793.94/2296: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 22—7 a.m.]
805. Following from Hanson [and] Salisbury:
“October 20, 4 p.m. 1. This telegram will be an attempt to throw light on the general situation in Manchuria as a whole from September 18th to date.
2. The Department is aware that the relations between the Chinese and Japanese had been so tense that it was but a matter of time when a clash would occur. The Japanese military leaders were determined that matters should be brought to head and the Chinese military in Manchuria disorganized. The Chinese military leaders, such as General Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang, began to realize too late that the Japanese Army was preparing to strike and, according to reliable Chinese reports, ordered the local Chinese military to withdraw their troops in case of attack on the part of the Japanese to avoid warfare in which they knew they would suffer defeat, humiliation and loss.
3. The clash took place September 18th between 10 and 11 p.m. just outside of Mukden, and this started the Japanese Army in Manchuria into action.
4. Four companies (600 men) of the Japanese independent railway garrison stationed at and near Mukden early in the morning of September 19th attacked the north barracks and put to flight the 10,000 Chinese troops who were stationed there. In the meantime the Japanese Twenty-ninth Regiment (6 companies) stationed in the Japanese concession at Mukden attacked the Chinese troops inside and outside the city and before the day was over Mukden was in the hands of the Japanese Army.
5. The Second Division of Japanese troops under Lieutenant General Tamon was moved from Liaoyang to Mukden on the 19th and subsequently General Honjo, Commander of Kuantung Army, moved his headquarters from Port Arthur to Mukden.
6. Acting under orders from General Honjo, the Japanese military commanders directly concerned made surprise attacks (all of which began before dawn on the 19th) at the principal points of the South Manchuria Railway area and either drove away or disarmed the Chinese soldiers and police of that area. By early afternoon of the 19th the Japanese had taken, in addition to Mukden, Changchun, Newchwang (Yingkou) and Antung, the key cities (together with Dairen) of the South Manchuria Railway area. Having consolidated their position in this area, the Japanese military then moved to obtain control of the Chinese railways paralleling the South Manchuria Railway. On September 21st they took Kirin city (along with the Kirin-Changchun Railway), thus controlling movement on the Chinese Shenhai8 and Haiki9 Railways, which parallel the South Manchuria Railway on the east; on the morning of the 22nd they took over Cheng-chiatun [Page 289] and Tungliao, thereby controlling movement on the Chinese Ssutao10 and Tatung11 Railways, that parallel the South Manchuria Railway to the west. Tungliao was evacuated on the 23rd. Shortly after these movements the Japanese military begun to advance along Chinese-owned railways: on September 23rd they occupied the Kirin-Tunhwa line and Tunhwa (from which point they have been anxious to construct the Tunhwa-Kainei Railway) withdrawing however from this line and city on October 5th, and on September 25th Japanese troops moved north from Chengchiatun to Taonanfu whence they could advance on Tsitsihar via the Taonan-Angangki line. They withdrew from Taonan on the 26th. Until the time we left Taonan October [14th?] the Japanese miltary forces controlled the Ssupingkai-Taonanf line to Chengchiatun and were patrolling the branch to Tungliao. Reliable Chinese reports state that the Japanese blew up a portion of the Tatung line below Tungliao, making transportation of freight on that line impossible. The Shenhai and Haiki lines were for, a while in Japanese hands but are now run by the Chinese administrations under Japanese financial supervision.
7. At present [Japanese] control Kirin, the capital of Kirin Province, and [Mukden,] the capital of Liaoning [Province], and Newchwang, Dairen and Antung, the three ports of entry into Manchuria. The all-Chinese route from Tientsin to Tsitsihar is blocked by them, thus isolating, as far as China proper is concerned, Tsitsihar and Harbin, both of which cities could be easily taken by Japanese.
