Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2207: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, October 19, 1931—9 a.m.
[Received 12:05 p.m.]

221. Consulate’s 213, October 17, midnight; and 215, October 18, 2 p.m.

The draft resolution quoted in the telegrams under reference is not a finished plan comprising final conclusions to be presented to the Council for adoption but constitutes a tentative basis of action and embraces elements for negotiation between the President of the Council and the Chinese and Japanese representatives. It was the general opinion in the preparatory session yesterday that it would be premature to present and solicit their acceptance of its provisions. In this connection it was recalled that since the Council is acting under article 11 of the Covenant its proposals must be adopted unanimously, including the parties to the dispute, in order to be binding. Bearing in mind the opposing views already expressed by the two parties in regard to certain of the most important measures envisaged in this resolution the Council was of the opinion that it would be necessary to take some preliminary steps in order to feel out the ground and prepare the way for final action. After a brief discussion as to procedure the Council decided on a tentative program of action comprising the following steps:

1. A public session today to hold a discussion along the lines indicated in the Consulate’s 216, October 18, 4 p.m.⁷⁹ The object of this discussion will be to obtain a public explanation of the intentions of the parties and to ascertain from them what they have already done to fulfill their engagements and how far they are willing to go to seek a common ground for agreement. This meeting will also serve the purpose of informing public opinion as to the status of the situation and in an exchange being in public render more effective any commitments obtained.

2. On the basis of the results of this discussion, and with the draft resolution as a guide, Briand is to carry on private negotiations with the parties in the attempt to find a compromise solution.

3. If no agreement is reached in this way the Council is to intervene and suggest the program embraced in the draft resolution, after further study of and modification of its provisions in the light of any concessions or proposals made by the disputants.

The following are the chief considerations which led to the more important changes made by the Council yesterday in the text of the draft resolution, as reported in the Consulate’s 215, October 18, 2 p.m.:

Paragraph 1. The insertion of the word “henceforward” was suggested by Madariaga in order to carry the implication that “aggressive action” had been resorted to in the past. Briand accepted the change though he felt inclined to avoid any disagreeable allusions to the past.

Paragraph 3. Attention was called to the analogy between article 10 of the Covenant and the clause quoted from the Nine-Power Treaty. The reference to article 10 was inserted in order doubly to reenforce the obligation and link it up with action under the Covenant.

Paragraph 7 was partially recast in order to make it more flexible and to avoid any explicit mention of “direct negotiations” which would be disagreeable to the Chinese by leaving the impression of supporting the Japanese insistence on this point.

Paragraph 8. [Paraphrase.] This constitutes the pivotal center of the entire program of action. Lord Reading strongly opposed the original wording of the text on the ground that the terms, being too elastic, would at best result inevitably in slight progress toward Japanese evacuation and in further disputation at the end of the term fixed. Evacuation would be delayed by the Japanese until the time for direct negotiations approached, while the Chinese would refuse to negotiate directly because of the delay in evacuation.

The more elastic original text was preferred by Briand on the ground of Japanese fear lest, upon completion of the evacuation, the Chinese should refuse direct negotiations on the sum total of questions pending between them. Briand reaffirmed the need for intervention by the League being confined to the questions of evacuation and of security, with all other matters to be left for settlement through direct negotiations, for the League would be involved in an interminable process by any other course. Moreover, Briand did not wish either party to be given too much encouragement, as this might be taken advantage of.

It was decided, upon the insistence of Reading and Madariaga, that formal undertakings should be given for the initiation of direct negotiations on the day when the evacuation is completed. [End paraphrase.]

For the sake of greater simplicity the references to previous numbered paragraphs were deleted.

Paragraph 9. For fear of opposition on the part of Japanese to the formal acceptance of this proposal, it was decided at least for the present not to include this paragraph in the resolution but to allow the President of the Council to make the suggestions at an appropriate moment in a general statement.

Gilbert

79. Not printed.