Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2558

The Chargé in Japan (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 24, 1931.
[Received November 9.]

No. 374

Sir: I have the honor to report that Mr. Salisbury left Tokyo, in accordance with the Department’s telegram No. 177 of September 29th, 6 P.M., on the morning of October 2nd. He arrived at Changchun at 1 P.M., October 4th, where he met Mr. Hanson. The rest of that day and the one following they spent in investigating conditions at Changchun and the nearby places of Nanling and Kuanchengtze. On the morning of October 7th they went to Kirin and the following afternoon proceeded to Tunhua, arriving again at Kirin on the afternoon of October 9th. On the morning of October 10th they again went to Changchun and the rest of that day and most of the eleventh was spent in further work there. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the 11th they started for Taonanfu, reaching there early in the morning of the 12th. They left Taonanfu that night for Mukden, where they arrived early in the afternoon of the 13th, having spent four hours at Ssupingkai on the way. On the afternoon of the 14th they proceeded to Newchwang (Yinkou) and spent that evening and most of the following day studying the situation there. They arrived again at Mukden at 8:00 P.M., on the 15th, and left there three hours later for Antung, where they spent October 16th, returning by the night train to Mukden. The 17th, 18th, and 19th were spent at Mukden investigating conditions there and preparing a final telegraphic report covering the entire trip. On the 20th each officer started for his respective post, Mr. Salisbury arriving at Tokyo on the morning of October 23rd.

There is enclosed a copy of Mr. Salisbury’s report of his investigation.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin L. Neville

[Enclosure]

Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in Japan (Salisbury)

I. Brief Outline op Japanese Military Action From September 18th

Between ten and ten-thirty on the night of September 18th, according to the Japanese military, some Chinese set off an explosive on the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway just north of Mukden. This precipitated a clash that resulted in an attack by the Japanese on the Chinese North Barracks. During the remainder of that night and the following day, the Japanese military occupied the cities of Mukden, Changchun, Antung, and Newchwang (Yinkou). On September 21st the Japanese military occupied the city of Kirin and on the 22nd Chengchiatun, thereby making ineffective for use by the Chinese those Chinese railways that parallel the South Manchuria Railway on the east and the west. Between September 22nd and 25th troops occupied Tungliao, Tunhua, and Taonanfu, cities located on the Chinese parallel lines, but withdrew from them by October 5th. Following the occupation of these cities, the most important action by the Japanese military was the bombing of Chinchow where Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang were attempting to reestablish the Government that had existed at Mukden prior to the Japanese military activities. Other military action by the Japanese has continued sporadically to the present time to quell the activities of bandits whose number had been augmented by the Chinese troops that had fled before the approach of the Japanese or had been dispersed.

II. Causes of the Action of the Japanese Military

A clash in Manchuria between Japanese and Chinese forces was inevitable. The Japanese had long been aggravated by Chinese intransigeance. The Chinese would not—wilfully would not, from the Japanese point of view—come to a conclusion with the Japanese in negotiations over problems that affected legitimate Japanese economic development in Manchuria. Among the problems which the Japanese were anxious to have solved were those of taxation, land rights, Koreans in Manchuria, the boycott of Japanese goods, and the construction of railways by the Chinese allegedly in contravention of existing agreements. In addition to these more fundamental problems, there had been during the months preceding September 18th an increasing number of occurrences, such as the murder of Captain Nakamura and his two companions, which had added to Japanese dissatisfaction.

The Japanese military had further reasons for discontent. They believed that the conciliatory policy of the Japanese Foreign Office with respect to Manchuria was mistaken and they felt that their prestige had been lowered through it.

Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Consul General at Mukden, stated that in July of this year he informed Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Foreign Minister, that, although the conciliatory policy should be adhered to, a clash was inevitable. He patently regretted, however, that the pretext seized upon—or manufactured—by the military was unconvincing and trivial.