8. Officially, Japanese military and consular [officers?], including General Honjo, state that Japanese Army attacked Chinese Army to prevent the latter, about two one [sic] hundred thousand Chinese against 10,000 Japanese forces in Manchuria, according to a Japanese report, aroused by the clash at Mukden, from annihilating Japanese forces and in the South Manchuria Railway zone and other places in South Manchuria. That this was not the real reason for the Japanese last attacks can be proved by the fact that the Chinese forces withdrew or allowed themselves to be disarmed in most cases when the Japanese advanced, thus indicating that they were under orders to do so, had no courage to fight Japanese, and in places like Harbin, which has Japanese population of 4,000 and to which no Japanese forces were sent, did not attack Japanese residents. We believe that the real reason for the Japanese attack was the desire of the Japanese Army to strike a fatal blow to the Chinese northeastern army, to restore the prestige of the Japanese Army and to secure the pawn to be redeemed by the settlement favorable to the Japanese of the irritable [sic] Chinese-Japanese disputes pending. We believe that the Japanese occupation of the places mentioned above is not contingent upon whether the presence of Japanese forces insures safety to lives and property of Japanese interests. At Antung and Changchun lives and property of Japanese are not in danger and would not be if Japanese forces were withdrawn. There is danger increasing throughout Manchuria from Chinese soldiers who have been driven away from their bases of supply and who have been forced by economic conditions [Page 290] to become brigands. There is little evidence that the Japanese desire to withdraw their troops in such a manner in which [as?] to forfeit their control of the principal political and military centers.
9. The Japanese military are controlling the Chinese civil authorities, some newly appointed since September 18, who are functioning fairly adequately at Newchwang, Antung, Mukden, Changchun and Kirin and other less important points. On October 19th we talked with Yuan Chin-kai, who is head of the Mukden Municipal Government Committee and who has been known to Hanson for 6 years. He stated he was only anxious for preserving peace until permanent municipal government could fix the blame. He was positive that the Japanese could not permit the return of Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang to Manchuria. He felt that the Japanese were scheming to place the ex-Emperor, Hsuan Tung, at the head of a new Manchurian government. Judging by the fact that Japanese aircraft bombarded the Liaoning Provincial Government established at Chinchow, it is evident that the Japanese do not desire the formation of any government at or outside Mukden which is not approved and controlled by them. Yuan stresses the point that in Kirin city, Hsi Chia, former Chief of Staff of Chang Hsueh-liang,12 had been sent by the Japanese to take over provincial government and declared it quite independent, and that General Chang Hai-peng of Taonan was about to make himself ruler of an independent Heilungkiang Province, either on behalf of Hsuan Tung or the Japanese, or both. Thus, according to Yuan, the Japanese could easily force on Kirin and Heilungkiang provincial governments or a government favorable to them, and Liaoning Province would be forced to join an independent Manchuria. Reliable foreign and Chinese observers feel that Yuan is being unconditionally forced by the Japanese to form a Liaoning Provincial Government with self at the head. These observers believe that when Yuan has established a stable provincial government he will be replaced by some one more willing to be the tool of the Japanese. Generally speaking, the mass of the thinking Chinese resident in Manchuria are opposed to the Japanese occupation of South Manchuria. However, there are certain elements, realizing that they can gain an immediate material personal profit from the Japanese, who are in favor of Japanese occupation.
10. In all places taken by Japanese military and visited by us, Chinese telegraph offices were closed but the Chinese post offices were not molested. In several places like Antung and Newchwang censorship of Chinese-addressed mail was established. Chinese wireless stations wherever found by Japanese were put out of commission. Telephone lines were everywhere operated only under Japanese supervision.
11. In some places like Antung and Changchun Japanese forces could be withdrawn into the railway zone without danger of Chinese reprisals or attacks from brigands. In other places like Mukden and Kirin Japanese military by driving away Chinese soldiers have created the dangerous situations which they at first stated they were anxious to avoid. Unless some provision is made to control and solidify the disbanded Chinese soldiers, which the Japanese Army wishes to permit [Page 291] pro-Japanese Chinese officials to remain [supervise?] Japanese troops cannot be withdrawn without exposing Chinese and foreign lives and property to danger.
12. Consideration should be given to the fact that the Japanese Army, although it will not admit it, is acting with relation to the armed Chinese, the civil population, government officers, foreigners and property, as if it were waging actual warfare and is guided by army regulations. It may not have attained all of its objectives but it has sufficient of them to enable it to dictate to the Chinese the solution of the many Chinese-Japanese disputes at hand. At present a deadlock exists. The Japanese demand a settlement of the outstanding disputes before the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, before commencing a discussion. Japanese hope to force a settlement by dealing with local Chinese officials, approved and controlled by them, and perhaps independent of any Chinese Government south of the Great Wall. There is no indication that the Japanese Army desires a return to the status quo ante at the present time.”