793.94/2515
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Castle) of a Conversation With
the Japanese Ambassador (Debuchi), October 28, 1931
October 28, 1931
The Ambassador left with me the attached papers. He said that his
Government was very unhappy over the final decision of the League of
Nations, primarily, because they felt themselves unable to accept
dictation as to the withdrawal of their troops before the 16th of
November, and, secondly, because their fifth point was an essential part
of the whole picture. The Ambassador brought out the fact that in giving
me an outline of the five points, he had spoken particularly, as the
fifth point, of all arrangements concerning railroads. This had been
brought up with Mr. Briand and Lord Reading, both of whom had said that
it would be impossible for the League to consider any inclusion of the
railroad question and that the railroads must not be specifically
mentioned. The Japanese then felt that by changing the wording of the
fifth point to its present wording, that is, “respect for treaty rights
of Japan in Manchuria”, the League would be likely to accept, as the
maintenance of treaties was one of its main interests. This, however,
was not accepted, and at the last minute the League rushed through its
resolution largely at the instance of Lord Reading.
On the first page of the memorandum given me by Mr. Debuchi, it will be
noted that Sir Eric Drummond, on October 20, made a definite suggestion
to Mr. Yoshizawa of certain points which might prove acceptable to the
League. It is quite clear from what the Ambassador said that Mr.
Yoshizawa took these points of Drummond’s as completely official. He
telegraphed them to his Government immediately
[Page 334]
and received an answer from his Government on
October 22nd, stating that the Japanese Government would accept. Mr.
Yoshizawa hurried to Lord Reading with this acceptance, but Lord Reading
refused to discuss the matter and the League passed the resolution,
which we know, over Japan’s protest. This has led in Japan to violent
outbreaks against Great Britain.
No. 2 of the memoranda left me by the Japanese Ambassador is the
statement of the Japanese Government issued on October 27th, which we
have already seen. The Ambassador at this point stated that Mr.
Yoshizawa had made a very serious error in not clearly stating in Geneva
what Japan considered as fundamental. He said that there was no point
whatever in making any secret of this since the news as to Japan’s fifth
point had already more or less leaked out. I gathered that Mr.
Yoshizawa, in refusing to make this public and thereby creating a
mystery was, if not actually disobeying his instructions, at least not
seizing an opportunity which had been given him.
No. 3 of the papers left with me is Article 6 of a treaty concluded
between China and Japan, September 4, 1909.27 Mr. Debuchi pointed out on the map he
brought28
just where this section of railroad continuing the Kirin-Changchun
Railway to Huining was of very vital importance to Japan. He said that
in spite of this article of the treaty, the Chinese have steadily
refused to allow the railroad to be built.
No. 4 of the papers is part of a statement made by Mr. Hughes at the
Washington Conference.29 The Ambassador
left this with me largely in explanation of the fourth point made by
Japan in the statement given out as to effective protection in Manchuria
of peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects. Mr. Debuchi
explained that these pursuits included the right to lease land for
building purposes, trade and manufacture, for agricultural purposes and
for general business purposes. It does not go beyond this. The
Ambassador said that the reason point four was of importance was that
the Chinese had consistently prevented wherever possible the Japanese
subjects from having equal rights with others.
The question which the Ambassador brought up the other day as to ruinous
competition among the railroads is covered in the first paragraph of the
fifth paper attached. He said that the Chinese had built certain
railroads which more or less paralleled the Japanese lines and were
planning to build others contrary to the treaty, that Japan felt it
essential, particularly in these days when railroads were not
[Page 335]
making money, that China
should recognize these obligations and should not thus parallel the
roads.
Attached paper No. 6 is a letter from Mr. Lamont, 1920, to the Japanese
Banking group in the Consortium.30 The Ambassador pointed out to
me the various railroads mentioned in the three numbered paragraphs of
Mr. Lamont’s letter, some of them being already built, some of them
partly built. He felt that this was a recognition of Japanese rights on
these various railroads in that they were specifically excluded from the
operation of the Chinese Consortium. He pointed out that Mr. Lamont in
writing the letter said that the statement had the approval of the
governments of the United States, Great Britain and France.