III. Aims of the Japanese Military

The only frank Japanese avowal of the immediate aim of the Japanese military was that of Lieutenant-Colonel Iwata, commander of the Japanese troops at Tashihchiao and at Newchwang (Yinkou). He told us that Newchwang had been occupied by the Japanese, not to protect the Japanese residents, as they had not been in danger, but to disperse Chang Hsueh-liang’s troops—of which there had been 500 at Newchwang—and to destroy his power. He added that these were also the reasons for the taking of Changchun, a very different but more credible explanation than the one we had heard at the latter city.

There seems to be no question that the Japanese military believed that Chang Hsueh-liang’s power was inimical to a favorable solution of a number of outstanding questions. They decided to destroy this power in the interest of the Japanese. Both Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria agree on this point, and the bombing of Chinchow can be adequately explained only by the fact that Chang Hsueh-liang had set up his government there. The military probably felt, too, that only by some such action could they restore their prestige which they thought had been impaired. How much further the ambition of the Japanese military may have extended will be discussed subsequently in this report.

IV. Japanese Excuse for Military Action

With the exception of the military commander at Newchwang already quoted, all Japanese military and civil officers with whom we talked claimed that the extended military action was necessary to safeguard Japanese lives. They insisted that once news of the clash in Mukden was received the Chinese troops would have attacked Japanese residents had they not been forestalled by the Japanese military.

V. Validity of the Japanese Excuse

In no place did we find the Japanese excuse convincing. In places outside of Mukden, the Chinese attitude invariably was: “Why did the Japanese come here? This is a Mukden affair and should have been settled at Mukden.” Wherever they were not surprised and fired upon by the Japanese without warning, the Chinese troops either fled or surrendered their arms without resistance. We were told by many Chinese that orders had sometime previously been issued to all Chinese troops not to resist in case of Japanese aggression, and the truth of this report seems to have been borne out wherever the Chinese troops had a chance to act in this sense. If such an order had been issued, it would seem that a command as efficient as the Japanese command probably knew of it. Every place which Japanese troops occupied had strategic value and such a place as Harbin, with 4,000 Japanese residents, received no military protection while Tunhua with 18 Japanese residents and Taonanfu with 5 were occupied. Of all the Japanese we asked with regard to the reasons for the non-occupation of Harbin, although the Japanese residents there were so uneasy that many left the city, only the commander of the Japanese troops at Newchwang had a definite answer. He said that occupation of Harbin would have created complications with the Russians. To convince us of the danger to the Japanese, both at Changchun and Newchwang, we were told of trenches the Chinese troops had recently dug. At Changchun these trenches were very close to the Kuanchengtze barracks and could have been used only in defence (though they were not so used in the recent clash). As the trenches at Newchwang afforded no protection from approach of an enemy by railway (the natural way for Japanese to approach), they were undoubtedly built for protection against bandits, the number of which has increased considerably in that vicinity during the past year.

a. At Mukden.

The accounts of the Japanese military of what occurred near Mukden on the night of September 18th are so very contradictory and their protestations of Chinese culpability so elaborate that it seemed to us not only were the initial events of that night not as the Japanese military explained them but that the Japanese attack on the North Barracks came as an almost complete surprise to the 10,000 Chinese soldiers occupying them. (As the Consulate General at Mukden has already reported the initial incident, it seems unnecessary for me to give reasons for disbelief.) Admitting, however, that the Japanese version is correct, military action could have been stopped following the death of the three Chinese, who were alleged to have caused the explosion, without dishonor to the Japanese and without danger either to Japanese troops or civilians. Colonel Shimamoto, who commanded the Japanese troops in their attack on the barracks, told us that after a Japanese lieutenant and six soldiers had pursued the alleged perpetrators of the explosion, two or three companies of Chinese troops came out of the barracks to aid their countrymen, only to retreat into the barracks before the approach of a Japanese company. Until this time there had been no Japanese casualties. When Colonel Shimamoto was asked why the Japanese did not allow hostilities to stop at this point, he said that once the retreating Chinese had informed the remaining 10,000 fellow soldiers of the affair they would have poured out and annihilated the Japanese. Considering that the 10,000 Chinese were apparently unprepared to resist the subsequent attack by 600 Japanese, during which 300 Chinese were killed and only 2 Japanese, it would seem that they had had no intention of leaving their barracks to attack the Japanese.

b. At Changchun.

