Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/2186: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Nanking, October 17, 1931—9 a.m.
[Received 9:50 a.m.]

(1) The Secretary of the Japanese Legation in China and Consul General at Nanking last evening told me of his Government’s efforts to dissuade the United States from sending an observer to the League Council meeting. He said Japan would negotiate with China only, without observers or the interference of a third party. If China would but start negotiations, he intimated, it would find Japan asked little, merely the protection of Japanese lives, property, and rights in Manchuria by China.

(2) I was told later, after dinner with T. V. Soong last night, that his Government would welcome any suggestions which might be offered by the United States as to a way out; that in negotiations with Japan the Chinese felt helpless without the presence of a neutral observer; and that what Japan wanted was to put into effect the treaties of 1915.⁷² Soong did not believe Japan entertained political ambitions in Manchuria, but did want railways and economic control. He expressed the belief that Japan even now, while occupying territory, was feverishly working to complete the much-disputed line connecting Kirin with Hueining (Kwanei, Korea). Soong insisted that his country could not negotiate with Japan so long as the latter occupied Chinese cities and territory; and that no government in China could survive the popular agitation which would assuredly follow the beginning of negotiations under these circumstances. He said it was feared that the Japanese were just waiting with the intention of creating an incident at Shanhaikwan which would serve as a pretext for them to land more men there, thus cutting off the rest of the Chinese forces in Manchuria. This, he said, would mean war, since the Chinese troops would be obliged to fight their way out.

(3) To my query regarding the guarantees which might be arranged to protect Japanese during the evacuation period, Soong replied that his Government would be willing to accept either neutral observers or a vanguard to be composed of an international force; a very small force would suffice, he thought. He wondered what the United States would think of a suggestion for China to yield to Japan control over railways, built or being built, in Manchuria, plus a dominant economic position, on condition that all Japanese troops now in Manchuria be removed.

(4) Referring to the Cantonese situation, Soong informed me there were very bright prospects of a peaceful settlement. He said the Cantonese delegation, headed by Wang Ching-wei and including C. C. Wu and Eugene Chen, would shortly arrive in Shanghai to hold a preliminary meeting. Hu Han-min has proceeded there to take part. Chen Ming-shu, said Soong, will take over the post here of garrison commander, and this was a political gesture meant to restore Cantonese confidence. In the beginning, Soong admitted, the Cantonese had been inclined to make use of the Manchurian situation in order to bring Nanking to terms, but this had all stopped when the students intervened; now the leaders at Canton were only too happy to regain favor on any terms.

Johnson

72. For treaties and notes signed at Peking, May 25, 1915, see Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 171 ff.