Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2236: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, October 20, 1931—9 a.m. [p.m.?]
[Received 9:22 p.m.⁹⁸]

232. Consulate’s 221, October 19, 9 p.m. [a.m.] No public session of the Council was held yesterday but there was a private session at 10:30 a.m., without the presence of the Chinese and Japanese representatives. I was in attendance at this session.

The President first explained the reasons for not holding a public meeting by stating that news has been received concerning a lessening of the tension in Manchuria and of a slight abatement of the excitement in China as a whole; that in view of this apparent amelioration of the situation it would be wiser to allow this détente to operate further in a natural manner rather than to press developments forward in a public session which might cause an unfavorable reaction. As concrete evidence of this lessening of the tension in Manchuria he referred to information just received that the Mukden-Hailungcheng Railway had resumed operations through an administrative arrangement between the Chinese and Japanese local authorities. He felt that this action was probably not an isolated and totally undirected incident but perhaps was the result of some more or less definite trend operating behind the scenes. Since this movement was in a favorable direction he considered it advisable to give it further time for development and felt that this moment was opportune for continuing the negotiations between himself and the Chinese and Japanese representatives. This is the plan which Briand is following today and the date of convening the next meeting of the Council will depend upon developments.

After this procedure was decided upon the Council next examined the positions of the Chinese and Japanese respectively as they now stand insofar as known.

[Paraphrase.] A summary was read by Briand of an aide-mémoire which Sze handed him on October 18 in explanation of the Chinese position. The general tenor of the Chinese points is indicated as follows:

1. In regard to the questions of Briand concerning the Chinese Government’s willingness to begin negotiations with the Japanese after they had substantially withdrawn their troops and indicated they would complete such withdrawal (see my 213, October 17, midnight, for draft resolution’s text) the Chinese aide-mémoire presented points as follows:

(a) For the sake of reassuring Chinese public opinion, the session of the Council should not be terminated formally but merely adjourned pending completion of Japanese evacuation, and the Council President should closely follow events in liaison with the League’s Secretary-General.

(b) The Chinese Government accepts the suggestion for neutral officers and civilians to be attached as observers to Chinese troops when taking over areas evacuated by the Japanese, but it feels that there should be added a League commission of neutral observers to supervise in Manchuria both evacuation and reoccupation; however, in a spirit of conciliation, China would be prepared to modify this proposal by introducing it as a corollary to (1) the Japanese proposal and the Council’s September 30 resolution concerning the communication of information by neutral persons on the spot, and (2) the attaching of neutral observers to Chinese troops who take over the evacuated areas. [End paraphrase.]

(c) Chinese opinion is passively unanimous in a determination not to negotiate under the pressure of military occupation. Only after assurance of the loyalty and effectiveness of Japanese withdrawal and the certainty of the time limit which might be agreed upon could Chinese apprehensions be allayed and thus permit an approach to the other problems in a tranquil frame of mind.

2. Linking up the foregoing immediate question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops with the problem of a general settlement after the completion of the withdrawal, the remaining portions of the aide-mémoire briefly summarized are as follows:

(a) The League must not become indifferent to the problem involved in the settlement of the Japanese claims in Manchuria. The appearance of deserting China and abandoning her to “direct negotiations” with Japan might have the gravest consequences on the internal situation in China.

(b) No departure should be allowed from the principle of equal opportunity set forth in the Nine-Power Pact and from the rights of the parties under the Covenant. This principle is of interest not only to China but to the powers.

(c) In order not to leave the impression of abandoning China and leaving her face to face with Japan, the Council and the United States jointly should offer to appoint neutral members or “referees” to assist the parties to arrive at a settlement as was done at the Washington Conference.

(d) It should be made clear at the outset that the scope and nature of the ensuing conversations should be limited by the necessity of respecting the situation established by the treaties, the resolutions of the Washington Conference and of reserving the rights of the parties under the Covenant.

(e) Suggests seizing this opportunity to lay the foundations of enduring peace and amity between China and Japan by the establishment of a permanent board of conciliation and arbitration, on such lines proposed for such bodies in the “general act”,⁹⁹ to facilitate the solution, apart from present controversies, of Sino-Japanese problems as a whole.

[Paraphrase.] The foregoing Chinese position was not discussed by the Council at great length. The greatest difficulty was felt to lie in obtaining from Japan sufficient concessions to meet China’s minimum demands. It was thought that these demands might be made to harmonize with the September 30 resolution of the Council. If, on the other hand, the principles as set forth in this resolution should be abandoned to meet the demands of Japan, this probably would mean China would go to war.

The position of Japan, as brought out in the meeting of the Council and in subsequent private conversations, is not so well defined, but the known chief elements are as follows:

1. It is maintained by Japan that the security of the lives and property of its nationals cannot be assured without a complete détente taking place between China and Japan.

2. To obtain this, the two Governments must first agree upon certain points based upon respect for existing treaties.

3. As soon as an agreement is reached on these points, normal relations can, the Japanese assert, be resumed, with evacuation taking place.

4. The above, representing a new element, is not contained in Japanese demands hitherto.

5. This new element merely serves as an apparent reinforcement of their former position regarding direct negotiations.

6. However, it was pointed out that the Council might be the negotiator between the two Governments concerning these points, thereby satisfying Chinese opposition to negotiating directly. [End paraphrase.]

7. Of a more reassuring nature is the fact that the Japanese reiterate their denial of any territorial ambitions in Manchuria.

8. With regard to the Chinese offer to allow neutral officers and civilians to act as observers during the evacuation and reoccupation to watch over the security of Japanese nationals, the Japanese representative has implied that the responsibility for their security should rest on the powers whose nationals act in this capacity. This it was pointed out in the Council discussion is impossible. To do this would mean the stationing of foreign troops in Manchuria and this would be objectionable to the Japanese themselves. The Japanese position on this point is not clear.

9. [Paraphrase.] It is felt by some Council members that the Japanese position is not clear enough on other points to enable intelligent negotiations, and they suggest the necessity of inducing the Japanese to make a statement of their exact meaning.

During the course of the discussion in the Council, reference was made to certain misunderstandings having arisen in Tokyo regarding what is transpiring here. It is implied that the Japanese representative here perhaps is not keeping his home Government informed accurately. The suggestion was made that the powers, through communications to their Tokyo Embassies, should clarify the situation there. Action along this line has already been taken by Great Britain.

Reference was made in this connection to the very efficacious support of the League’s efforts respecting this whole problem if the United States should independently act through diplomatic channels. [End paraphrase.]

Gilbert

98. Telegram in three sections.
99. International convention signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907, Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1181.