In the vicinity of Changchun, the only place besides Mukden where there was fighting, there would have been no clash if the Chinese had not been attacked while they were asleep. Both Japanese and Chinese informants stated that the Chinese troops were asleep. The Japanese also admit that no attempt was made beforehand to effect the surrender of the Chinese troops, the Japanese again claiming that military tactics demanded an “offensive defensive”.

There were four separate “battles” in the vicinity of Changchun: two at Nanling, three miles south of Changchun, one at Kuanchengtze, three kilometres north of Changchun, and one at the barracks of the Chinese railway guards at the Changchun station of the Kirin-Changchun Railway.

Major Hosoki, our military guide there, told us that news of the fighting at Mukden was received at Changchun at 12:15 and that at 1:30 A.M. all the troops at Changchun were ordered to go to Mukden to assist. (As the departure of these troops, numbering 1,000, would have left only 100 railway guards to protect the Japanese residents of Changchun, according to the Japanese consul there, it would seem to show that there was no especial concern regarding their safety.) At 3:50 or 3:55 A.M. word came from Mukden that the assistance of these troops was not necessary. 200 troops were then sent against the artillery barracks at Nanling, while 200 other troops were despatched against the infantry barracks at Kuanchengtze.

According to the Japanese military: the troops sent against the artillery barracks at Nanling reached there about 5:00 A.M., where there were approximately 500 Chinese soldiers. By 8:00 A.M., the 36 cannon and the barracks had been destroyed and the Chinese had fled. The Japanese then retired to a nearby village to rest and dress their wounds. At 10:00 A.M., 200 Japanese reinforcements having arrived from Kungchuling, south of Changchun on the South Manchuria Railway, an attack was made on the infantry barracks at Nanling, where there were from 1,500 to 1,800 Chinese troops.^*

The curious point about this battle at the Chinese infantry barracks at Nanling is that, although these barracks are only two or three hundred feet from the artillery barracks, the infantry did not come to the support of the artillery but waited quietly in their barracks until ten o’clock when the Japanese attacked them and, after fighting until 2 P.M., put them to flight.

Both at Mukden and at Changchun one felt distinctly that the Japanese wished to make it appear that the resistance of the Chinese had been very strong and that only severe fighting had quelled them. One Chinese told us that the infantry had fled, as soon as the artillery was attacked, as the Chinese cavalry in contiguous barracks had fled. Remembering the behavior of Chinese troops elsewhere, it is difficult to believe that the Chinese infantry waited in their barracks until 10:00 A.M. while the artillery was fighting and when they knew that probably they would be attacked. Before this ten o’clock battle, if it occurred, no effort was made by the Japanese, according to Major Hosoki, to have them surrender. The indications of severe fighting at the infantry barracks cannot be taken as proof that severe fighting actually did occur since the Japanese military are not above the suspicion of having manufactured evidence, as it is alleged, with some reason, they did at the railway tracks at Mukden.

At the barracks at Kuanchengtze there seems to have been really strong resistance, which can be explained by the fact that, not only was it a surprise attack, but the building in which the 500 to 600 Chinese infantry were housed was a much stronger building for purposes of defence than the other barracks where fighting occurred. Also, here they were under fire from at least three sides and the chance of escape was lessened. The total number of dead, according to Japanese figures, in the fighting at Nanling and Kuanchengtze was: Japanese, 68; Chinese, 216. Of the Chinese, 180 were killed at Kuanchengtze.

I cannot but believe that, had the Chinese at Nanling and Kuanchengtze been given warning, they would either have fled or submitted peacefully.

