibly leave a ladder by which Japan could climb down. He laughed and said he appreciated my use of the word “ladder” because that was a term commonly used in Oriental negotiations and indicated my familiarity with it. He then asked me my views of the final result of the situation. I said that I thought Japan had made a great mistake; that she was now beginning to suffer from the Chinese boycott all through China and that this was likely to bring her to her knees because she would not have the moral support of any other nation. I said I regretted this because I regarded Japan’s welfare in her position on the outskirts of the Asiatic continent as very important to the Western world and I was sorry that she had put herself in a position which would probably in the long run end up by doing her serious harm.
- Infra.↩