Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

“1. Arrived yesterday at Antung at 7 a.m. and departed 2:45 p.m.

2. According to Chinese officials and Japanese military and civil authorities we interviewed there, on September 19th early in the morning about 50 Japanese regular soldiers from Shingishu, Korea, entered the Chinese city of Antung, disarmed the entire force of Chinese police, took possession of the Chinese governmental establishments, with the exception of post office, and put out of commission the electric-light plant in the Chinese city. There were not and have not been for a long time any Chinese soldiers in Antung. At the same time Japanese South Manchuria Railway guards from Liutaokow, about 1 mile outside the city, disarmed and sent by rail to Mukden several hundred Chinese soldiers stationed at Fenghuangchen, about 30 miles from the city. These were the only Chinese soldiers stationed in the vicinity of Antung.

3. Three or four days later the Japanese soldiers left the Chinese city and Japanese gendarmes were stationed at the offices of the magistrate and of the city, river and district police. The Chinese telegraph office was closed by the Japanese gendarmes on September 19th and was still closed when we tried to send a telegram on October 16th; [Page 238] according to the postmaster, the Japanese gendarmes commenced censoring the Chinese post-office mail on October 13th, special attention being paid to mail addressed to Chinese officials and the delivery of the Chinese newspapers from Shanghai and Tientsin being prohibited.

4. The Chinese-owned electric-light plant owes Andersen, Meyer and Company, an American firm, $90,000 gold for equipment. When asked why the Japanese soldiers put out of commission this plant, Mr. Yonezawa, the Japanese Consul at Antung, replied that it was done for military reasons which he did not understand, inferred that the Japanese electric plant had a monopoly on furnishing electric current, and said that the Chinese company had no right to operate and that it could not make enough profit to pay interest on its debt.

5. Roy Talbot, American Commissioner of Chinese Customs at Antung, informed us that the Japanese military, who stated that they acted in order better to defend the Japanese railway bridge across the Yalu, closed the customs inspection shed at the Antung end of this bridge. This forced the customs to attempt inspection work in tents located several hundred feet from the bridge with the result that inspection, except of trains, is practically impossible and the way is now open for the entry into Manchuria of large amounts of goods which do not pay duty, thus seriously affecting customs receipts. There is no longer any cooperation with the Customs on the part of Japanese officials. We inspected the customs situation at the bridgehead and found it to be as described by Mr. Talbot.

6. When we called at the office of the Chinese magistrate he stated that he could not talk frankly with us as there were Japanese gendarmes listening to our conversation behind the curtain at the end of the room where we were. We saw two Japanese officers behind the curtain mentioned. The magistrate agreed to meet us a half hour later at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, where he informed us that Japanese guard had been stationed over him in his office since September 19 for reasons unknown to him. He stated that, when the Japanese Chief of Gendarmes informed him of the expected arrival of Japanese troops, he protested against their arrival on the grounds that conditions were peaceful in the city, that the 600 Chinese police had maintained and could maintain order and that the quarrel between Japanese and Chinese at Mukden was no concern of the Chinese inhabitants of Antung. He also said that a committee consisting of himself, the chiefs of city and river police, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, one banker and two merchants, one of whom speaks Japanese, had been formed to advise in regard to maintenance of peace and order in the city. This committee meets once daily but has no governmental power. We could not discover whether the Japanese had anything to do with the formation of this committee. According to the Chinese officials, they are being prevented from receiving instructions from Chinchow or Nanking and therefore they are compelled to act independently of any outside Chinese authority.

7. The thinking Chinese at Antung are very much opposed to the occupation by Japanese gendarmes of the Chinese city of Antung.

8. The Japanese Consul and 4 Japanese military officers with whom we talked for 2 hours stated that although there had existed only [Page 239] friendly relations between the 12,000 Japanese and 10,000 Koreans and the Chinese, the Japanese Army felt it necessary to disarm the Chinese police to prevent them from making an attack on the Japanese concession, where practically all the Japanese residents were living.

When asked when the Japanese gendarmes would withdraw from the native city, they replied that this would be done as soon as they were sure that conditions would remain quiet and that the danger of an attack by bandits would disappear. In this connection we might remark that both Japanese and Chinese interviewed stated that the city of Antung has for many years been practically free of banditry. As far as we could ascertain there are various disbanded soldiers in this neighborhood and, therefore, there is no more danger of an attack from brigands than there was before the Mukden incident occurred. The Japanese Consul informed us that there was no Japanese censorship at the post office and that telegrams could be despatched by the Chinese telegraph office. These were misstatements and, considering the fact that he made other misstatements, it was apparent that he was attempting to mislead us. In reply to a question in regard to the presence of two Japanese officers in the magistrate’s office, Captain Kato, chief of the gendarmes, stated that he had no knowledge of their presence there but would investigate. As the conversation developed he admitted that he himself was living at the magistrate’s office and we discovered that he was one of the officers we had seen behind the curtain. The Consul then stated that the reason the gendarmes were there was to see that peace and order were being maintained in the city.

9. Mr. Talbot was informed late in the afternoon of October 16 by the Japanese commander of the Japanese troops at Shingishu that he was withdrawing on that day to Korea his troops (about 150) stationed at Antung. The withdrawal of these troops will have no effect on the control by Japanese of the native city for, as long as the Japanese gendarmes remain there, the Chinese Government institutions will not be able to function independently. We could see no indication of a desire on the part of the Japanese to withdraw their gendarmes from the native city or to return to the status quo ante, although they had returned 40 rifles (of 500 taken) to the Chinese city police, who were patrolling the streets under the direction of the Japanese gendarmes.

10. We believe that, as far as actual protection from possible attacks against Japanese residents is considered, the Japanese authorities were not justified in taking possession of the native city of Antung, as they had near at hand ample police and military forces to quell almost instantly any anti-Japanese outburst.

11. In our opinion the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese armed forces at Antung would not result in any danger to the lives and property of Japanese subjects there. In view of the fact that there are Japanese gendarmes and 150 Japanese police in the Japanese concession, some Japanese railway guards stationed one-half a mile away at Liutaokow, and many Japanese soldiers at Shingishu, we believe that neither the Chinese Government police nor inhabitants, no matter how bitter they felt against the Japanese, would dare attack the Japanese inhabitants and that a brigand attack could be easily warded off.

12. Four days after the Japanese took over the native city, through a misunderstanding brought about by a Chinese policeman shooting three shots, Japanese gendarmes sent to restore order, firing into a crowd of Chinese who had taken refuge in a silk mill during the excitement caused by the shots and who had armed themselves with spears and other weapons to resist the Japanese gendarmes. Four Chinese were killed. This was the only bloodshed which occurred in connection with the Japanese occupancy of Antung.[”]

Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State