The attack by Japanese troops on the barracks of the Chinese railway guards at the Changchun Station of the Kirin-Changchun Railway was certainly not to protect Japanese residents but to gain control of the telegraph office of that station. Here fighting lasted for only a very few minutes and there were no casualties on the Japanese side. Whether there were or not on the Chinese side, we were unable to learn.

c. At Other Places.

The 7,000 Chinese troops at Kirin retreated from the city the day before the arrival of the 200 Japanese troops. The withdrawal of the 1,000 Japanese residents would have been less expensive, it would seem, and would have had less serious effects on the ultimate maintenance of order than occupation of the city by Japanese troops.

At Antung there were no Chinese troops, only 600 Chinese policemen. These permitted themselves to be disarmed without offering resistance. The nearest troops (several hundred at Fenghuangchien) were disarmed without disorder and sent to Mukden.

At Newchwang about 300 Chinese troops and 800 Chinese policemen were disarmed peacefully. The remaining 200 Chinese soldiers of that city fled, having been outside of Newchwang hunting bandits at the time of the arrival of 300 Japanese troops.

VI. The Opportune Time Chosen for Attack

The time chosen by the Japanese military for widespread action was very opportune for its success. How much thought was given to the points that follow below it is, of course, impossible to say.

(a) The strongest Chinese officials of Manchuria were absent. Generals Chang Hsueh-liang, Chang Tso-hsiang of Kirin, and Wan Fu-lin of Tsitsihar were all in Peking. There was no official of their power or influence left in Manchuria. Their absence rendered organized resistance difficult, continuance of effective government impossible and the formation of any new government improbable unless with the support or acquiescence of the Japanese.

(b) It seems credible, as already stated, that the Chinese troops in Manchuria had received orders that in case of Japanese aggression they should not resist.

(c) The Nakamura case was on the verge of a satisfactory settlement, which would have lessened public sympathy for the action of the Japanese military if undertaken subsequently.

(d) The Japanese military may believe that this recent action, coming before the meeting of the Disarmament Conference, will make less likely any serious scaling down of the strength of the Japanese army.

(e) Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang’s increasing intimacy with Peking and Nanking was tending to orient Manchuria politically toward China south of the Wall, a tendency definitely destroyed to all practical intents by the action of the Japanese military.

(f) The other Powers were seriously occupied in combatting depression.

(h) [sic] The Japanese people were growing restive under the large expenditures for the military; this restiveness may very possibly decrease before the people’s pride in the efficiency of their army.

VII. The Plan of the Japanese Military

It is apparent that the Japanese had ready a well-worked-out plan of action in Manchuria, as any efficient army in the world probably has plans prepared for almost any contingency. That such a plan existed is indicated by the rapid, unified, and strategic action that followed the Mukden clash. It would seem to an observer that the plan consisted of four distinct steps, the first two of which were worked out fully, the third initiated but for some reason abandoned, while the fourth, apparently, is now in progress.

(a) The first part of the plan began with the alleged explosion on the tracks near Mukden and ended the following day when the Japanese military had gained control of the strategic cities of the South Manchuria Railway area, namely, Changchun, Mukden, Antung, and Newchwang. With these cities in control the Japanese army was reasonably free from any fear of attack in the South Manchuria Railway area and was in a position to administer it as they wished. All action in this area was initiated by the Japanese military before dawn on September 19th.

(b) When the control of the South Manchuria Railway area was consolidated, the second part of the plan was initiated; namely, the seizure of control of the Chinese railways that parallel the South Manchuria Railway on the east and the west. On September 21st, they took the city of Kirin, along with the Kirin-Changchun Railway. Possession of Kirin, with Mukden already occupied, gave the Japanese military the control of the Kirin-Hailung-Mukden Railway (Shen-Hai and Kai-Ki [Ki-Hai?] Railways), which parallels the South Manchuria Railway on the east and is a line built by the Chinese under strong Japanese protest. The following day (September 22nd) Chengchiatun was taken, thereby giving the Japanese control of Ssupingkai-Chengchiatun Railway. This made it impossible for the Chinese to use effectively the Chinese railway lines that parallel the South Manchuria Railway on the west, namely, the Tahushan-Chengchiatun and Chengchiatun-Taonanfu Railways. (The same day the Japanese troops advanced also to Tungliao, south of Chengchiatun on the Tahushan-Chengchiatun Railway, but withdrew on the 23rd, the day following.) That these occupations were for strategic control becomes apparent when one realizes that at Kirin there are only 1,000 Japanese residents and at Chengchiatun only about 150 Japanese residents; while between Ssupingkai and Chengchiatun the only town with Japanese residents is Pamiencheng, and they number about 20.