I told the Ambassador that a letter from Mr. Lamont could hardly be put
in the same class as a treaty, and added that I did not know personally
whether this Government had made any statement on the matter. He stated
that he wanted to leave these various papers with me in order that as
far as possible we might understand the Japanese point of view. He added
once more the disappointment of the Japanese Government at the refusal
of the League to consider the Japanese fifth point. I told him it seemed
to me that this was natural, since the demand of the League was confined
to the present emergency. What the League wanted, and, of course, what
we wanted also, was to see Japan live up to the agreement it made on
September 30th. I told him that the information we had from many sources
indicated that instead of withdrawing the Japanese were consolidating
their position out of the railroad zone with the apparent intention of
retaining control indefinitely, that because this was a violation of
treaties, it became inevitably of grave concern to the whole world. I
spoke, for example, of the fact that in one or two places the Japanese
seemed to be constructing winter barracks, which at least did not look
like evacuation. The Ambassador said that it was true that in one place
at least they had constructed wooden barracks of the cheapest kind,
because the weather was already exceedingly cold and the soldiers could
not sleep under tents. The Ambassador, of course, had not very much that
he could say on this subject, and I told him that I was personally very
unhappy about it, because we got very conflicting reports from Japanese
Government sources, for example, and military sources.
He said that he wanted to ask one indiscreet question, and that was
whether the League had asked this Government to associate itself with
the resolution taken by the Council a few days ago and had asked us in
addition to bring pressure to bear on Japan. I told him that the League
had not asked us to associate ourselves with their action, and
[Page 336]
if we felt it necessary to
give advice and suggestions to the Japanese Government, it would be on
our own initiative,—not at the request of the League.
W[illiam] R. C[astle,] Jr.
[Annex 1]
Essential Points of the Suggestion Made by
Sir Eric Drummond, October 20, 1931
(Approved by Japan on October 22)
Evacuation and direct negotiations
to proceed together.
- 1.
- Japan to evacuate as soon as possible.
- 2.
- China to provide security.
- 3.
- Direct negotiations for the above purposes.
- 4.
- The meeting of the Council to adjourn for three weeks
(November 16).
Essential Points of the Resolution
Approved by the Members of the Council Other Than Japan,
October 24, 1931
Evacuation before direct
negotiations.
- 1.
- Japan to evacuate as soon as possible, not later than the date
of the next meeting of the Council (November 16).
- 2.
- Direct negotiations, upon the completion
of the evacuation, to settle all pending questions,
especially the questions arising from the recent events as well
as the questions relating to the railways in Manchuria.
[Annex 2]
Statement of the Japanese Government, Issued at
Tokyo, October 27, 1931, Relative to the MancJmrian
Situation
- 1.
- On the 22nd of October, the Japanese representative in the
Council of the League of Nations proposed certain amendments to
the resolution then before the Council with regard to questions
of (1) withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway zone and (2)
direct negotiations between China and Japan. However, these
suggested amendments as well as the resolution itself fell
through, having failed to obtain unanimous approval of the
Council.
- 2.
- As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Japanese Government,
the whole Manchurian affair was occasioned solely by a violent
and provocative attack launched by the Chinese army on the
railway zone. Certain small contingents of Japanese soldiers
still remaining
[Page 337]
at a
few points outside that zone are insistently demanded by the
danger to which a large population of Japanese in that region
are exposed in life and property. The presence of such a limited
number of troops is quite incapable of being represented as a
means of dictating to China Japan’s terms for the settlement of
the present difficulties. Nothing is farther from the thoughts
of Japan than to bring armed pressure to bear upon China in the
course of these negotiations.
- 3.
- The Japanese Government have on various occasions given
expression to their firm determination to suffer no abridgement
or diminution of the rights and interests of Japan which are
vital to her national existence and which are woven into the
complex fabric of her political and economic relations with
China. Unfortunately, the so-called “recovery of rights”
movements in China have recently attained extravagant
developments, while feelings antagonistic to Japan have openly
been encouraged in text books used at various schools in China
and have become deeply seated in the Chinese mind. In defiance
of treaties and regardless of all history, vigorous agitation
has been carried on in China with the object of undermining
rights and interests of Japan, even the most vital. As things
stand at present, the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops to
the South Manchuria Railway zone under the mere assurance of the
Chinese Government would create an intolerable situation
exposing Japanese subjects to the gravest dangers. The risk of
such dangers is clearly evidenced by past experience and by
conditions which actually obtain in China.
- 4.
