793.94/2210c: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert)

[Paraphrase]

99. (1) In my telephone conversation yesterday with you I expressed my views on the necessity of not allowing the organization of any movement under the Kellogg Pact to be referred back to Washington. You should be absolutely staunch against this, for it would array this country in the most forcible manner vis-à-vis Japan and would delay peace in Manchuria. Not to invoke the Pact at all would be better than to invoke it in this way. The reasons for this were given to you in my 97, October 16, 11 p.m., in confirmation of our telephone conversations. I have made known my views on this point to Briand and Reading through their Embassies.

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(2) Now I wish you to understand my general view of the Manchurian situation. I believe that the principal and most efficacious step to preserve peace already has been taken through the step yesterday in formally alining the United States at Geneva with the other nations in a conference to preserve peace. If the conference agrees, this step may well be supplemented by organizing at Geneva a formal protest of the Kellogg Pact signatories. But already there has been given the firm impression of solid alinement of public opinion. For the purpose of clinching this seeming solidarity I am inclined to think it well may be desirable to proceed with such a general protest. However, my mind is entirely open on this subject, and I should be quite ready to acquiesce in not going further if it should seem in the discussions that there is a danger of such further steps causing the situation between Japan and China to be inflamed so as to delay peace.

(3) My firm conviction is that the ultimate solution of this problem must be left to the parties themselves in direct negotiations, whether accompanied by neutral observers or not. The neutral states should undertake no intrusion into the terms of such a settlement. Their sole interest is to insist upon the settlement being by pacific means and to prevent war. Japan and China should, therefore, be given every inducement to settle the present dispute in this way. While in the existing tense situation there is danger of further minor clashes, I believe neither country wishes to have a war, especially in view of the aroused opinion of the world at present; and somehow the requisite time must be found for them to overcome the obstacles which prevent the starting of such negotiations.

(4) As the situation now stands, in the resolution of the states of the world to stand together for peace a great step has been taken to demonstrate their solidarity even when confronted by a major crisis, and, similarly, a great vindication has been made of the present peace machinery of the world. The object should be the holding of this present situation and the insuring of a settlement without further break and by negotiation.

(5) When it seems desirable you may communicate the above as my views to Briand, Reading, and Grandi.

Stimson