(c) The third part of the plan is difficult to understand, for apparently it was abandoned almost as soon as initiated. From Kirin and Chengchiatun, through control of which the Japanese had rendered the parallel lines practically useless to the Chinese, Japanese troops were moved along Chinese lines. Mention of the advance south to Tungliao on the 22nd, followed by withdrawal on the 23rd, has already been made. On September 23rd, 200 Japanese troops advanced from Kirin to Tunhua, occupying that city and the line connecting it with Kirin. On September 25th Japanese troops were moved up to Taonanfu from Chengchiatun, whence they were withdrawn on the 26th. The troops at Tunhua were withdrawn to Kirin on October 5th. With regard to these movements, one can only be certain that they were not made for the protection of Japanese residents, as at Tunhua there were only 18, and at Taonanfu 5 at this time. Both places are of strategic importance, Tunhua being the point from which the Japanese have long desired to construct a railway line across to Kainei on the Korean border. (There was no evidence that such construction had been begun at Tunhua during the several days of Japanese occupancy.) From Taonanfu control of Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, could be obtained with comparative ease, if desired and if the Russians would not object. Such far-flung control by Japanese troops would, however, weaken Japanese strength, since apparently the Japanese action has been carried on without increasing the number of troops permitted in Manchuria under treaty with China. Further advance by the military, it is also believed, was opposed by the Tokyo Government.

(d) The fourth step of this plan appears to be the setting up of political administrations independent of infra-mural China and of the former rulers of Manchuria. This was done at Kirin, where Hsi Ch’ia, formerly Chief of Staff of General Chang Tso-hsiang, formed an independent government either at the request of the Japanese or at their command. At Mukden the Japanese several times requested Mr. Yuan Chin-kai to form a government, but he consistently refused. On October 18th and 19th there were reports that General Chang Hai-peng, Garrison Commander at Taonanfu, was marching on Tsitsihar and would, if he gained control there, be amenable to the Japanese. (General Chang Hai-peng told us, however, when we visited Taonanfu that he was independent of the Japanese.) Local governing bodies were set up by the Japanese at such places as Mukden and Kaiyuan, but as this information was obtained from the American Consul General at Mukden and as he has already reported regarding it, discussion of this phase is not included here. In the cities which we visited that were occupied by the Japanese, local governments had not been set up, governmental establishments being carried on by Chinese officials under Japanese supervision or control. This situation will be discussed more in detail, however, in a subsequent part of this report.

On October 18th we were told by Mr. Yuan Chin-kai that he expected that the ex-Emperor of China would be set up at Kirin within thirty days under the aegis of the Japanese. Kirin will be chosen because it has now a government independent of the rest of China. He went on to say that Heilungkiang will subsequently give allegiance, for General Chang Hai-peng of Taonanfu will by that time be in power at Tsitsihar, and later Fengtien will become a part of the restored Emperor’s “empire”. Mr. Yuan apparently felt that this would be a satisfactory solution of the present situation and did not believe that the new state would go the way of Korea. As I could obtain no definite information with regard to this alleged plan of the Japanese military and as Consul General Myers informed me that he is reporting to the Department regarding this development, I shall not discuss the matter further here.

In short, however, it is apparent that the fourth part of the plan of the Japanese military is to see that Manchuria will be governed independently of the rest of China by Chinese who will be amenable to Japanese suggestion.