- The Japanese Government are persuaded that in the present
situation the safety of Japanese subjects in Manchuria can
hardly be ensured without provision being made to remove
national antipathies and suspicions existing in the mutual
relations of the two Powers. With this end in view they have
already expressed in the note of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of October 9th to the Chinese Minister at Tokyo their
readiness to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government
on certain basic principles that should regulate normal
interrelationship between the two countries. That note was
communicated at the same time to the Council of the League.
Convinced that this method of procedure is alone calculated to
open out a way to save the situation, the Japanese Government
have consistently held to their proposals in that sense
throughout the recent discussions at the Council of the League.
The basic principles which they have had in mind relate to:
- (1)
- mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and
conduct,
- (2)
- respect for China’s territorial integrity,
- (3)
- complete suppression of all organized movements
interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up
international hatred,
- (4)
- effective protection throughout Manchuria of all
peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese
subjects,
- (5)
- respect for treaty rights of Japan in
Manchuria.
- The Japanese Government believe that all these points being in
entire accord with the aims and aspirations of the League of
Nations and embodying the natural basis upon which peace in the
Far East must depend, will commend themselves to the approval of
public opinion of the world. The refusal by the Japanese
representative to lay these points on the table of the Council
was due to the consideration that they should in their nature
properly form the subject of negotiations between the parties
directly involved.
- 5.
- With the future welfare of both nations in mind the Japanese
Government feel that the urgent need at the present moment is to
arrive at a solution of the problem by cooperation of the two
countries and thus seek a path of common happiness and
prosperity. Their willingness remains unaltered and unabated to
open negotiations with the Chinese Government on the subject of
the basic principles above formulated relating to normal
relations between Japan and China and on the subject of the
withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchuria Railway
zone.
[Annex 3]
Agreement Relating to the Chientao Region
Concluded Between Japan and China, September 4, 1909
(MacMurray—Page 797)
. . . . . . .
Art. 6.—The Government of China shall
undertake to extend the Kirin-Changchun Railway to the southern
boundary of Yenchi, and to connect it at Hoiryong (Huining) with a
Korean railway, and such extension shall be effected upon the same
terms as the Kirin-Changchun Railway. The date of commencing the
work of the proposed extension shall be determined by the Government
of China, considering the actual requirements of the situation, and
upon consultation with the Government of Japan.
. . . . . . .
[Annex 4]
Statement Made by Mr. Charles E. Hughes at the
Meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions of
the Washington Conference, February 3, 1922
. . . . . . .
It is further to be pointed out that by Articles II, III, and IV of
the treaty of May 25, 1915, with respect to South Manchuria and
Eastern
[Page 339]
Inner
Mongolia,31 the Chinese
Government granted to Japanese subjects the right to lease land for
building purposes, for trade and manufacture, and for agricultural
purposes in South Manchuria, to reside and travel in South
Manchuria, and to engage in any kind of business and manufacture
there, and to enter into joint undertakings with Chinese citizens in
agriculture and similar industries in Eastern Inner Mongolia.
With respect to this grant, the Government of the United States will,
of course, regard it as not intended to be exclusive, and, as in the
past, will claim from the Chinese Government for American citizens
the benefits accruing to them by virtue of the most-favored-nation
clauses in the Treaties between the United States and China.
I may pause here to remark that the question of the validity of the
treaties as between Japan and China is distinct from the question of
the treaty rights of the United States under its treaties with
China; these rights have been emphasized and consistently asserted
by the United States.
. . . . . . .
[Annex 5]
Protocol Attached to Sino-Japanese Treaty
Relating to Manchuria, December 22, 1905
. . . . . . .
“3. The Chinese Government engage, for the purpose of protecting
the interest of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct,
prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any main line
in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any
branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the
above-mentioned railway.
. . . . . . .
“10. The Chinese Plenipotentiaries declare that immediately after
the withdrawal of the Japanese and Russian troops from
Manchuria, China will proceed to take, in virtue of her
sovereign right, full administrative measures to guarantee peace
in that region and endeavor, by the same right, to promote good
and remove evil as well as steadily to restore order, so that
the residents of that region, natives and foreigners, may
equally enjoy the security of life and occupation under the
perfect protection of the Chinese Government. As to the means of
restoring order, the Chinese Government are to take by
themselves all adequate measures.
. . . . . . .