VIII. Treaty Infractions

The number of troops employed by the Japanese in Manchuria since September 18th has apparently not exceeded the number permitted under Article II of the Additional Articles of the Treaty of Peking of 1905.²⁴ All important military actions of the Japanese since September 18th, however, have been outside of rights conceded to the Japanese in existing treaties and agreements. From all that we learned, it would seem that the tactics used by the Japanese military were those that would be employed, subsequent to a declaration of war, against an enemy capable of competent strategy and action. There would seem to be no other explanation for the surprise attacks of the Japanese against the Chinese troops at Nanling, Kuanchengtze, and possibly at Mukden, the surprise entries into Newchwang and Antung, the seizure of strategic points on the Chinese parallel railways, the bombing of Chinchow, the taking over of control of Chinese telegraph and telephone wherever possible, and, in some instances, censorship of the posts.

IX. Behavior of the Japanese Military

At no place which we visited did we hear of “atrocities” on the part of the Japanese. Although the attacks at Nanling, Kuanchengtze, and Mukden were unnecessary, they were apparently governed by recognized rules of warfare, with the exception that no ultimatum had been sent nor a declaration of war made. Everywhere the Japanese military seemed desirous of making a favorable impression on Chinese civilians. Statements included in the proclamations posted by the Japanese military in the occupied cities support this view. In one of them was the declaration that “a benevolent government” would be instituted, in another that the Japanese troops had come to protect both Japanese and Chinese residents, and in a third that Japanese gendarmes had assumed responsibility for peace and order. At Antung, it is true, four Chinese were killed, but rather through misunderstanding than intention. The Chinese who told us of this incident seemed to bear no resentment. A Chinese policeman, having had his rifle returned to him by the Japanese, shot it three times at nothing in particular. The sound of the shots, however, created a panic among some Chinese. They rushed into a courtyard of a silk mill and there armed themselves with whatever happened to be at hand, thinking that they were about to be attacked. Japanese troops, intending to keep order, broke into the courtyard and apparently being attacked by the frightened Chinese—or believing that they were about to be attacked—fired and killed four. At Nanling the destruction of the artillery barracks appeared to have been more extensive than necessary. The military officer who accompanied us there explained that, as Chinese soldiers were fleeing with bundles of their belongings slung over their backs, Japanese soldiers set fire to the bundles. These burning bundles ignited the buildings. At Kuanchengtze we were told that a wounded Chinese policeman (or railway guard) cursed at the Japanese and was then killed by one of them. The dropping of two low explosive bombs at Taonanfu, without other reason than to frighten the inhabitants, might have resulted in unnecessary death if someone had been at that time in the toilet of the railway station. The bombing of Chinchow would seem to be a nearer approach to an atrocity on the part of the Japanese than any other acts in Manchuria since September 18th.

X. Japanese Control of Occupied Cities and Railways

In the cities we visited that were still occupied by the Japanese, we found that practically all principal offices were under the control or the supervision of the Japanese military and were practically cut off from free communication with other parts of China, including Manchuria. At Changchun one could telephone only in the Japanese language. At Antung the Chinese telegraph office had been closed and messages could be sent only through the Japanese telegraph office. At Mukden and Antung there was a censorship of mail, at Mukden since October 4th or 5th and at Antung since October 12th or 13th. Delivery of newspapers from Shanghai or Tientsin was not permitted and letters addressed to Chinese officials were liable to censorship. Chinese radio, in any of these cities where it had been established, was not in operation. The local press at Mukden was under Japanese control and of the two local Chinese papers at Antung one had suspended publication following the Japanese occupation and the other had become entirely innocuous. New airfields at Changchun and at Kirin were under construction by the Japanese. We were told that one was also being made at Tashihchiao, the junction of the main line of the South Manchuria Railway and the branch to Newchwang, but we were unable to investigate this personally. In each city the Chinese police and railway guards were under Japanese control or supervision. In some places there had been a partial or complete return to them of their arms; in other places they were still unarmed, as, for instance, the Chinese railway guards along the Kirin-Changchun Line.

At Kirin, we were informed, banks were permitted to be open for a few hours each day but the Governor was not allowed to draw funds with which to pay the disbanded soldiers outside the city. At Mukden the banks were at first closed; subsequently several Chinese banks resumed business, but we were told that Chinese government funds were kept sealed.

Officials were under close supervision. The magistrate at Newchwang had been under “house arrest” for 22 days from September 19th, his papers having been thoroughly investigated and ransacked during that time. Japanese gendarmes were occupying a part of the offices of the magistrate at Antung. The new governor of Kirin, having been put into office by the Japanese, was obviously under close Japanese surveillance. The new magistrate and mayor at Changchun were appointees of this Japanese-controlled government at Kirin. We learned also of a number of arrests of Chinese officials with whom the Japanese were displeased. The Chinese postmaster at Kirin was arrested within a few hours after having called on us, but was released a day or two later. At Mukden we were told that the Civil Governor, the Commissioner of Education, and the Commissioner of Industry had been arrested and were still under arrest. In this connection, it may be of interest that Mr. Lung Hou, former official of the Kirin Government, fled secretly from Kirin within two or three hours after his conversation with Mr. Hanson. He had said that he expected to leave in a few days, and much of his baggage was already packed. Apparently, he thought it would be wiser to leave immediately. Chinese of Kirin believed that he would not escape because the trains were watched, but subsequently we learned that he had reached Harbin safely.

The Kirin-Changchun and Ssupingkai-Chengchiatun lines were under Japanese control, with Japanese military at the larger stations, over some of which—on the former line—the Japanese flag was flying. The Mukden-Hailung-Kirin Railway was, when we left Mukden, being run by Chinese under Japanese financial supervision. This line cannot connect, as formerly, with the Mukden-Peiping line, for the tracks where the latter runs under the South Manchuria Railway have been torn up for a distance of perhaps two or three hundred feet—“to prevent the entry into Mukden of Chinese troops”, we were told. The Newchwang terminus of the Chinese Kaopangtze-Newchwang line was in the hands of the Japanese military and trenches had been dug at the end of the station facing toward Kowpangtze. We were told on what seemed to be fairly reliable Chinese information that the tracks of the Tahushan-Chengchiatun Railway had been destroyed by Japanese just south of Tungliao, but we were unable to get this report confirmed at Mukden. In short, most of the railways of South Manchuria are now under Japanese control or supervision, or, if not, at least practically useless as far as the Chinese are concerned.

XI. The Chinese Attitude Toward the Japanese

All of the Chinese with whom we talked were very much opposed to the Japanese occupation. Some were bitter and all seemed resentful. We frequently heard expressions of astonishment that the Japanese military action had extended beyond Mukden, since, they said, the affair concerned Mukden only and should have been settled there. We were told by those with whom we spoke that the only Chinese who might be satisfied with the new situation were some who would gain financially, while the uneducated classes were, not unnaturally, indifferent. It seemed that the great majority of the thinking classes of Chinese would prefer their own inadequate government to capable Japanese administration.

It did not seem that the resentment of the Chinese extended to the civilian Japanese residents, or, if it did, that they would dare attack them. For example, at Taonanfu, when we were there, there were only ten Japanese, employees of the South Manchuria Railway, in the city and no Japanese military. These Japanese cut the telephone wires that connect Taonanfu with the south and ran them into their office building so that they only could telephone south of Taonanfu. Although the Chinese expressed dissatisfaction, they did not even attempt to cut the wires a second time so that at least these ten Japanese would also be unable to use the telephone. Japanese consistently said that withdrawal of the Japanese troops would endanger Japanese residents. Particularly at Kirin did such expressions seem sincere. When it is recalled that at Harbin and other places in China, where there are large groups of Japanese residents without Japanese military protection, no harm has come to the Japanese, it seems improbable that the Japanese civilians in the now occupied places would receive injury at the hands of the Chinese residents should occupation be abandoned. In the places which we visited, one did not feel that the resentment of the Chinese would subsequently take the form of attacks upon the Japanese civilians.

XII. Japanese Withdrawal

Until October 19th, when we left Mukden for our respective posts, we could see no indications of intention on the part of the Japanese to withdraw effectively. It is true that two of the three companies that had occupied Newchwang had been withdrawn and that from Antung the Japanese troops had returned across the Yalu River to Shingishu. These withdrawals, however, were without significance, for it was apparent that in either place a platoon could continue to maintain as complete control as a battalion. It would appear that the Japanese military do not intend to abandon its present control until after a settlement of the principal problems that affect the Japanese in respect to Manchuria or until the formation of a government or governments amenable to Japanese wishes. Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Consul General at Mukden, said, on October 18th, that he believed that the Foreign Office at Tokyo was getting control of the situation, that the military were beginning to realize the true condition of affairs and the fact that there is such a thing as international relations, and that it intends to straighten out matters. I saw very little, if anything, that would seem to support this view.

The few Japanese gendarmes at Antung could be withdrawn immediately. There are no bandits operating in its vicinity as few, if any, disbanded soldiers have moved in its direction. The proximity of the railway guards at Antung and of Japanese troops at Shingishu would hold in check any recalcitrant Chinese. The Japanese military that are now in Changchun and its environs could also be withdrawn to the railway zone without danger to the lives of Japanese or Chinese residents. There is a total of from 50 to 70 Japanese military in the Chinese city of Kirin [Changchun?], Nanling, and Kuanchengtze. This force is not sufficient for protection, and in case of trouble troops from the railway zone could reach the scene of disturbance in a very few minutes. The airfield under construction at Changchun can scarcely be regarded as vital to the safety of the residents.

At Kirin, Chengchiatun, and Newchwang, however, the situation is different. The presence of bandits and of disbanded soldiers ready for participation in banditry would jeopardize the lives and property of both Japanese and Chinese residents were the Japanese troops to be withdrawn before adequate means of protection by the Chinese military had been instituted. At Kirin since September 19th, 800 men have been formed into a bodyguard for the new governor. This bodyguard, composed principally of new recruits, together with the few hundred Chinese police, would be scarcely adequate protection against the large numbers of bandits and ex-soldiers that are said to be in the neighboring hills. At Kirin, as well as at the other places mentioned, some sort of a competent Chinese defence organization would have to be formed before the withdrawal of Japanese troops could be made with safety. We did not feel that the Japanese residents would be in danger of attack by Chinese residents if the Japanese military withdrew. At Newchwang we were told by Chinese officials that many of the ex-soldiers would return immediately to their posts upon the evacuation of the Japanese troops. This seemed to us to be a reasonable view of the situation.

In the places which we visited it seemed that the local officials would begin to function as competently as usual after withdrawal of Japanese control, provided adequate Chinese military protection were assured. This may prove difficult to provide in many places. The problem seems to be a police rather than a military one. Manchuria has long been notorious as a bandit center. At present the dividing line between a soldier and a bandit seems not to be clearly drawn. The Chinese “armies” in Manchuria appear to be ex-bandits or potential bandits hired by the larger cities or districts for protection. Outlying small places may be attacked, or may pay bandits not to attack them. This situation could probably be taken care of by an adequate police or constabulary force. The provision of such force presents a political problem that is outside the scope of this report. I feel, however, that the question of adequate protection by Chinese will prove to be one of the great difficulties of Sino-Japanese negotiations.

Tokyo, October 24, 1931.

Laurence E. Salisbury

1. When figures in this report differ from figures in the telegrams we sent, it is usually because later we received what seemed to be more accurate information. [Footnote in the original.]
24. For texts of treaty and additional articles signed at Peking, December 22, 1905, see Foreign Relations, 1906, pt. 2, pp. 996 and 997.